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L. Introduction
As demonstrated by some recent high-profile cases and suggested by a
seemingly endless litany of misconduct,'I American prosecutors exercise
1. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A
REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA, 1997-2009, 18-41 (2010),
available at http://law.scu.edu/ncip/file/ProsecutorialMisconduct_ BookEntire online%20
version.pdf (studying the extent to which prosecutorial miscon~duct was a factor in the
conviction of innocent people in California); STUAR TAYLOR & K.C. JOHNSON, UNTIL
PROVEN INNOCENT: POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE
LACROSSE RAPE CASE 84-89 (2007) (discussing the misconduct of prosecutor Michael
Nifong during the Duke lacrosse rape case, including never interviewing the alleged victim);
EMILY M. WEST, COURT FINDINGS OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT CLAIMS IN
POST-CONVICTION APPEALS AND CIVIL SUITS AMONG THE FIRST 255 DNA EXONERATION
CASES, INNOCENCE PROJECT (2010), available at http://www.innocenceproject.
org/docs/Innocence ProjectPros_Misconduct.pdf (using DNA exoneration cases to offer
proof of prosecutorial misconduct); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeler, Stephen R. Greenwald, Harold
Reynolds & Jonathan Sussman, Vigilante Justice: Prosecutor Misconduct in Capital Cases,
55 WAYNE L. REV. 1327, 138 1-85 (2009) (examining categories of prosecutor misconduct
that occur in capital cases and discussing suggestions to help prevent and remedy such
misconduct); Tony Mauro, Justices Appear Ready to Hold New Orleans Prosecutors Liable
for Misconduct, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7, 2010 (discussing the Supreme Court deciding whether to
allow "a New Orleans man to win compensation for prosecutorial misconduct that put him
behind bars for more than two decades for a murder he did not commit"); DA Kratz Quits
After 'Sexting' Revelations, WISC. STATE J., Oct. 4, 2010, available at
http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/article -43ebebe8-cfd7- 1 ldf-bsbb-
O0lcc4cOO2eO.htmi (noting misconduct by prosecutor who, inter alia, propositioned a 26-
year-old domestic abuse victim while prosecuting her ex-boyfi-iend); Darryl Fears, Black
Teens' Case Intensifies Racial Issues, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2007, at A3 (detailing racially
tinged prosecution); Brad Heath & Kevin McCoy, Prosecutors' Conduct Can Tip the Scales,
USA TODAY, Sept. 23, 2010, at IA (describing prosecutorial abuses including federal
prosecutors who hid facts and covered up evidence); Peter J. Henning, Another Claim of
Prosecutorial Misconduct, Dealook, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2010, http://dealbook.blogs.
nytimes.com/2010/01/1 1/another-claim-of-prosecutorial-misconduct/ (last visited Nov. 17,
2010) (explaining how the defense attorney in the case against the former chief executive of
KB Homes, Bruce Karatz, was filing a motion to dismiss the case claiming that the U.S.
Attorney threatened a witness) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Eric
Lichtblau, Criticism of Ex-Official in Hiring at Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2009, at
A16 (commenting on a former Justice Department official who allegedly made hiring
decisions based on political affiliations); Adam Liptak, Justices Will Decide Whether
Ashcroft May Be Sued in Detention Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 20 10, at Al 17 (discussing a
Supreme Court case where the defendant alleges that former Attorney General John Ashcroft
misused "material witness" detention law); Steve Mills, Prosecutor DNA at Odds, CHI.
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almost limitless discretion in a series of decisions affecting individuals
embroiled in the criminal justice system. They decide whether to accept or.
decline a case, and on occasion, whether an individual should be arrested in
the first place; they select what crimes should be charged and the number of
counts; they choose whether to engage in plea negotiations and the terms of
an acceptable agreement; they determine all aspects of pretrial and trial
strategy; and in many cases, they essentially decide the punishment that will
be imposed upon conviction. These and other discretionary judgments are
often made without meaningful internal and external review or any
effective opposition. In many (if not most) American jurisdictions, the
prosecutor is the criminal justice system. For all intents and purposes, he
makes the law, enforces it against particular individuals, and adjudicates
their guilt and resulting sentences.
Consider the case of Weldon Angelos, who at the age of twenty-three
was arrested for dealing marijuana and possessing firearms in his
hometown of Salt Lake City, Utah. 2  A first-time offender with no adult
criminal record, Angelos started selling relatively small amounts of
marijuana to help pay the bills after the birth of his second son. The fact-
pattern that led to his conviction and punishment was as follows:
[O]n two occasions while selling [eight ounces] of marijuana, Mr.
Angelos possessed a handgun under his clothing, but he never
brandished or used the handgun. The third relevant crime occurred
TRIB., Dec. 15, 2008, at C4 (detailing three cases in which one prosecutor continued to
pursue suspects excluded by DNA evidence); Nedtra Pickier, Justice Dept. Lawyers in
Contempt/or Withholding Stevens Documents, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2009, at A7 (reporting
on federal prosecutors who were held in contempt of court for failing to produce documents
relating to the Senator Ted Stevens investigation); Henry R. Chalmers, Prosecutorial
Misconduct Leads to Dismissal of Broadcom Criminal Charges, ABANET (Feb. 11, 2010),
http://www.abanet.org/litigationllitigationnews/topstories/ ruehle-broadcom-prosecutor-
mrisconduct.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2010) (describing a courts finding of prosecutorial
misconduct where the prosecutors violated the defendants' Sixth Amendment rights by
intimidating and improperly influencing key witnesses) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Mary Jacoby, Judge Cites Prosecutorial Misconduct in Blackwater Dismissal,
MAIN JUSTICE, Jan. 1, 2010, http://www.mainjusfice.com/2010/01/01/ judge-cites-prosecutorial-
misconduct-in-black water-dismissal! (last visited Nov. 17, 2010) (describing the dismissal of an
indictment against five Blackwater Worldwide security guards for a shooting incident in Iraq due
to prosecutors' unconstitutional use of tainted, compelled testimony) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Reivew). See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, USA: MODEL
CRIMINALt JUSTICE? DEATH BY PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AN A "STACKED" JURY (May
11, 2010), available at www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/i/ ClemonsReport.pdf (describing the
prosecutorial misconduct in the case of Reginald Clemons).
2. As a matter of disclosure, one of the present authors (Luna) represented Angelos
before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and in his petition for a writ of
certiorari before the U.S. Supreme Court.
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when the police searched his home and found handguns in his
residence .... Mr. Angelos did not engage in force or violence, or
threats of force or violence, in furtherance of or in connection with the
offenses for which he has been convicted. No offense involved injury to
any person or the threat of injury to any person.3
Instead of bringing state charges, officials decided to prosecute the
case in federal court employing an infamously harsh law that carries
mandatory minimum punishment. That statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) ,
provides an obligatory five-year sentence for possessing a firearm during a
drug transaction 5 and a twenty-five-year sentence for each subsequent
transaction.6 Multiple charges can be brought under § 924(c) in one case,
and the mandatory sentences must be served consecutively, that is, one after
the other rather than simultaneously! As a result, the prosecution can slice
a drug dealer's actions into as many transactions as it likes (or wishes to
corroborate) and bring them in a single case, where the mandatory
sentences can be stacked on top of each other in twenty-five-year
increments. A defendant does not need a criminal record to trigger
§ 924(c). What is more, the firearm does not even have to be brandished or
used, nor does the law require that any violence or injury be caused or
threatened. 8When Angelos was convicted of three § 924(c) counts in
December of 2003, the punishment was predetermined: a mandatory
sentence of fifty-five years. As a result, this low-level marijuana dealer will
not be eligible for parole until the middle of the twenty-first century, when
he will be over seventy years old. In all likelihood, he will die in prison.
To some extent, this case is exceptional. Few drug dealers receive
(effective) life sentences, particularly where the underlying drug is
marijuana and the defendant has no prior convictions. As a more general
issue, however, it is not uncommon for defendants to be threatened with or
actually face charges and punishment out of proportion to their moral
blameworthiness. Nor is it unique for offenders of similar culpability to
receive disparate sentences (or worse yet, for the less culpable to receive
the stiffer punishment). The prosecution of Weldon Angelos thus throws
into stark relief a basic issue of the American criminal justice system, one
3. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1258 (D. Utah 2003).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006).
5. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
6. Id. § 924(c)(1 )(C)(i).
7. Id. § 924(c)(1 )(D)(ii).
8. See, e.g., Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1234-35 (noting that exchanging a gun for
drugs constitutes "use" of a firearm for purposes of § 924(c)).
1416
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barely understood by the public and rarely admitted by law enforcement.
The enormous power provided to prosecutors to decide the fate of people's
lives-from the lucky draw of nonprosecution or case dismissal, to minor
inconveniences and invasions of privacy tbrough pleas in abeyance and
probation, to deprivations of liberty by incarceration or even the taking of
life itself-is subject to the proclivities and peculiarities of a given state's
attorney.
Parts of this phenomenon have been recognized for quite some time,9
although the problem of discretion in criminal justice was not officially
"discovered"t until the late 1950s.10 In the ensuing decades, some of the
best scholars in the nation examined and critiqued the criminal process and
the discretionary judgments of various legal actors. Much light and heat
was placed on the street-level decisions of police officers and the
sentencing discretion of judges,"' but prosecutors were also prime targets
for critical analysis. 12  In general, academic solutions to the problems of
prosecutorial discretion came in two forms: the promulgation of internal
office guidelines to control prosecutorial decision-making and the
development of external limitations through restrictive legislation or
heightened judicial review.'" The literature was rich and engaging, calling
9. See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, No. 4. REPORT
ON PROSECUTION 19 (193 1) (noting the broad discretion given to prosecutors in dismissing
cases and the lack of required explanations for most dismissals).
10. See SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: TH-E CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 6-11 (1993) (describing the 1956 American Bar Foundation Survey of the
Administration of Criminal Justice, which recognized the major roles of decision-making
and discretion throughout the criminal justice system).
11. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRNKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5-
11, 69-85 (1973) (describing the wide discretion given to judges in sentencing and
suggesting possible solutions); JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 91-109 (1966) (examining the behavior and
decision-making of policemen in situations such as traffic citations and prostitution
investigations).
12. See, e.g., KENNETH GULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY 188-195 (1969) (describing the wide discretion given to American prosecutors and
comparing it to the absence of discretion given to German prosecutors); Norman Abrams,
Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REv. 1, 7-
11 (1971) (discussing the discretion of prosecutors and advocating for the promulgation of
guidelines to restrict such discretion).
13. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN.
L. REv. 29, 51-53 (2003) [hereinafter Wright & Miller, Screening/Bargaining] (discussing
various approaches).
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on prosecutors to control themselves or face limitations by the other
branches of government. 
14
Unfortunately, real-world implementation has been far less inspiring,
with limitations on prosecutorial discretion being infrequent and of dubious
value. Absent a showing of invidious discrimination based on race or
religion, for instance, courts will not question the prosecution's decision to
charge a given person;'" conversely, the judiciary will not demand that a
criminal case be brought against any individual.'16 Nor are the courts likely
to impede plea negotiations and the resulting agreements. 17 The main legal
checks are the burdens of proof-probable cause that a crime has been
committed in order to charge a suspect and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in order to convict a defendant-coupled with procedural
requirements during the pretrial and trial process. In practice, these hurdles
impede only a fraction of cases brought in earnest by the prosecution.'"
14. See, e.g., id (proposing various solutions).
15. See, e.g., Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186 (1992) ("Thus, a defendant
would be entitled to relief if a prosecutor refused to file a substantial-assistance motion, say,
because of the defendant's race or religion."); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607
(1985) ("'[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused
committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what
charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion."'
(quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978))); United States v. Batchelder,
442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979) ("This Court has long recognized that when an act violates
more than one criminal statute, the Government may prosecute under either so long as it
does not discriminate against any class of defendants."); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357, 364 (1978) ("'[Tlhe conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in
itself a federal constitutional violation' so long as 'the selection was [not] deliberately based
upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification."'
(citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962))); see also United States v. Armstrong, 517
U.S. 456, 464 (1996) ("'[A] presumption of regularity supports' their prosecutorial decisions
and, 'in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly
discharged their official duties."' (citing United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1,
14-15 (1926))).
16. See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 381
(2d Cir. 1973) (stating that the decision of whether to prosecute various state officers for
possible civil rights violations was within the discretion of the United States Attorney).
17. See, e.g., Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations, 54
Amv. J. Comp. L. 199, 199-200, 202-14 (2006) [hereinafter Turner, Judicial Participation]
(discussing the lack of judicial participation in America and the problems it produces). But
cf. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971) (remanding a case in which the
prosecutor failed to abide by the terms of the plea agreement).
18. See, e.g., RONALD JAY ALLEN, ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1095
(2d ed. 2005) (noting studies finding dismissal rate of 3-8% for preliminary hearings);
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS ONLINE tbi.5.57.2006 (2010) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS], available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5572006.pdf (noting that
1418
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Lawmakers also have been wary to hamper prosecutors and instead
have facilitated the prosecutorial function through the passage of more
crimes and harsher punishments.' 9 As for internal guidelines, some
prosecution offices have adopted policies on charging, plea bargaining,
and other crucial decisions .20  These constraints are far from universal,
however, and may be confidential, often employing hortatory language or
pitched at a level of generality that confines little.' Most importantly,
they are not legally binding in court, and the lack of vigorous internal
oversight and discipline has rendered such guidelines largely ineffective.2
of the felony defendants arrested in the seventy-five largest counties in 2006, 68% were
convicted, 3 1% were diverted or had their cases dismissed by the prosecution, and only 1%
were acquitted at trial); id at tbl.5.24.2009 (finding that of the defendants disposed of in
U.S. District Court in 2009, 91 % were convicted while only 0.5% were acquitted by jury);
id. at tbl.5.7.2009 (2010) (finding similar results); Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Jwies Do
Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 260, 274-78 (1995) (providing
indictment statistics); Sam Skolnik, Grand Juries: Power Shf?, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 12,
1999, at 1 (reporting federal indictment rate of 99.9%); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2004 59-62 (2004) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM
OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS] (finding that 90% of all federal defendants are convicted,
and 79% of defendants who exercise their right to trial are convicted).
19. See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. REV.
703, 703-12 (2005) [hereinafter Luna, Overcriminalization] (discussing the proliferation of
crimes in state, federal, and administrative law).
20. See, e.g., Alan Vinegrad, Justice Department's New Charging, Plea Bargaining
and Sentencing Policy, N.Y. L.J., June 10, 2010, at 3 (reporting on new charging,
sentencing, and plea bargaining policy guidelines at the Justice Department under Attorney
General Eric Holder).
2 1. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW
85-86 (2001) ("[P]rosecutors receive little formal training in sentencing theory; often they
decide the fates of defendants rapidly and intuitively, without obligatory coordinating
guidelines and without any institutionalized requirement to explain and compare their
decisions in a reviewable manner."); David T. Johnson, The Organization of Prosecution
and the Possibility of Order, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 247, 268 (1998) ("In other large
American prosecution offices, one usually finds an office manual or handbook of some sort,
but 'in most instances it is difficult to say that these materials set forth prosecutorial
policy.'); see also DAVI BURNH-AM, ABOVE THE LAW: SECRET DEALS, POLITICAL FIXES,
AND OTHER MISADVENTURES OF THE U.S. DEPARTMVENT OF JUSTICE 46 (1996) ("Many of the
broad policy determinations and specific determinations of the Justice Deprment ... are
permeated with profound contradictions and politics in a way that is only barely understood
by the public.").
22. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing
"Discretionary Justice," 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 167, 177-85 (2004) (discussing
federal prosecution guidelines and the failure to enforce them). Indeed, discipline against
American prosecutors for any kind of misconduct is an infrequent occurrence. See, e.g.,
ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 123-41
(2007) (discussing a study of over eleven thousand cases involving possible prosecutorial
misconduct and finding that in just over two thousand of those cases courts reversed
419
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In most cases, prosecutors can charge at will and preordain the ultimate
resolution.2
The prosecution of Weldon Angelos highlights many of these
concerns. It epitomizes the danger of expansive or poorly delineated crimes
and ruthless punishments, often enacted in spurts of political opportunism
or during periods of moral panic. With little legislative debate, Congress
proposed and passed 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in a single day in 1968, reacting in
part to the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy
and, more generally, the mounting public fear of lawlessness on the
streets .24 The statute's language was ambiguous and its goal idealistic-"to
persuade a man who is tempted to commit a federal felony to leave his gun
at home "2 -all portending broad applicability and thus enhanced
prosecutorial authority, with subsequent enactments and judicial
interpretations only increasing this power. As such, statutes like § 924(c)
hold great potential for injustice, checked only by the conscience of a single
actor, the prosecutor. In very discrete situations, crimes with low predicates
(e.g., any drug and a firearm) and high penalties (e.g., a twenty-five-year
mandatory, consecutive sentence per count) might be justifiably employed
against, say, a brutal drug lord or the occasional dictator who turns his
country into a narco-state. But when applied to the vast majority of
convictions, dismissed charges, or reduced sentences, and that most of the prosecutors
suffered no consequences); CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, HARMFUL ERROR:
INVESTIGATIN4G AMERICA'S LOCAL PROSECUTORS i-iii (2003), available at http://projects.
public integfity.org/pm/ (same); Daniel Medwed, Brady's Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1533 (2010) (discussing widespread failure of prosecutors to disclose exculpatory
evidence to defendants); Michael S. Ross, Thinking Outside the Box: How the Enforcement
of Ethical Rules Can Minimize the Dangers of Prosecutorial Leniency and Immunity Deals,
23 CARDozo L. REv. 875, 890 (2002) (stating that the Department of Justice's Office of
Professional Responsibility has been known to overlook acts of misconduct by prosecutors,
even when such misconduct has been publicly noted by judges); see also Ronald F. Wright
& Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide Accountablilty Deficit for Prosecutors, 67 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1587 (2010) (describing the "accountability deficit" of American prosecutors across
a range of decisions).
23. See, e.g., Hans P. Sinha, Prosecutorial Ethics: The Charging Decision, 41
PROSECUTOR 32, 33 (2007) (discussing a former deputy district attorney acknowledging "that
if a prosecutor wants to bring charges against someone, the prosecutor will be able to do so,"
and "[a] prosecutor can. ... sit down at the onset of a typical case and fairly accurately plan
and predict the outcome of the case").
24. See United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1233 (D. Utah 2003)
(describing the history of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
25. 114 CONG. REC. 22, 231 (1968) (statement of Rep. Poff, sponsor of the amendment
that became § 924(c)).
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offenders, low-level drug dealers who neither threaten violence nor cause
injury, the results can be grotesque.
Angelos 's case also reveals the rough play of American adversarialism
and the extent of prosecutorial power in plea bargaining. The prosecution
initially said that if Angelos pled guilty to a charge of drug distribution and
one count of § 924(c), it would recommend a prison term of fifteen years-
a steep sentence given the nature of the offense and the background of the
offender.2 If the offer was not accepted, however, the prosecution
threatened to obtain a new indictment that carried more than 100 years of
mandatory imprisonment via multiple § 924(c) counts.2 When the plea
bargain was declined, the prosecution followed through on its promise,
charging crimes with the potential for 105 years of mandatory
incarceration. And when Angelos was convicted on three § 924(c) counts,
the prosecution only obtained an obligatory sentence of fifty-five years.2
Of course, some might say that Angelos should have taken the deal,
with any disproportionality between crime and punishment the result of his
own intransigence rather than the government's vindictiveness. He is the
author of his own demise, or so it might be argued. The counterargument
seems just as strong, however. If this defendant is so extremely dangerous
or the public interest is so important as to merit a 105-year mandatory
sentence, how could the prosecution put the citizenry at risk by permitting
Angelos to serve a fraction (1/7) of that amount? Surely, prosecutors would
not offer a serial rapist, mass murderer, or violent terrorist a fifteen-year
deal when justice demands a century of incarceration. Angelos was not one
of these predators, but instead a local marijuana dealer who got caught in a
sting operation. Nonetheless, he was treated like the marijuana equivalent
of Al Capone or Manuel Noriega-brutal contraband kingpins who,
ironically enough, received lower sentences than Angelos.2
In theory, any excesses in this case could have been stemmed by office
policies, supervision, and discipline, supported by more general norms and
expectations of government attorneys. Unfortunately, both the threatened
26. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1254.
27. Id. "In short," the trial court summarized, "Mr. Angelos faced the choice of
accepting fifteen years in prison or insisting on a trial by jury at the risk of a life sentence."
id.
28. Id at 1239.
29. See United States v. Noriega, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1381 (S.D. Fla. 1999)
(reducing Noriega's sentence from forty to thirty years); Joseph Loss, Al Capone Bio,
Concentrates On Fed Tax Case, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 9, 20 10, at D9 (stating that
Capone was found guilty of income tax fraud and sentenced to eleven years in prison).
421
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and actual punishment demonstrates the impotence of existing guidelines
and the failure of professional culture to control prosecutorial discretion in
America. Under the so-called "Ashcroft Memorandum," prosecutors in
cases involving three or more § 924(c) violations should only pursue the
first two violations and only where the predicate offenses involve crimes of
violence. 30 Here, the prosecution charged Angelos with five violations and
obtained convictions on three, and his predicate offenses were drug crimes,
not crimes of violence. 31  In the end, however, there were no internal or
external repercussions for failing to abide by this prosecutorial guideline.
Finally, this case exemplifies the remarkable level of prosecutorial
deference, by which the American judiciary largely acquiesces to charging
decisions and the prosecution sets punishment through determinate
sentencing regimes. For Angelos, it did not matter that few U.S. Attorneys
would have prosecuted the case in such a heavy-handed manner. Nor did it
matter that the sentence was longer than those prescribed for far more
serious crimes (e.g., aircraft hijackers, terrorists, second-degree murderers,
and rapists).3 Moreover, it was irrelevant that jurors who heard his case
would have recommended a sentence decades less than that demanded by
the prosecution,3 and that his punishment was opposed by twelve dozen
former federal judges and prosecutors, including four former U.S.
Attorneys General.3 Most of all, it did not matter that the sentencing judge
himself believed that the punishment was "unjust, cruel, and irrational. 3
By charging the case as it did and obtaining the relevant convictions, the
prosecution was the adjudicator of the sentence, with the court relegated to
the role of an unwilling rubber stamp.
The story of Weldon Angelos thereby illustrates the largely unfettered
nature of prosecutorial discretion in America and the very real potential for
its abuse. Contemporary criminal justice scholars recognize this state of
affairs and many find the status quo to be quite disconcerting. In a series of
30. Memorandum from John Ashicroft, Attorney General, to All Federal Prosecutors
Regarding Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of
Charges, and Sentencing, § B3(5)(b)(ii) (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://wwwjusticegov/
opa/pr/2003/September/03ag5 16.htm.
31. United States v. Angelos, 345SF. Supp. 2d 1227, 1233 (D. Utah 2003).
32. See, e.g., id. at 1246 ('Amazingly, Mr. Angelos' sentence under § 924(c) is still far
more severe than criminals who committed, for example, three aircraft hijackings, three
second-degree murders, three kidnappings, or three rapes.").
33. Id. at 1242.
34. Brief for 145 Individuals as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1, Angelos v.
United States, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2003) (No. 06-26).
35. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1230, 1263.
1422
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articles, William Stuntz has argued that the expansion of crimes and
punishments effectively transferred to prosecutors the power to make and
adjudicate law.3 Likewise, Marc Miller and Ronald Wright raise many
concerns about the concentration of power in the prosecution, from the
resulting lack of transparency in the process and the emasculation of judges
at sentencing, to the possibility that prosecutorial domination has distorted
the system's truth-finding function.3 In turn, Miximo Langer offers a
strong critique of one-sided "prosecutorial adjudication," whereby
prosecutors deploy coercive plea bargaining tactics that make them the sole
judges of crime and punishment.
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At least a few authors, however, have come to appreciate the virtues of
a system where prosecutors effectively adjudicate cases. Gerard Lynch, a
distinguished scholar and federal judge, may have been the first to use the
36. See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing
Shadow, 117 HARv. L. REv. 2548, 2549 (2004) [hereinafter Stuntz, Disappearing Shadow]
("The law-on-the-street-the law that determines who goes to prison and for how long-is
chiefly written by prosecutors, not by legislators or judges."); William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 506 (2001) [hereinafter
Stuntz, Pathological Politics] ("The definition of crimes and defenses plays a different and
much smaller role in the allocation of criminal punishment than we usually suppose. In
general, the role it plays is to empower prosecutors, who are the criminal justice system's
real lawmakers."); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119
HA~tv. L. REv. 780, 791 (2006) [hereinafter Stuntz, Political Constitution] ("Official
discrimination is barred but even where it exists, proof of discriminatory intent is
impossible. Laws need not be regularly enforced. Prosecutors can charge a handful of
defendants and ignore hundreds of thousands of violators." (citations omitted)).
37. See Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56
STAN. L. REv. 1211, 1252 (2004) ("The overwhelming and dominant fact of the federal
sentencing system, beyond the Commission and the guidelines and mandatory penalties, is
the virtually absolute power the system has given prosecutors over federal prosecution and
sentencing."); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargaining,
55 STN L. REv. 1409, 1410 (2003) ("Only by improving transparency can we address the
underlying concerns, such as convicting innocent defendants or providing prosecutors with
such complete control over outcomes that defendants retain no realistic access to judges,
trials, or trial rights."); Wright & Miller, Screening/Bargaining, supra note 13, at 30-36
(suggesting a "screening" alternative to negotiated plea bargaining, which would include
increased initial investigative information, filing of only appropriate charges, and restriction
of plea bargaining); Ronald Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence, 154 U. PA. L.
RFV. 79, 101 (2005) ("Low acquittal rates in some jurisdictions might reflect a tragic
indifference to the truth and the prosecutors' determination above all to secure
convictions.").
38. See M6.ximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of
Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 Am~. J. CREW. L. 223, 225-
26 (2006) [hereinafter Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining] (defining and analyzing
prosecutorial adjudication).
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term prosecutorial adudication in contesting the traditional assumption of a
trial-focused adversarial process. 39 In today's system,
[T]he prosecutor, rather than a judge or jury, is the central adjudicator of
facts (as well as replacing the judge as arbiter of most legal issues and of
the appropriate sentence to be imposed). Potential defenses are presented
by the defendant and his counsel not in a court, but to a prosecutor, who
assesses their factual accuracy and likely persuasiveness to a hypothetical
judge or jury, and then decides the charge of which the defendant should
be adjudged guilty. Mitigating information, similarly, is argued not to the
judge, but to the prosecutor, who decides what sentence the defendant
should be given in exchange for his plea.4
The upshot is a hybrid process that looks more like the image of criminal
justice in continental Europe, with a prosecutor serving the magisterial role of
fact-finder and adjudicator Of guilt.41 This approach should not be rejected as
"arbitrary," "intrinsically unfair," or "beyond the pale of civilization, 4  Judge
Lynch argued, but instead should be recognized as comparable to the
criminal processes in civil law nations. 3
Lynch's account of American prosecutors serving "a quasi-judicial role"
in an "indigenous administrative-inquisitorial""4 system has been described as
"1appealing,,4 1 "brilliant,",46 even "path-breaking",47 -but in the end, "too
39. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM
L. REv. 2117, 2141, 2147 (1998) [hereinafter Lynch, Administrative System] (employing the
term "prosecutorial adjudication"); Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing
Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 58 (1997) (same).
40. Gerard E. Lynch, Screening Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We
Trading Off?, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1399, 1403-04 (2003) [hereinafter Lynch, Screening]; see
also Lynch, Administrative System, supra note 39, at 2135 ("[NMegotiated dispositions
involve a different process for resolving a social dispute. In that process, the prosecutor acts
as the administrative decision-maker who determines, in the first instance, whether an
accused will be subject to social sanction, and if so, how much punishment will be
imposed.").
41. See id at 2124 (reimagining "the prosecutor as the agent of an inquisitorial state
process for determing the facts and assessingthe culpability of persons who are or might be
accused of crime").
42. Id. at 2129, 2124; Lynch, Screening, supra note 40, at 1405.
43. See Lynch, Administrative System, supra note 39, at 2142-43 (noting that
"[aidmirers of the civil law system" adopted in many countries "simply fail to realize that the
United States is one of those countries").
44. Id.at2150-5i.
45. Ronald Wright, Sentencing Commission as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 10 10, 1027 n.69 (2005).
46. Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 36, at 818 n.208.
47. Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining, supra note 38, at 251.
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celebratory.",48  For instance, Professor Langer rejects the notion that
American criminal justice now resembles the continental system where
prosecutors serve as inquisitorial adjudicators, arguing instead that
prosecutorial adjudication in the United States thrives only through an
unfairly coercive, unilateral plea bargaining process that is bereft of
fundamental safeguards, which would be unacceptable in a civil law nation.4
In contrast, a system of bilateral adjudication involves both the prosecution
and the defense in a voluntary, noncoercive process aimed at achieving a fair
plea agreement. While neither bilateral adjudication nor unilateral
prosecutorial adjudication reflects the inquisitorial style, Langer suggests that
at least the former is consistent with the adversarial ideal rather than
undenmining it.50
This does not mean that there are no lessons to be drawn from the
comparative study of criminal prosecution. A few years earlier, in fact,
Professor Langer conducted an in-depth study of plea bargaining in four civil
law nations to test the "Americanization thesis," namely, that foreign legal
systems will start to resemble the American system due to the global
influence of the United States .5'1 Although finding support for a weak version
of the thesis based on the adoption of plea bargaining in the studied nations,
Langer concluded that the practice within each jurisdiction varied from the
American model due to efforts of local reformers and the structural
differences among systems .52 This process of "legal translation" could even
generate a paradoxical divergence, he argued, where historically comparable
civil law systems start to vary in their criminal processes under the gravity of
American plea bargaining. 53
48. Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 36, at 818 n.208.
49. See Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining, supra note 38, at 25 7-58
("[Pirosecutorial adjudication can only achieve its adjudicatory decisions through the guilty
plea process by threatening unfair outcomes at trial. It is only by threatening to take weak
cases to trial, seeking excessive trial sentences or overcharging that the prosecutor can
coerce the defendant to plead guilty.').
50. Id. at 247.
5 1. See generally Miximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations:
The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal
Procedure, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Langer, Legal Translations].
52. See id. at 62 (discussing the varying plea bargaining practices in Germany, Italy,
Argentina, and France).
53. Id. at 4. For an intriguing account of adversarialism transplanted into the highly
inquisitorial setting of the Italian criminal justice system, see Michele Cainniello, The Italian
Public Prosecutor: An Inquisitorial Figure in Adversarial Proceedings?, in TIE
PROSECUTOR iN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade eds.,
forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Caianiello, The Italian Public Prosecutor].
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What is of particular interest to us is the extent to which scholars like
Professor Langer and Judge Lynch have revived a comparative dialogue on
the prosecutorial function, looking at the European approach for similarities
and contrasts, seeking insights or even potential solutions to problems like
those mentioned above.5 Generations of American comparativists have
explored European criminal law and procedure, often as a curiosity but
sometimes as an inquiry into the improvement of criminal justice on this
side of the Atlantic.55 Some comparative pieces of the early and mid-
twentieth century suggested that American criminal justice would benefit
"by examining in a sympathetic spirit a system which has been worked out
by the best minds of continental Europe,"5 preparing for a future where the
terms adversarial and inquisitorial will no longer serve to distinguish
criminal processes."7
Over the past half-century, leading comparativists and criminal
procedure scholars have reiterated the calls for a "closer look at continental
criminal justice"08 to help America progress "beyond the Neanderthal
stage."59 Numerous works have recommended the adoption of a European-
style approach to, among other things, search and seizure, interrogation,
arrest, pre-trial detention, discovery, defendant testimony, and mixed judge-
jury tribunals .60  Indeed, scholars now debate whether the civil law and
common law systems are converging on a similar criminal process .6' But
54. Cf infra notes 463-95 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of
comparativism).
55. See infra Part ILA (exploring existing American scholarship on European
prosecution).
56. Frederic R. Coudert, French Criminal Procedure, 19 YALE L.J. 326, 340 (1909).
57. Morris Ploscowe, The Investigating Magistrate (Juge d'Instruction) in European
Criminal Procedure, 33 MICH. L. REv. 1010, 1036 (1935).
58. Gerhard 0. W. Mueller, Lessons of Comparative Criminal Procedure, 15 Amv. U.
L. REv. 341, 348 (1966).
59. Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing
Foreign Experience, 26 BUFF. L. REv. 361, 374 (1977).
60. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 58, at 349-51 (explaining why the French and
German comparably higher standards for arrest are preferable to the American approach);
Schlesinger, supra note 59, at 369-7 1 (arguing that America can learn from the comparative
study of civil law approaches to arrest and pre-trial detention); id. at 3 72-77 (recommending
America adopt civil law approaches to discovery in criminal cases).
61. Compare Craig M. Bradley, The Convergence of the Continental and Common
Law Model of Criminal Procedure, 7 CRIMv. L.F. 471, 474 (1996) ("The differences between
the Anglo-American and the continental system have begun to diminish."), and Mary C.
Daly, Some Thoughts on the Differences in Criminal Trials in the Civil and Common Law
Legal Systems, 2 J. INST. Sru~y LEGAL Emics 65, 65 (1999) ("[The civil and common law
legal systems] are separately undergoing a remarkable transformation in which the influence
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perhaps the greatest controversy arose several decades ago, revolving
around the civil law tenet of strictly limited prosecutorial discretion and the
notion that any problems associated with the American prosecutor might be
62
remedied by adopting the restraints placed on his European counterpart.
These ideas have fallen by the wayside, however, and the problems in the
United States have only been exacerbated with the passage of time, as
epitomized by the case of Weldon Angelos.
This Article seeks to engage and further the comparative dialogue on
the prosecutorial function. Like Judge Lynch, we see a surface movement
in one legal tradition toward another. But it is not the American prosecutor
becoming more like the continental jurist; instead, the European prosecutor
has become more like his American counterpart, with the de facto and
sometimes de jure power to adjudicate cases. He is deservedly refer-red to
as "the judge before the judge."03  We agree with Professor Langer,
however, that important differences remain between the two adjudicative
styles, adversarial versus inquisitorial, and among the plea bargaining-like
processes existing in civil and common law countries.64 But what is yet to
be fully explored is the more complex picture of prosecutorial adjudication
across Europe resulting from various discretionary powers that extend
beyond the dichotomous view of plea bargaining versus fuill-fledged trial.
By prosecutorial adudication, we are referring to a functional, rather
than formal, conception of adjudication. The prosecutor decides the
defendant's guilt, the amount of punishment he deserves, or both. This then
determines the outcome of a case either because external approval is not
required or it is granted as a matter of course. As Professor Langer notes,
prosecutorial adjudication does not assume that the decision-maker reaches
a judgment based on a legal hearing with all the procedural rights
of each on the other is substantial."), with Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not
Converging, 45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 52, 61-62 (1996) (arguing that the common law and
civil law systems "have not been converging, are not converging and will not be converging"
in Europe).
62. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41
U. CHI. L. Ruv. 439, 439-40 (1974) [hereinafter Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial
Discretion] (suggesting that study of the German model of prosecutorial discretion could
help solve American prosecutorial problems).
63. See generally ERHARD KAUSCH, DER STAATSANWALT: EiN RICHTER VOR DEM
RICHTER? (Dftncker & Humblot 1980) (coining the phrase "emn richter vor den richter," or
"the judge before the judge").
64. Cf infra notes 496-98, 505-06 and accompanying text (discussing limits of
comparativism).
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associated with impartial adjudication .6 ' But once the independent analysis
and official imprimatur of the court are removed from the definition and
focus is placed on the consequences of prosecutorial decision-making,
adjudication by a prosecutor is no less real than that of a judge.6
In the United States, prosecutors have the unreviewable power to
decline cases; their decisions simply cannot be overturned by judges or any
other external entity. Under many determinate sentencing schemes,
prosecutors also have the power to set punishment upon conviction. Once a
defendant is convicted of a crime carrying a mandatory minimum sentence,
for example, the prosecutor's opinion about punishment is final-the court
cannot impose a lower sentence.6 In both cases, the prosecutorial
adjudication is de j ure, decisive, and binding, neither requiring the approval
of the court nor being subject to its review. American prosecutors have the
power of de facto adjudication as well, best exemplified by plea bargaining.
The defendant may decline a plea offer, of course, and the judge can reject
the agreement. But the vast majority of defendants take these deals,
sometimes due to prosecutorial threats of much greater punishment if the
cases go to trial. The courts nearly always give their consent after
perfunctory review, even where the differential between the plea deal and
the potential trial sentence reeks of coercion. In these situations, the
prosecutors are adjudicators in effect, requiring the formal agreement of
others but almost always getting their way.6
Consistent with this functional interpretation of adjudication, European
prosecutors also have the effective and even legal authority to adjudicate
crimes and punishments. They may drop cases based on insufficient
evidence or lack of public interest; they may enter a conditional disposal
requiring a suspect to fulfill some obligation prior to his case being formally
65. Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining, supra note 38, at 243 n.72.
66. On the osmosis of power from the judiciary to the prosecutor, see generally Stefan
Braum, Critique of Prosecutorial Control of Investigations in Europe: A Call for Judicial
Oversight, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Erik Luna & Marianne
Wade eds., forthcoming 2011).
67. In theory, a court could strike down a sentence based on higher law, the federal or
state constitution. Judges are loathe to do so, however, with only a handful of decisions
striking down prison sentences on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (striking down nonviolent recidivist's sentence of life imprisonment
without possibility of parole for uttering "no account" check); Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d
755, 775 (9th Cir. 2004) (striking down defendant's twenty-five-years-to-life sentence for
his third shoplifting offense); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010)
(striking down juvenile offender's sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole).
68. Supra notes 17, 26-29 and accompanying text.
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dropped; they may apply for a "penal order" that carries a fine or even a short
sentence; and they may enter into negotiated case settlements that seem
somewhat similar to American plea bargains. For those resolutions that require
court approval, prosecutors virtually lead the judicial hand in signing the
orders. But for some types of case-endings, the prosecutor acts independently
from the court, resulting in de jure prosecutorial adjudication.6
This Article seeks to enrich the American understanding of European
prosecutors, which might in turn provoke a broader dialogue on the
comparative study of prosecution and the possibility of reform in both places.
After a brief review of the American literature on this topic, Part H describes
and analyzes the various case-ending powers wielded by European prosecutors.
Part 111 then discusses some of the implications of prosecutorial adjudication by
comparing the context in which the phenomenon resides in Europe as
contrasted with the United States. Part IV offers some thoughts about
reforming the scope and application of prosecutorial power in America. At the
present time, definitive conclusions may not be possible and various caveats
must be kept in mind, as Part V concedes, but we hope that this preliminary
work will inspire fuarther comparative research on the prosecutorial fuanction.
H. Prosecutorial Adjudication in Europe
The Anglo-American common law tradition tends to be affiliated with an
"adversarial" criminal process, which pits the state against accused defendants.
Evidence of the former is gathered by law enforcement and presented by public
prosecutors to mostly passive fact-finders (i.e., trial judges or jurors), who then
decide the truth of the matter based on their assessment of the competing
stories offered by the parties. In contrast, the mainland European civil law (or
continental law) tradition is associated with an "inquisitorial" approach, which
views the criminal process as an official inquiry aimed at uncovering the truth
through a rational, nonpartisan investigation. A judicial officer directs the
probe, collecting information into a "dossier" that may provide the basis for
criminal charges. A judge or collegial panel then leads the subsequent trial by
calling and examining witnesses himself, rather than relying upon the parties to
present their cases.
Of particular interest here is the alleged dissimilarity of prosecutorial
power in the United States and Europe. As mentioned, the American
prosecutor has vast discretion in determining whether to bring a case and how
69. Infra notes 175-84 and accompanying text.
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to dispose of it once brought. In the federal system, about one out of every five
cases is declined by U.S. Attorneys,"0 for instance, while about 95% of
prosecuted cases are terminated by plea bargain.7 ' European prosecutors have
no such discretion, however, at least according to the traditional image. This
conception of constrained authority was forwarded by leading continental
scholars, who described compulsory prosecution pursuant to the so-called
"legality principle" as the basic rule of prosecutorial decision-making, ensuring
equal protection for individuals and a rule-of-law proscription against arbitrary
action.7 These scholars recognized various exceptions to compulsory
prosecution-for instance, reliance upon a principle of "expediency" (or
"1opportunity") to forego a misdemeanor prosecution where the defendant's
guilt was minor and a trial would not serve the public interest.713  Still,
70. COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 18, at 9; see also
Federal Justice Statistics, 2007 Statistical Tables, Disposition of Suspects in Matters
Concluded by Offense, October 1, 2006-September 30, 2007, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/contentpub/htm/fjsst2007/tables/fjs07st2O2.pdf (last
visited Nov. 17, 2010) (finding that U.S. Attorneys declined to prosecute 20.3% of cases
brought to them) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Federal Justice
Statistics, 2007-Statistical Tables, Basis for Declination of Prosecution By U.S. Attorneys,
October 1, 2006-September 30, 2007, FEDERAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.
usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2007/tables/5s07st203.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2010)
(describing the reasons why U.S. Attorneys declined to prosecute suspects in criminal
matters) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
71. See COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 18, at 67 (providing
the statistic); SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMI1NAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 18, at tbl.5.35.2009
(finding that 96.3% of convictions in U.S. District Court were obtained by guilty plea); see
also Sean Rosenerkel, et al., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Felony Sentences in State Courts,
2006-tatistical Tables, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Dec. 2009), available at
http:/Ibjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/ pdf/fssc06st.pdf (finding that 94% of felony offenders
in state courts in 2006 plead guilty).
72. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], Apr. 7, 1987,
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBL] § 152(2) (Ger.) [hereinafter STPO], available at
http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/90 16/Preview ("Except as
otherwise provided by law, the public prosecution office shall be obliged to take action in
the case of all criminal offenses which may be prosecuted, provided there are sufficient
factual indications.").
73. SrPO, supra note 72, § 153(2). The provision states:
If charges have already been preferred, the court, with the consent of the public
prosecution office and the indicted accused, may terminate the proceedings at
any stage thereof under the conditions in subsection (1). The consent of the
indicted accused shall not be required if the main hearing cannot be conducted
for the reasons stated in Section 205, or is conducted in the cases of Section 231
subsection (2) and Sections 232 and 233 in his absence. The decision shall be
given in a ruling. The ruling shall not be contestable.
Id.
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compulsory prosecution was considered the rule and American-style plea
bargaining was verboten. 1
4
The stylized depiction of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems
belies reality, however, as does the conventional vision of prosecutorial
discretion in Europe. A hard contrast between common law and civil law
traditions and their associated criminal processes cannot be maintained
today. No system is either completely adversarial or inquisitorial, with any
stereotype glossing over the very real differences among nations within
each legal tradition. For this reason, some scholars have sought a different
typology, possibly a measure for the degree of "adversariness" within a
particular system.7 In Europe, "the traditional distinction is tending to
blur" as individual nations "bring their laws and regulations more closely
into line with what are now common European principles."06  More
importantly for present purposes, prosecutorial discretion in Europe is far
broader than the historical image, with the range and depth of case-ending
powers increasing markedly in recent times. The resulting forms of
prosecutorial adjudication will be described and analyzed below. But
before then, the next section will briefly summarize the present American
understanding of the European prosecutor.
A. American Scholarship on European Prosecutors
By and large, two aspects of continental criminal justice allegedly
serve to limit prosecutorial discretion, the first being the investigating
74. See Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Discretionary Powers of the Prosecuting Attorney in
West Germany, 18 Am. J. Comp. L. 508, 511 (1970) (explaining how the German
prosecuting attorneys lack the legal discretion to enter into plea bargains with the accused
and his counsel, and describing this type of plea bargaining as "fundamentally prohibited in
German law"); see also Robert Vouin, The Role of the Prosecutor in French Criminal
Trials, 18 Am. J. Comp. L. 483, 488-89 (1970) (describing the expectation of compulsory
prosecution).
75. See, e.g., Mi~IAN DAMA KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 5-6
(1986) (describing a typology of understanding adversarial and inquisitorial systems not in
rigid definitions, but by instead identifying the adversarial and inquisitorial aspects of
different legal systems); Albert W. Alschuler, Introduction: Adding a Comparative
Perspective to American Criminal Procedure Classes, 100 W. VA. L. Rnv. 765, 767 (1998)
("[T]he issue is what degree of adversarmness is appropriate and what independent
responsibility for truth-finding judges should have.").
76. Comm. of Ministers of the Council of Eur., The Role of Public Prosecution in the
Criminal Justice System, Recommendation 19 and Explanatory Memorandum, at 2 (2000)
[hereinafter Recommendation 19], available at http://www.venice.coe.int/site/main/texts/
ID_docs/rec(2000)19 E.pdf.
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magistrate or examining judge (juge d'instruction). As described by John
Merryman in his primer on civil law:
The examining judge controls the nature and scope of [the pre-trial
phase of the criminal process]. He is expected to investigate the matter
thoroughly and to prepare a complete written record, so that by the time
the examining stage is complete, all the relevant evidence is in the
record. If the examining judge concludes that a crime was committed
and that the accused is the perpetrator, the case then goes to trial. If he
decides that no crime was committed or that the crime was not
committed by the accused, the matter does not go to trial .
The second aspect is the idea of compulsory prosecution pursuant to
the legality principle, requiring trial of all crimes for which there is
sufficient evidence. Mandatory prosecution promotes the rule of law and
the legislative intent in categorical criminal prohibitions, while American-
style plea bargaining would violate the principle of legality.
Where discretion is permitted, it is controlled by law and, perhaps more
importantly, by hierarchical review procedures within the prosecutorial
bureaucracy. In most civil law nations, the victim of the crime also has
standing to object to the abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Most
significant of all is the different effect of the guilty plea. . ... In the civil
law world, a trial cannot be averted by a guilty plea. The accused's
confession can be admitted as evidence, but the trial must go on. The
court determines guilt, it is said, not the defendant or the prosecutor.7
It was this understanding that touched off a series of works in the
American legal literature. Toward the end of his seminal 1969 book,
Discretionary Justice, Kenneth Gulp Davis pointed to Europe and, in
particular, Germany as a prosecutorial model for the United States.
Whenever it was clear that a defendant had committed a crime, a
prosecution must ensue.
The German prosecutor does not withhold prosecution for such reasons
as that he thinks the statute overreaches, that justice requires
withholding enforcement because of special circumstances, that the
statute ought to be enforced against some violators and not others, that
he lacks time for bringing a marginal prosecution, or that he finds
political advantage in not prosecuting. Hence the German prosecutor
never has discretionary power to engage in plea bargaining.7
77. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 129 (2d ed. 1985).
78. Id. at130-3 1.
79. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 194
(1969).
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The heavy constraint on discretion was buttressed by hierarchical
supervision of line prosecutors and the potential for victims to legally
compel prosecution. In contrast to the practice in America, German
prosecutors were not authorized to selectively enforce the criminal code.80
The issues came to a head in a now-classic debate of comparative
criminal justice. In 1974, John Langbein argued that unbridled discretion
of American prosecutors could be curbed through the continental model of
compulsory prosecution." By requiring charges for all serious crimes for
which a sufficient factual basis exists, the German code precluded arbitrary
enforcement, political manipulation, and the reviled convention of plea
82bargaining. Moreover, compulsory prosecution was reinforced by the
hierarchical, meritocratic organization of state's attorneys and the various
avenues for aggrieved victims to counter nonprosecution decisions.8
Langbein did refer to the aforementioned principle of expediency and
various means to avoid trial,8 but actual practice did not threaten the
fundamental preference for prosecution in Germany.
A few years later, Lloyd Weinreb offered his own proposal to improve
American criminal justice based on observations of continental procedure,
especially the French criminal process.85 Among other things, his 1977
book called for the institution of an examining judge to investigate crime
and consider charges. "If he has found insufficient basis for an accusation,
he should enter an order closing the investigation," Weinreb argued, but
"[ilf he has found proof of a crime, he should close the investigation with
an order making a specific accusation against the defendant. 8 The charges
would not be a prelude to real fact-finding but instead the culmination of a
80. Id. at 195.
81. See JOH-N LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 89 (1977)
("What the Germans have largely done, and the Americans largely not done, is to devise
means to regulate the prosecutor's monopoly."); Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial
Discretion, supra note 62, at 439-40 (suggesting that study of the German model of
prosecutorial discretion could help solve American prosecutorial problems).
82. See Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 62, at 443
(explaining the German rule of "compulsory prosecution" and its limit on prosecutorial
discretion).
83. See id at 447-48 ("German police and prosecutors are professionals,
hierarchically organized and controlled from the state level and subject to effective
administrative and judicial review and discipline upon citizen complaint.").
84. See id at 458 (explaining that the German rule of compulsory discretion is limited
by the counterprinciple of discretionary nonprosecution, also known as the principle of
expediency).
85. See generally LLOYD L. WEINREn, DENIAL OF JUSTICE (1977).
86. Id. at 135.
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neutral judicial investigation. Moreover, the presence of an evidentiary
record supporting the allegations would ensure that all guilty pleas had a
87
factual basis.
That same year, however, Abraham Goldstein and Martin Marcus
critically examined, among other things, the extent to which continental
systems curtail prosecutorial discretion and avoid plea bargaining. 8
Building upon a theme of Goldstein's previous work-that Europeans "may
tolerate more discretion than their literature concedes, 89 and a dispassionate
comparison will show that "the two systems tend to converge"9 0-- the
authors sought to debunk a number of myths. In France, examining
magistrates came into play in a small fraction of criminal cases, for
instance, while compulsory prosecution in Germany was limited by both
explicit and tacit means to avoid bringing (severe) charges. More
generally, all civil law countries recognized analogues to plea bargaining.
Although parties were formally prohibited from striking deals, implicit
agreements developed from mutual recognition that a defendant's
confession and cooperation could lead to reduced punishment.9 '
In a vigorous response, Langbein and Weinreb took their rivals to task
for treating criminal justice officials in America and Europe as
indistinguishable. It was erroneous to assume that "the French procureur
and German Staatsanwalt are simply district attorneys who speak a foreign
language," given the vast differences in legal and professional ethos.9
There was no proof that mandatory prosecution was "anything less than
completely effective,"9 3 for example, and the continental legal process
rejects the defining characteristics of plea bargaining, such as party
negotiation and greater punishment if the defendant insists upon trial and is
subsequently convicted. 94  In a reply, Goldstein and Marcus claimed that
87. Id. at 138.
88. See generally Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial
Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J.
240 (1977) [hereinafter Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth].
89. Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in
American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1009, 1019 (1974).
90. Id at 1020.
91. Goldstein & Marcus, The Myih, supra note 88, at 279.
92. John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth"
and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549, 1550 (1978).
93. Id. at 1563.
94. See id at 1558 (describing the French procureur 's choice to "correctionlize" the
accused or charge him with the crime). In this process, the procureur does not speak with
the accused or his attorney. Id Furthermore, "[tihe accused ordinarily has no reason to
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their scholarly adversaries' bedazzlement with continental law on the books
had blinded them to the law in action.95 To assume that the absence of
overt deals between prosecutors and defendants means that plea bargaining
does not occur in Europe, for instance, confuses formal law for actual
practice. 96
The high quality and pitch of this debate reverberated for two decades,
with some authors taking sides or offering their own angle on the issues. In
the 1980s and 1990s, a few scholars attempted to advance the discussion
beyond the apparent "stalemate. "9' Especially thoughtful were the works of
Richard Frase and Thomas Weigend, who suggested that smaller, selective
transplants from France and Germany were feasible.9 Among the
proposals were a continental approach to the selection, training, and
supervision of prosecutors99 and the adoption of European restraints on
prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining practices. 00 But in a "gentle"
but "long overdue" defense of the American district attorney, William Pizzi
suppose that the more elaborate proceeding for a crime would give him an advantage, lost if
he pleads guilty, comparable to the American defendant's chance for an acquittal." Id.
95. Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, Comment on Continental Criminal
Procedure, 87 YALE L.J. 1570, 1575 (1977) ("In general [Langbein and Weinrib] assume
that because there is no explicit bargaining, face-to-face or otherwise, there are also no trade-
offs and compromises.").
96. Id. Another prominent scholar, Mirian Dama~ka, claimed that the real limit on
prosecutorial discretion in Europe was not the external legal system but internal
organizational structures and norms-hierarchical, centralized supervision of the
prosecutorial corps and a professional emphasis on consistent, uniform decisionmaking. See
generally Mirjan Dama~ka, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure,
84 YALE L.J. 480, 503-04 (1975). In large part, our analysis in Part III is consistent with
Dama~ka's claims.
97. Thomas Weigend, Continental Cures for American Ailments: European Criminal
Procedure as a Modelfor Law Reform, 2 CRIME & JUST. 381, 418 (1980).
98. See Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law
Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78
CAL. L. REv. 539, 662 (1990) ("Thle differences suggest possibilities for useful reform of
American procedures, and the similarities suggest that transplants may be feasible.");
Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American
Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT'L & Comp L. REv. 317, 352
(1995) (noting that some similarities in the American, French, and German legal systems
suggest that the countries' various rules and practices would be receptive to transplant from
one to the other).
99. See Frase, supra note 98, at 554 (discussing French policies in regard to police,
prosecutorial, and judicial organization); Frase & Weigand, supra note 98, at 353 (noting
that the German criminal justice system includes careful selection, supervision, and training
ofjudges and prosecutors).
100. See, e.g., Frase & Weigand, supra note 98, at 354 (noting the benefits of the
German control of prosecutorial discretion and the German plea bargaining practice).
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challenged the idea that prosecutorial controls could be cleanly separated
from a civil law system and then incorporated into the criminal processes of
the United States. 01 Moreover, the American political ideology-including
a preference for local decision-making, an insistence on popular control of
public officials, and a general distaste for centralized governmental
authority-would make European-based prosecutorial reforms a political
nonstarter. 10 2
For the past decade or so, comparative scholarship on the prosecutorial
function has focused almost exclusively on plea bargaining. Certainly,
there was good reason for this concentration, given America's addiction to
the practice coupled with the revelation that Germany could no longer be
called the "land without plea bargaining."003  As it turns out, German
practitioners had been covertly engaged in negotiated settlements since the
early 197s.104~ The most recent comparative works in this area have
examined the degree to which American-style plea bargaining has spread
throughout the Western world. The jury is still out, so to speak, as the
practice of negotiated case settlements continues to expand and mutate
around the world, with scholars following any developments to achieve a
greater understanding of the plea bargaining phenomenon and the
possibility of reform in the United States.105
101. See William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United
States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54
OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1330 (1993) ("The idea that we can leave our criminal justice system
and our legal tradition substantially intact, but yet achieve meaningful reform of
prosecutorial discretion by borrowing mechanisms for controlling such discretion from the
civil law tradition is mistaken and unfair to both great traditions.").
102. As will be discussed below in Part 111, this marks a fundamental difference
between adversarial and inquisitorial styles of adjudication, given the emphasis upon
certainty and uniformity in continental legal systems, particularly those of Germany and
France.
103. See John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It,
78 MICH. L. REv. 204, 224 (1979) (coining this nickname).
104. See Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the
Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. Rnv. 547, 549-50 (1997) (discussing the debate
over plea bargaining in Germany); Joachim Hermann, Bargaining Justice-A Bargain for
German Criminal Justice?, 53 U. Prr-r L. REv. 755, 755 (1992) (discussing the origins of
plea bargaining in the German criminal justice system).
105. See, e.g., Langer, Legal Translations, supra note 5 1, at 3 (considering American
style plea bargaining in Germany, Italy, Argentina, and France); Turner, Judicial
Participation, supra note 17, at 3 (discussing judicial participation in plea bargaining in
Germany, Connecticut, and Florida).
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B. European Scholarship on European Prosecutors
The preceding summary was offered for several reasons. To begin
with, it is necessary to get a lay of the scholarly terrain and, in particular,
a sense of the main motivation behind comparative scholarship in this
area-a long-standing attempt by American scholars to address problems
of domestic criminal justice by importing solutions from foreign legal
systems. To a large extent, these efforts have concentrated on the
criminal processes of two nations, Germany and France, with relatively
little discussion about other continental systems. While the discourse that
began nearly four decades ago had the potential to be a wider-ranging
inquiry into prosecutorial power, it narrowed rather quickly to a debate
about plea bargaining in a few European countries.
The foregoing literature review is relevant for yet another reason:
American scholars seem to have been far more interested in the discretion
of European prosecutors than their continental colleagues. Until recently,
little attention was paid to what European prosecutors actually do. It was
not until the publication of the first European Sourcebook on Crime and
Criminal Justice Statistics 06 that scholars began to take notice of a
seemingly strong shift in power toward prosecutorial decision-making in
the criminal process. Although several European studies have been
published since 2000, 107 Europe's new concern about the power of the
106. See generally EUROPEAN SOURCEBOOK OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS (1st ed. 1999), available at http://www.europeansourcebook.orglsource
book start.htm.
107. See generally THE PROSECUTOR OF A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT (Louise Arbour et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE PROSECUTOR OF A PERMANENT]
(providing reports concerning the prosecution services in selected countries); THEf ROLE OF
THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR IN THE EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 9-138 (Tom Vander
Beken & Michael Kilchling eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR]
(discussing the role of the public prosecutor in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England and
Wales, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and the Netherlands); TASKS AND POWERS OF THE
PROSECUTION SERVICES IN THE EU MEMBER STATES 1 7-457 (Peter J.P. Tak ed., 2004)
[hereinafter Tak, PART 1] (discussing the prosecution services in Austria, Belgium, Denmnark,
England and Wales, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden); TASKS AND POWERS OF THE
PROSECUTION SERVICES IN THE EU MEMBER STATES II 481-681 (Peter J.P. Tak ed., 2005)
[hereinafter Tak, PART 11] (discussing prosecution services in Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia); Cyrille Finjaut et al.,
Special Issue: The Future of the Public Prosecutor's Office in the European Union, 8 EUR.
J. CRIME, CniM. L. & CaNm. JUST. 149 (2000) (discussing the public prosecutor's office in
Belgium).
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public prosecutor has not emerged in American legal scholarship. The
present work seeks to fill that gap.
The lack of European interest in the prosecution has several sources.
The British had no prosecution service until the mid-1980s, when one was
created as a reaction to a series of extraordinary miscarriages of justice
due to police suppression and manipulation of exonerating evidence.1
0 8
Of note, the Prosecution of Offenses Act subjected the police charging
decision to review by the newly formed Crown Prosecution Service.'0
Since its inception, this institution has been fighting to establish a right to
exist against a hostile and virtually omnipotent police force."0 In fact, it
was not until 2003 that the power to charge a suspect was given to full-time
prosecutors without reservation."'
In contrast, prosecution services were well established in continental
European systems. The academic debate assumed prosecutors were abiding
by the principle of legality, thereby making their discretion a topic of little
interest. 1 In general, prosecutors were viewed as a rather dull lot,
inspecting files and sifting out cases with insufficient evidence as required
by the principle of legality, and then passing any real decision-making on to
the courts. The array of powers that slowly crept into criminal procedure
codes-allowing prosecutors to drop "minor cases," 1 ' for instance-were
legislative responses to the demands of practice. These were either ignored
by scholars or assumed to be of no concern, premised on the notion that
lawyers were to be trusted in using such provisions in the exceptional case
108. See THE REVIEW OF THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE 33 (1998) (noting that the
Crown Prosecution Service "started to operate in April 1986 in Metropolitan Counties and in
October 1986 in the remainder of England and Wales").
109. Prosecution of Offenses Act, 1985, c. 23 § 8 (Eng.).
110. See, e.g., LORD JUSTICE AULD, REVIEW OF TUE CRIMINAL COURTS OF ENGLAND AND
WALES 399 (2001) (making policy recommendations for the development of the Crown
Prosecution Service); 4iAN GLIDEWELL, THE REVIEW OF THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE
33 (1998) (discussing the early history of the Crown Prosecution Service); Marianne Wade,
Bruno Aubusson & Josef Zila, Tinker, Tailor, Policy-Maker, 14 EuR. J. CRIM. POL'Y & REs.
181, 183-84 (2008) [hereinafter Wade et all.
1 11. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 29 (Eng.).
112. See Tak, PART I, supra note 107, at 9-11 (discussing the application of the legality
principle in Europe).
113. STPO, supra note 72, § 153.
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of no real importance." 4 The image was one of prosecutors as bureaucratic
administrators who hardly seemed worthy of attention.' 15
With the fall of the Iron Curtain came the need to reform the ill-
reputed and even blood-stained prokuratura in former communist states.
This inspired a certain level of interest within the Council of Europe," 
6
particularly regarding the competing concerns of political accountability
and independence of the prosecution service.' 17 The Council and affiliated
bodies sought increased unity among European nations, a degree of
harmony across criminal justice systems, and eventually, a set of common
principles for public prosecutors." 8 More recently, a number of scholars
have "discovered" the changing prosecutorial role in Europe, somewhat
similar to the revelation about criminal justice discretion in the U.S. a half-
century earlier." 9 As occurred in America, the impetus for increased power
114. Cf Hans-Ji~rg Albrecht, Emn Nachruf auf G~nther Kaiser [A TRIBUTE To GUJNTHER
KAISER], Emmendingen, Sept. 2008 (providing a laudatic read by Professor Albrecht at
Professor Kaiser's funeral).
115. Studies documented by Hans-Heinrich Jescheck and Rudolf Leibinger offered a
noteworthy outlier. See generally DIE FuNKTION UND TATIOKEIT DER ANKLAGEBEHORDE IM
AUSLANDISCI-EN RECHT (Hans-Heinrich Jescheck & Rudolf Leibinger eds., 1979). More
recent exceptions in the American literature are provided by Professors Weigend and
Hermann. See generally Herrman, supra note 104; Weigend, supra note 97.
116. The Council of Europe in Brief, Who We Are, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
http://www.coe.int/aboutcoe/index.asp?page quisomimesnous&l=en, (last visited Nov. 17,
2010) (noting history and goals of the Council of Europe) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
117. See, e.g., Eur. ParI. Ass., Role of the Public Prosecutor's Office in a Democratic
Society Governed by the Rule of Law, Recommendation 1604 and Explanatory
Memorandum, Doc. No. 9796 (2003) [hereinafter Recommendation 1604], available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/DocO3/ED0C9796.htm
(discussing the role of the public prosecutor in Council of Europe members states);
Recommendation 19, supra note 76 (discussing the relationship between the public
prosecutor and various governmental bodies); Comm. of Ministers of the Council of Eur.,
Report of the Committee of Experts on the Role of the Public Prosecution in the Criminal
Justice System (1997) (outlining the proper relation of the public prosecutor to governments,
courts, police, and citizens).
118. See, e.g., Recommendation 1604, supra note 117, 3 (advocating harmonization
between the criminal justice systems in Council of Europe member states); Recommendation
19, supra note 76, 3 (discussing the function of the public prosecutor in certain criminal
justice systems); Introductory Memorandum by Marc Robert, Discretionary Powers of
Public Prosecution: Opportunity or Legality Principle-Advantages and Disadvantages,
Conference of Prosecutors General of Europe, 5th Session (May 2004) [hereinafter
Conference of Prosecutors General], available at http://www.coe.intt/dghl/cooperation/ccpe/
conferences/cpge/2004/default_-EN.asp (discussing prosecution services in Europe).
119. See THE PROSECUTOR OF A PERMANENT, supra note 107, at 191-485 (presenting
national reports concerning prosecution services in Austria, Belgium, England and Wales,
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Russia, and Spain, as well as
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of European prosecutors has been a surge in criminal caseloads across the
continent,2 0 which scholars now recognize as the source for the
proliferation of plea bargaining.'
What has not been acknowledged, however, is the extent to which a
different, broader convergence may be occurring. Until now, the working
premise-at least with regard to European case-ending options, particularly
plea bargaining-was that the manager of case resolutions will remain the
trial judge, not the state's attorney 6i la American prosecutorial
certain non-European countries); THE ROLE OF A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, supra note 107, at 7
(noting recent scholarly discussion of the public prosecutor in certain European countries);
Tak, PART 11, supra note 107, at 462 (noting responses of EU member states to a
questionnaire regarding prosecution services); Finjaut et al., supra note 107, at 1 50-51I
(discussing recent developments in European prosecutorial systems).
120. See, e.g., Comm. of Ministers of the Council of Eur., The Management of Criminal
Justice, Recommendation 12 (1995) ("[O1ver recent years criminal justice systems
throughout Europe have faced an increase in the number and often in the complexity of
cases, unwarranted delays, budgetary constraints and increased expectations from public and
staff...); Comm. of Ministers of the Council of Eur., The Simplification of Criminal
Justice, Recommendation 18 and Explanatory Memorandum (1988) [hereinafter
Recommendation 18] ("[T~he increasing number of criminal offences committed in the
exercise of the activities of enterprises. ... cause considerable damage to both individuals
and the communiy. .. ."); Conference of Prosecutors General, supra note 118 (noting the
phenomenon of rising case-loads); JORG-MARTIN JEILLE & MARIANNE WADE, COPING WITH
OVERLOADED CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: THE RISE OF PROSECUTORIAL POWER ACROSS
EUROPE 5 (2005) [hereinafter JEHLE & WADE] ("If one looks at the numbers of offenses and
suspects recorded one can observe that for decades an enormous rise in crime has taken
place in Western Europe, even if in some countries the crime rates have stabilized or are
slightly declining in the last years."); THE ROLE OF A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, supra note 107, at
149 ("It was found that each European and international criminal justice system is
confronted with the challenge to administer the enormous input of criminal cases."); J6rg-
Martin Jehle, Prosecution in Europe: Varying Structures, Convergent Trends, 8 EUR. J.
CRIM. POL'Y RES. 27, 34 (2000) (offering data on the caseloads in select European
countries); Marianne Wade, The European Prosecution Service, 16 CRIM. L.F. 387, 392
(2005) [hereinafter Wade, European Prosecution] (reviewing Tak, PART 1, supra note 107);
Shawn Marie Boyne, Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany's Rechtsstaat: Varieties of
Practice and the Pursuit of Truth 68 (Aug. 28, 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Wisconsin) [hereinafter Boyne, Varieties of Practice] (noting prosecutors'
"increasing workload pressures") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
121. See, e.g., Recommendation 19, supra note 76 (offering recommendations to
member states as to the operation of their public prosecution systems); THE PROSECUTOR OF
A PERMANENT, supra note 107, at 525 (noting the introduction of "certain mechanisms of
bargaining" in prosecutions world-wide); THE ROLE OF A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, supra note
107, at 149-50 (discussing the fading distinction between legality and expediency based
prosecution systems); Jehle, supra note 120, at 38 (discussing the increased use of plea
bargaining in Europe); Langer, Legal Translations, supra note 51, at 37 (discussing the
differences between inquisitorial-style systems and plea bargaining based systems); Wade,
European Prosecution, supra note 120, at 388-89 (assessing Tak's argument regarding
prosecutorial discretion).
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adjudication.122 The assumption proves debatable, we believe, based on a
review of a variety of resources. Particularly noteworthy are the results of
the first study to go beyond basic legal comparison, which draws upon
empirical research, analysis of guidelines, and review of working practices,
all to establish what prosecutors really do within criminal justice systems
across Europe.123  Collectively, these resources suggest a potentially
troubling convergence on both sides of the Atlantic-the power of
prosecutors to adjudicate cases through a variety of case-ending
mechanisms, often undermining the power of the judiciary in most matters
passing through the criminal justice systems. Although one probably
cannot overstate the degree of legal diversity among European nations, this
sidelining of judges is a turning point for all of them, challenging a long-
held tenet of their criminal justice systems-the power of highly
independent, often constitutionally protected judges to adjudicate cases in
public trials.
1. The Reality of Prosecution in Europe
The six-country comparison presented here grew out of research for
the European Sourcebook, focusing upon different countries (e.g., large,
small, long-established Western, former communist, etc.) that represent the
major legal traditions across Europe: England and Wales, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden. The three-year project
utilized a comprehensive questionnaire requesting an assortment of
details-including information on the amnbit of the criminal justice system,
the structure and powers of the police force, the roles and powers of
prosecutors as well as the structure of their offices, the prosecutor-court
relationship, and issues concerning victims, juveniles, and constitutional
constraints-all complemented by comparative data analysis and
standardized country reports.12
122. Langer, Legal Translations, supra note 51, at 44 (discussing the role of the trial
judge in German plea bargaining).
123. See JEHLE & WADE, supra note 120, at 3 (outlining the approach that the authors
take in their study); Marianne Wade, The Januses of Justice, 16 EUR. J. OF CRIME, CRJM. L.
& CRIM. JUST. 43 3, 434 (2008) (presenting the findings of a study on the prosecution services
of England and Wales, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, and Sweden).
124. To view the questionnaires, see The Prosecution Service Function Within the
Criminal Justice System: A European Comparison, GEORG-AUGUST-UNIVESITAT
GOTTINGEN INsTITUT FUR KRimINALWISSENSCHEFTEN, available at http://www.kriminologie.
uni-goettingen.de/pps. For all other results, see JEHLE & WADE, supra note 120, at 315-29.
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The study showed a surprising level of similarity across Europe,
despite the historical diversity of the systems examined. In many countries,
prosecutors have an array of case-ending options (sometimes shared with
the police) coupled with powers to control investigations, sway court
decisions, and even obtain convictions with a great degree of independence.
For definitional purposes, a case-ending decision is one that ceases criminal
proceedings. The standard examples are the trial court's verdict of
conviction or acquittal, as well as a prosecutor's decision to drop a case on
technical or evidentiary grounds. Beyond these resolutions, which seem
almost obligatory, European justice systems feature a variety of other case-
ending options that are not intrinsic components of a legitimate criminal
process. Although labeled differently within each system and containing
nation-specific facets, these case-ending methods have so much in common
across Europe that they can be appropriately grouped together in descriptive
categories.
a. Simple Drop
The decision not to pursue a case due to insufficient evidence or some
dispositive legal bar is characterized as a "simple drop." This classic case-
ending is considered to be in line with the principle of legality, which, as
mentioned, is the polestar of a number of continental criminal justice
systems and is often associated with the rule of mandatory prosecution in
Germany. A primary purpose of the prosecution service is to filter out
untenable cases, including those where no crime has been committed, the
offender cannot be found, the available evidence is inadequate to support a
trial against the suspect, or a law precludes bringing the case to begin with
(e.g., amnesty, double jeopardy, expiration of the statute of limitations,
etc.). Declining prosecution in such situations fulfilled rather than
subverted the legality principle, which was intended to guarantee that all
viable cases were prosecuted. 125 Where the prosecution would be futile or
illegal, a simple drop is considered the appropriate case-ending.
125. See Michael Kilchlmng, Germany, in THE ROLE OF THE PUBnLIC PROSECUTOR IN THE
EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS, 8 1-82 (Tom Vander Beken & Michael Kilchling
eds., 2000) [hereinafter Kilchling, Germany] (discussing nonprosecution from an historical
perspective) (citations omitted).
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b. Public Interest Drop
This category refers to a prosecutor's decision that proceedings should
be dropped without any further consequence, even though he believes the
suspect is guilty, and sufficient evidence is available to take the case to
court. The public interest drop can be seen as recognizing that certain cases
are not worth the prosecutorial capital required for a more intense response,
implying that these resources would be better expended on more pressing
matters. 126  The decision is recorded in an internal register-often
accessible to the police-informing future prosecutors that this individual
may not have an entirely unblemished background. The suspect will be
informed that the case has been dropped in spite of his being considered
guilty, and he cannot appeal the decision even though the information will
be noted in law enforcement records. This case-ending option is available
to prosecutors in England and Wales,127 France,128 Germany, 129 the
Netherlands, 30 and Sweden.'1
3 1
The public interest drop is the simplest discretionary case-ending for
those who are presumed guilty, although it precludes prosecutors from
having any further influence on suspects. For this reason, the action
represents one of the least potent forms of prosecutorial adjudication, and it
was usually the first to be introduced or featured in European criminal
justice systems. Typically, prosecutors use public interest drops to deal
with first-time offenders who have committed minor crimes, such as petty
theft and marijuana possession.13 2 The public interest drop can be seen as
inherent in the British and Dutch systems, which do not adhere to the
126. See Boyne, Varieties of Practice, supra note 120, at 67-73 (discussing pressures
on prosecutors to close cases).
127. Code for Crown Prosecutors, 2010, §§ 4.10 et seq.
128. CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE [C. PR. PE N.] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] art.
40-1, 40-3 (Fr.) [hereinafter C. PR. PtN.], available at http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtn-l?
languk&c=34&r--885.
129. See STPO, supra note 72, § 153 (providing for the nonprosecution of petty
offenses).
130. See WETBOEK VAN STRAFVORDERING [Sv] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] arts.
167-11, 242-11 (Neth.) [hereinafter Sv] (allowing nonprosecution for public interest).
131. RATrEGANGSBALKEN [RB] [CODE OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE] 23 :4a (Swed.)
[hereinafter RB], available at http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/3926/a/27778.
132. See MARIANNE WADE, The Power to Decide, in JORG-MARTIN JEHLE & MARIANNE
WADE, COPING WITH OVERLOADED CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: TuE RISE OF
PROSECUTORIAL POWER ACROSS EUROPE 5, 67 (2005) [hereinafter WADE, The Power to
Decide] (cataloging the use of public interest drops in certain European countries).
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principle of legality and its obligation to prosecute. 133 Although France and
Sweden have allowed drops of this kind from the very outset of their
systems (e.g., 1808 in France),134 the option was only introduced in
Germany in the last half-century, providing a limited alternative intended to
ease the case-load pressures that German prosecutors had reported to
lawmakers. 135  In contrast, the option of a public interest drop was taken
away from the Polish prosecution service in 1997, signaling a fuindamental
shift in decision-making and an attempt to disempower the once mighty
prokuratura. 1
3 6
In England and Wales, the prosecution evaluates the option of a public
interest drop in accordance with a number of considerations listed in the
Code for Crown Prosecutors: the likelihood of a nominal sentence; the
relative insignificance of the offense in relation to other charges against the
suspect; the infliction of only minor loss or harm in a single criminal
incident, especially if deemed the result of sincere misjudgment by the
offender; the potential delay in bringing the case; the harm to the victim
from a trial; the age of the suspect; reparations provided by the offender;
and concerns for national security.137 Likewise, Swedish prosecutors may
waive a case under the following circumstances: the expected outcome is
no more than a fine, or possibly a "conditional sentence";138 the potential
133. See Chris Lewis, The Prosecution Service Function Within the English Criminal
Justice System, in JORG-MARTIN JEHLE & MARIANNE WADE, COPING WITH OVERLOADED
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: THE RISE OF PROSECUTORIAL POWER ACROSS EUROPE 5, 158
(2005) [hereinafter Lewis, The Prosecution] (discussing "public interest factors in favour
and against prosecution"); see also Martine Blom & Paul Smit, The Prosecution Service
Function Within the Dutch Criminal Justice System, in JORG-MARTIN JEULE & MARIANNE
WADE, COPING WITH OVERLOADED CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: THE RISE OF
PROSECUTORIAL POWER ACROSS EUROPE 5, 242-43 (2005) [hereinafter Blom & Smit, Dutch
Justice System] (discussing Dutch prosecutors' decisions as to whether to prosecute).
134. See Bruno Aubusson de Cavarlay, The Prosecution Service Function Within the
French Criminal Justice System, in JORG-MARTIN JEHLE & MARIANNE WADE, COPING WITH
OVERLOADED CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: THE RISE OF PROSECUTORIAL POWER ACROSS
EUROPE 5, 185 (2005) [hereinafter Aubusson de Cavarlay, French Criminal Justice System]
(discussing the provisions of the 1808 code).
135. See Hans-J~rg Albrecht, Criminal Prosecution: Developments, Trends and Open
Questions in the Federal Republic of Germany, 8 EuR. J. OF CRIME, CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST.
245, 246 (2000) [hereinafter Albrecht, Criminal Prosecution] (discussing the criteria for
such drops when they were introduced in the 1960s).
136. Theodor Bulenda et al., The Prosecution Service Function Within the Polish
Criminal Justice System, in JORG-MARTIN JEHLE & MARIANNE WADE, COPING WITH
OVERLOADED CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: THE RISE OF PROSECUTORIAL POWER ACROSS
EUROPE 5, 267 (2005) [hereinafter Bulenda et al., Polish Criminal Justice System].
137. Code for Crown Prosecutors, 2010, § 4.17.
138. Josef Zila, The Prosecution Function within the Swedish Criminal Justice System,
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charge is irrelevant in relation to other charges; the suspect requires
psychiatric or special care that would not disregard a compelling public or
private interest; or, the costs of the proceedings would exceed any societal
benefit.)39  German prosecutors also have the authority-independent for
petty cases and contingent upon court approval for others-to drop cases
involving suspects with "minor guilt" (geringer Schuld), with the term more
closely defined in guidelines issued by the Ministry of Justice or the
relevant Prosecutor-General.14 0  This case-ending option has become
somewhat unpopular in France and the Netherlands, however, after the
respective governments declared that public interest drops should be used
less frequently. 141
c. Conditional Disposal
A "conditional disposal" refers to the prosecutorial decision that
al ,though a case need not proceed to trial, the suspect deserves some type of
state reaction. In these situations, prosecutors (and courts with
prosecutorial approval) may offer to drop a case if the suspect performs a
given task or accepts the imposition of a consequence. Until the individual
fulfills the assigned condition, the drop does not become legally binding
and the state retains the right to prosecute, which almost invariably occurs
when a suspect fails to meet his obligations. Conditional disposals are
typically used to divert routine criminal cases out of the criminal justice
system-particularly unremarkable instances of petty theft, marijuana
possession, traffic offenses, lesser acts of violence, and minor property
crimes-with the most frequent condition being the payment of a fine.'1
4 1
in JORG-MARTIN JEHLE & MARIANNE WADE, COPING WITH OVERLOADED CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS: THE RISE OF PROSECUTORIAL POWER ACROSS EUROPE 5, 292 (2005) [hereinafter
Zila, Swedish Criminal Justice System] ("[T]he conditional sentence is an alternative
sanction to imprisonment.").
139. RB, supra note 131, 1942:740,20:7.
140. See Beatrix Eisner & Julia Peters, The Prosecution Service Function Within the
German Criminal Justice System, in JORG-MARTIN JEHLE & MARIANNE WADE, COPING WITH
OVERLOADED CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: THE RISE OF PROSECUTORIAL POWER ACROSS
EUROPE 5, 220 (2005) [hereinafter Elsner & Peters, German Criminal Justice System]
(discussing the German prosecutor's ability not to prosecute cases in which "the offender's
guilt is to be seen as of a minor nature and there is no public interest in prosecution").
141. PETER J.P. TAK, THE DUTCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 53 (2003) [hereinafter
TAX, DUTCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM], available at http://projektintegracija. pravo.hr/_
downinadlrepository/Dutch-criminal-justice-system pdf;, Wade et al., supra note 110o, at 188.
142. Community service, addiction treatment, and mediation are also possible. The
45
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The suspect is not formally considered guilty but is regarded as acquiescing
to the prosecutorial presumption of guilt, which is noted in an internal
record.
The conditional disposal is available to prosecutors in England and
Wales,14 3 France (including the rappel a ici and m~liation p~nale),'44 the
Netherlands,145 Poland,146 and Germany.147 This case -ending option can be
a mechanism for specific policy objectives, such as support for victim-
offender mediation. Conditional disposals are most often lauded as
achieving greater efficiency by diverting relatively low-level offenders out
of the criminal justice system and thereby minimizing court congestion. In
fact, this option was often introduced alongside the public interest drop,
with both intended to ease caseload pressures. The conditional disposal is
used for slightly more serious offenses than the public interest drops, and it
may require court approval in Some systems.148 However, the option is not
available for recidivists except in France via the mt~iation pinale 149 and in
Germany in exceptional cases. 50
In England and Wales, the Criminal Justice Act of 2003 introduced
"conditional cautioning" to add the bite of a task or consequence to
traditional police cautioning that only resulted in official documentation
about the offense and offender.' Although it was first employed by the
conditional disposals are not used for crimes of violence in Sweden or for petty theft and
marijuana possession in Germany. See WADE, The Power to Decide, supra note 132, at 71
(listing uses of the conditional disposal in England and Wales, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden). It should be noted that data was not available for Poland
or England and Wales, and the data from the Netherlands was only for the transactie.
143. Code for Crown Prosecutors, 2010, § 7.1-7.4.
144. See C. PR. PEN., supra note 128, arts. 41-1-40-3, 389, 706-72 (setting out the way
in which the conditional disposal operates in the French system).
145. See WETBOEK VAN STRAFRECHT [SR] [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 74c (Neth.) (stating
conditions under which the conditional disposal may be used).
146. See KODEKS POST1EPOWANIA KARINEGO [K.P.K.] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]
art. 67 (Pol.) [hereinafter K.P.K.] (providing for conditional disposal).
147. STPO, supra note 72, § 153a.
148. See, e.g., Elsner & Peters, German Criminal Justice System, supra note 140, at
22 1-22 (describing the German conditional disposal).
149. C. PR. PEN., supra note 128, art. 41-1; see also WADE, The Power to Decide, supra
note 132, at 71, 125 (describing how the m~diation p~nale can be used for recidivists).
150. See WADE, The Power to Decide, supra note 132, at 71, 125 (noting that a
conditional disposal is available for all offenses but is more frequently used for traffic
offenses, minor violent offenses, minor property offenses, and first-time offenders).
151. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, pt. 3 (Eng.) (outlining the conditional
caution option and the requirements that must be satisfied).
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police alone, the conditional caution must now be exercised jointly with the
British prosecution service.'112  The judiciary is not involved in the
cautioning process, but this case-ending still carries the stigma of a criminal
record. In France, prosecutors were authorized to divert addicts to
treatment three decades ago, and they have been amassing powers of
conditional disposal ever since, particularly during the 1990s when the legal
system embarked upon the troisi~me voie (the third way).'153 By issuing a
formal warning known as a rappel a loi, French prosecutors can
independently order the suspect to perform any number of actions, such as
fulfilling a previously imposed duty (e.g., spousal or child support
payments), compensating the victim for the harm caused, or making efforts
to improve his employment status.' 54  With court approval, French
prosecutors can also refer the case to a community justice center (maison de
justice et du dro it) for mediation"55 or impose a punishment via a
composition pt~nale.'156 All such disposals are noted in official records, with
a composition pdnale recorded in the criminal register as well.1'
In the mid-i 970s, the German prosecution service was empowered to
impose nonpunitive fines (Geldbuj3en) and other conditions in low-level
cases where the suspect is deemed to have minor guilt.' 58 The power to
refer suspects to mediation was introduced more recently as increased
political attention was paid to victims' rights issues.159 These disposals are
contingent upon court approval and are often pursuant to guidelines issued
by the Ministry of Justice for specific crimes like shop-lifting and drug
152. See Code for Crown Prosecutors, 2010, § 7.1-7.8 (detailing the prosecutor's role
in the conditional caution process).
153. See Aubusson de Cavarlay, French Criminal Justice System, supra note 134, at
185 (describing "a period of experimenting with disposals, known as alternative
proceedings, which produced a rapid succession of legislative reforms starting in 1993').
154. Id. at 193.
155. Id. at 194.
156. Id. at 191.
157. See WADE, The Power to Decide, supra note 132, at 70 (noting that conditional
disposals in France, Germany, and the Netherlands are recorded in the public prosecutor
service register, and the composition p~nale is recorded in the criminal register).
158. See Albrecht, Criminal Prosecution, supra note 135, at 247 (stating that German
prosecutors are authorized to dismiss cases of minor guilt if the offender satisfies certain
conditions such as fines, community -service, compensation to the victim, and/or
maintenance duties).
159. See Elsner & Peters, German Criminal Justice System, supra note 140, at 207, 234
(noting that the Victim's Rights Reform Act established mediation as a possible case-ending
procedure).
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possession.160  Since Poland's criminal procedure reforms of 1997, a
conditional disposal has been subject to relatively stringent judicial control,
making it a less attractive case-ending option.'16' Likewise, Polish
prosecutors must apply for mediation through a separate court procedure.16 1
Over several decades, the traditional power of Dutch prosecutors to
issue a reprimand or waive a prosecution conditionally was flanked and
eventually overshadowed by the case-ending option known as the
transactie. 1 1In particular, a political realization of the high rate of public
interest drops prompted a major policy shift in the Netherlands during the
1 980s, with prosecutors instructed to use the transactie whenever possible
to ensure that suspects receive some response by the criminal justice
system. 164 At the same time, the theoretical basis for prosecutorial
discretion, the principle of opportunity, was reinterpreted toward a
presumption in favor of court proceedings absent some legitimate grounds
to forego prosecution. 66' Recently, however, a new case-ending option (the
straitbeschikking, discussed below) was introduced by Dutch lawmakers,
signaling the beginning of the end for the transactie, which should be
phased out entirely in the next few years.166
160. See Albrecht, Criminal Prosecution, supra note 135, at 251 (stating prosecutors
have to follow directives issued by their superiors that include general guidelines and
directives aimed at individual cases). For an interesting exploration of prosecutorial
decisions and their effects in different contexts relating to serious crime cases, see Shawn
Marie Boyne, Uncertainty and the Search for Truth at Trial: Defining Prosecutorial
"Objectivity" in German Sexual Assault Cases, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1287 (2010).
16 1. See Bulenda et al., Polish Criminal Justice System, supra note 136, at 263 (stating
that prosecutors have to acquire approval from the court).
162. See K.P.K., supra note 146, art. 23a (describing the process of mediation).
163. See TAK, DUTCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 141, at 53-54 (describing
the process of transaction, or transactie, whereby the offender pays a fine in order to avoid
further prosecution and a trial).
164. See id. (noting extension of the transactie from misdemeanors to crimes with a
prison sentence of less than six years, which encompasses ninety percent of all crimes under
the Dutch Criminal Code).
165. See Blom & Smit, Dutch Justice System, supra note 133, at 237, 246 (describing
change and its role in the decline of prosecutorial drops).
166. See id. at 253 (noting that the strajbeschikking will replace the transactie and that
there will be a period of overlap); Peter J.P. Tak, The Criminal Justice System in the
Netherlands, in 6 STRUCTURES OF EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE part II.B.3 (Ulrich Sieber &
Marianne Wade eds., Diincker & Humblodt forthcoming) [hereinafter Tak, Criminal Justice
System in the Netherlands] (same).
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d Penal Order
The case-ending categorized as a penal order typically involves a court
judgment, but one so strongly based on information provided by the
prosecution service and so rarely rejected that it is properly considered a
prosecutorial case-ending. In its conventional form, a penal order is
requested by the prosecution through a standardized application form
containing a brief summary and a suggested punishment, accompanied by
the government's case file. Based upon the written information, the court
either accepts the prosecution's request or rejects it outright, with the latter
triggering the traditional process and a fuill trial. When the application is
approved, as usually occurs, the court issues a penal order to the accused
informing him of the judgment and the resulting punishment, as well as the
time period in which he may formally object and thereby receive a standard
trial. If the accused does not object within the stipulated period-seven
days in Poland, 167 for instance, and two weeks in Germany 168 -a conviction
ensues, and the punishment is imposed, typically resulting in a criminal
record. In practice, sanctions are limited to fines or, in a small number of
cases, (suspended) short-term sentences. Although this option is available
for recidivists and can be employed for more serious offenses than those
dealt with by conditional disposals, penal orders are used for minor acts of
violence, low-level property crimes, petty theft, marijuana possession, and
even traffic offenses.
This case-ending is found in France, 169 Germany,
70  Poland,17 1
Sweden,172 and now the Netherlands.173  The German penal order
167. See K.P.K., supra note 146, art. 506 § 1 (providing that defendant has seven days
after receiving a penal order to object).
168. See STPO, supra note 72, § 410 ("Within two weeks following service of the penal
order the defendant may lodge an objection against the penal order at the court which issued
it, either in writing or orally to be recorded by the registry.").
169. See C. PR. PEN., supra note 128, arts. 524-528-2 (detailing the French penal order
process).
170. STPO, supra note 72, §§ 407-12.
171. See K.P.K., supra note 146, arts. 500-02 (describing the procedure for the Polish
penal order proceedings). No data is available for the use of penal orders in Poland. WADE,
The Power to Decide, supra note 132, at 77.
172. See RB, supra note 13 1, at 48:1-12 (describing the Swedish procedure for a penal
order called a summary punishment by fine or strafforelaggande).
173. See Wet OM-afdoeing [Law on Prosecutorial Case-Ending Decisions],
http://www.rechtspraak.ni/Actualiteiten/Themadossiers/Wet+OM-afdoenling.htin (last visited
Nov. 17, 2010) (describing the system in the Netherlands) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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(Strafbefeh() has been particularly influential across Europe and has served
as a model for other nations.'174 As mentioned, some systems may require
court review and approval, although this is often pro forma, with the
prosecutor acting as a veritable judge before the judge. The penal order in
Sweden, however, literally removes the court from the process, giving
prosecutors independent power to impose convictions and sanctions. 175
Using this case-ending, known as the straffcireldggande, Swedish
prosecutors issue a signed order to the suspect informing him that
punishment is to be imposed and stating the relevant details about the
offense, the governing law, and the intended sanction.176 It also describes
how the individual can agree to the order and what action he must take,
such as paying a fine.'177 Upon acceptance, the suspect becomes a convict
with a criminal record.17 8
The straffdrelaggande has always been something of an anomaly in
Europe, having been introduced in 1948 and expanding in scope ever
since. 179 In 2007, however, the Netherlands adopted a nearly identical form
of penal order, the so-called strafibeschikking, for which the prosecutor is
expected to exercise true adjudicatory power in a wide range of cases.'18
This substitute for the transactie was spurred by doubts about whether
Dutch conditional disposals complied with human rights standards. Cases
heard by the European Court of Justice relating to ne bis in idem (double
jeopardy) highlighted problems with such measures, in particular, whether
174. For instance, the German penal order served as a model for Croatia. See ZAKON 0
KRJVICNOM PosThPKu [Criminal Procedure Act] arts. 465-69 (Groat.) (describing
proceedings for an issuance of a penal order).
175. See Zila, Swedish Criminal Justice System, supra note 138, at 292 ("Any
approving of the penal order by a court is not required.").
176. RB, supra note 131, 48:6.
177. See id. at 48:9 (stating that the offender consents to the order by signing a
declaration admitting to the commission of the act, accepting the punishment, and sending
the declaration to the proper authorities).
178. See id. at 48:3 ("Orders consented to by the suspect shall have the same effect as a
judgment which has become conclusive."); see also Zila, Swedish Criminal Justice System,
supra note 138, at 292 ("Thus, the penal order represents, if accepted by the suspect, a final
decision on criminal responsibility and, as such, it is recorded in the criminal register.").
179. See generally Josef Zila, Prosecutorial Powers and Policy-Making in Sweden and
the Other Nordic Countries, in THE PROSECUTOR iN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE Part lV.C
(Erik Luna & Marianne Wade eds., forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Zila, Prosecutorial
Powers].
180. Sv, supra note 130, arts. 257a-h; see also Blom & Smit, Dutch Justice System,
supra note 133, at 253 ("[T]he straflbeschikking is a formal sanction which is not imposed by
a judge but by the prosecutor. There is no court involvement at all.").
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they should be considered judicial decisions that impose punishment,
thereby precluding prosecution in a sister nation. 18'1 The Netherlands
sought to avoid any potential problems by enacting the strajbeschikking,
which will enable prosecutors to convict and sanction without court
involvement. 182  Like the transactie, this option will be available for
offenses punishable by up to six years imprisonment,183 providing the
Dutch prosecutor tremendous authority to establish guilt and impose
punishment without the necessity of even cursory oversight by a court, let
alone its judgment.114
e. Negotiated Case Settlements
In a negotiated case settlement, the conviction and the sanction
imposed are the subject of an agreement between the prosecution and
defense. During an abbreviated hearing, the parties present selected
evidence in support of the proposed resolution, leading to a court decision
on the defendant's guilt and punishment. The process is available for
serious offenses (e.g., Polish crimes carrying up to ten years imprisonment),
with the defendant receiving a criminal record and possibly a term of
incarceration. Despite the fact that negotiated settlements have been around
for quite some time, official authorization of the process is a relatively new
phenomenon in European criminal justice systems. As mentioned earlier,
this form of case-ending has existed in Germany since the 1 970s, though
the practice was originally covert. In 2005, negotiated settlements finally
received the approval of the Federal Court of Justice
181. See, e.g., Angelina Tchorbadjiyska, Joint Cases C-18710J and C-38510J Gdzitok
and Brigge (E.C.J. February]]1, 2003) 2003 E.CR. 1-1345, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 549, 555-
58 (2004) (discussing the European Court of Justice's expansive interpretation of the ne bis
in idem principle in the G&zijok and Briigge cases).
182. The strajbeschikking is expected to come into fuill force within the next few years.
Supra note 166 and accompanying text.
183. Tak, Criminal Justice System in the Netherlands, supra note 166, at Part II.B.3.
184. For a detailed exploration of penal orders as well as of their relationships to
negotiated case-endings, see Stephen C. Thaman, The Penal Order: Prosecutorial
Sentencing as a Model For Criminal Justice Reform?, in THE PROSECUTOR IN
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade eds., forthcoming 2011).
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(Bundesgerichtshof);'8 5 and just last year, the German legislature authorized
the practice under certain circumstances. 8 6
Negotiated case settlements also exist in England and Wales, which is
unsurprising for Europe's bastion of common law, party-led adversarialism.
The history of British plea bargaining is long but also uncharted. This
option only obtained express statutory recognition in 2003.8 Likewise,
negotiated case settlements are recent legislative introductions in France188
and Poland.189 With the intent of saving time and resources, France adopted
the so-called "appearance before a court after prior admission of guilt"
(comparution sur reconnaissance prialable de culpabilite)'90 for crimes
punishable by up to five years imprisonment.' 9 ' The French criminal
procedure code requires prosecutors to develop an individualized
punishment for a defendant, with terms of incarceration capped at half the
statutorily prescribed sentence and no more than one year imprisonment.192
The defendant must receive the proposal in the presence of his lawyer, and
if the parties reach an agreement, the court may either accept or reject the
proposed resolution. 9 3
In Poland, two forms of negotiated case settlements are available: a
prosecutor's request for passing judgement without trial (skazania bez
rozprawy)'94 and a defendant's voluntary submission to punishment
185. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 3, 2005, 50
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN STRAFSACHEN [BGHSt] 40 (Ger.) (approving
negotiated case settlements).
186. See StPO, supra note 72, § 257c (providing statutory authorization for negotiated
case settlement); see also Bundesministerium der Justiz, "Bundestag verabschiedet
Gesetzentwurf zur Verstindigung in Strafverfahren," May 28, 2009, available at
http://www.bmj.bund.de/enid/cel4742dd2f053fd2fddde272e982bba,c25684636f6e5f6964092d
0935393333093a095f7472636964092d0932343736/Pressestelle/Pressemitteilungen_58.html
(press release of the German Federal Ministry discussing new law). All papers relating to the
legislative process are available at http://gesetzgebung.beck.de/node/181982.
187. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, sch. 3 (Eng.) (providing statutory authorization
for negotiated case settlement).
188. See C. PR. PEN., supra note 128, arts. 495-7-495-16 (providing for negotiated case
settlement).
189. See K.P.K., supra note 146, arts. 335, 387 (stating the procedures for negotiated case
settlements); Bulenda et al., Polish Criminal Justice System, supra note 136, at 264-65
(detailing the two types of negotiated case settlements under the Polish system).
190. C.PR.PtN.,supra note 128, arts. 495-7-495-16.
191. Id. art. 495-7.
192. Id. art. 495-8.
193. Id art. 495-9.
194. K.P.K., supra note 146, art. 335; see also Bulenda et al., Polish Criminal Justice
System, supra note 136, at 264 (stating that the skazania bez rozprawy involves an offender
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(dobrowolnego poddania siq karze).'95 As their names indicate, these
proceedings involve either a prosecutorial proposal for the court to sentence a
defendant without carrying out a trial or a defense application to receive a
specific punishment for a given crime, both being available for offenses
punishable by up to ten years imprisonment. 196 The accused must always be
represented by legal counsel during the court hearing, which generally involves
a brief description of the case facts by the applicant and the agreement of the
nonmoving party to the proposed reouio.9
It should be noted that negotiated settlements in most European nations
cannot be traced as a statistical matter because they are not formally recognized
as a separate form of proceeding. Instead, the requisite procedural path for this
case-ending is an official trial, albeit abbreviated and oriented toward a
particular resolution. For this reason, negotiated settlements are subsumed
within the data for cases taken to court in all countries except France and
Poland, where they are registered as a special form of court proceeding. This
has obvious ramifications for the analysis below.
2. Analysis of European Prosecution
In contrast to the conventional wisdom both here and abroad, the
palette of options available to the European prosecutor is wide and varied,
with the countries examined here featuring styles of prosecutorial
adjudication in a number of case-ending decisions and related procedures.
Prosecutors possess the classic option to drop a case on evidentiary or
public interest grounds, effectively rendering a not guilty verdict. But
they also maintain a range of powers to resolve cases on discretionary
grounds and to impose a consequence upon a suspect they presume to be
guilty. In essence, prosecutors judge an individual to be responsible and
likely to be convicted at trial but circumvent the traditional court process,
thereby adjudicating the case based on some evidence of culpability and
inflicting a sanction of sorts. In certain cases, there is no legal finding of
guilt and concomitant conviction, and thus no official stigma inflicted upon
the suspect. i other cases, the individual is in fact convicted and punished for
agreeing to a prosecutor's request to enter a judgment without a trial).
195. K.P.K., supra note 146, art. 387; see also Bulenda et al., Polish Criminal Justice
System, supra note 136, at 264-65 (describing the dobrowolnego poddania siq karze whereby
the accused requests the court to enter a judgment without hearing the evidence).
196. Bulenda et at., Polish Criminal Justice System, supra note 136, at 264-65.
197. K.P.K., supra note 146, art. 387.
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a crime, which is reflected in official records. Where such case-endings
are subject to judicial approval, prosecutors are engaged in effective
adjudication and serve as a type of judge behind the judge. But where the
decisions are made independently, the form of prosecutorial adjudication
may involve far softer parameters than those used in court.
Table 1 summarizes much of the foregoing information on the
availability of and requirements for each case-ending option. Figures 1-6
then provide the actual use of these case-ending options (in 2002 for
Sweden and 2004 for the other nations), based on official data and a cross-
analysis of official and internal prosecution statistics. 98 This information
offers the most recent empirical insights into prosecutorial decision-
making, given that very few jurisdictions regularly monitor prosecutors'
work closely enough to provide official data on their case-ending decisions.
Based upon the research detailed above, the latest edition of the European
Sourcebook 99 sought to gather and present more detailed prosecution data.
Unfortunately, the resulting statistics are not as comprehensive as those
provided in the aforementioned six-country study, and the European
Sourcebook's approach is largely incompatible with the statistics presented
here because it uses broader statistical categories and includes, for instance,
cases involving unknown offenders. Moreover, the latest data stem from
2006 and 2007 and therefore do not reflect the recent Dutch and German
legislative changes. Nonetheless, the statistics in the European Sourcebook
provide a good overview of developments in the jurisdictions for which
statistics are available, and most importantly, the results do not appear to
contradict our analysis. 00
198. The corresponding data for these figures can be found in Appendix 1, infra.
199. EUROPEAN SOURCEBOOK OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (4th ed.
2010), available at http://www.europeansourcebook.org/ob285_fiill.pdf.
200. 1d. at 127-62. The data from the European Sourcebook can be found in Appendix
2, infra.
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Table 1: Availability and Requirements of CaeEdnsa
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Negotiated Settlement
SThe table excludes simple drops and cases taken to court, which are available in all jurisdictions.
Ibf What is theoretically allowed by the law may be far broader than actual practice.
I"I "Must Agree" applies to mediation penale and composition p~nale. "May Reject" applies to rappel a
1oi.
[dI "Court Approval" applies to composition p~nale.
I'l Composition p~nale and mediation p~nale are possible for recidivists.
It Approval not necessary in petty cases.
18 Dutch "Penal order" (strajbeschikking) is too new for statistics to be available.
~Ih The prison sentence for the Swedish "penal order" (strafforelaggande) is suspended.
455
1456 6 7 WA SH. & LEE L. REV 1413 (2 010)
Figure 1. Case-Endings in England & Wales. 2004
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Putting aside Poland for the moment, nations that rely upon full trial
proceedings in a large proportion of cases use speedier formats, which are
still profoundly influenced, if not essentially predetermined, by prosecutors.
For instance, full trials in the Netherlands are based almost exclusively on
written submissions-live witnesses are rarely heard and even complicated
cases take only a few hours-with the court ultimately relying upon the
dossier arranged by the prosecutor.20 In England and Wales, most court
cases are handled by summary or simplified processes, such as guilty plea
proceedings negotiated by the prosecution. In contrast, France, Germany,
and Sweden employ court proceedings in a minority of cases. A low
proportion of trials might suggest that a given system is unable to deal with
increasing caseloads, an idea that is supported by existing information.
Although other reasons exist for the demise of the continental trial-for
instance, the desire for diversionary measures that include victims-the
general trend toward increasing prosecutorial power is clearly linked to an
otherwise unmanageable criminal docket, with prosecutors across Europe
202facing caseloads sometimes above 1,000 cases per year.
The system-overload argument becomes all the more persuasive when
the figures are considered in relation to the proportion of cases receiving a
simple drop. Those countries with a relatively low percentage of full court
trials display the highest rates of cases being dropped for evidentiary
reasons. 20 3 To be sure, in every criminal process there will be some number
of cases that must be rejected for technical deficiencies or insufficient
evidence. But the growth in this category indicates a larger systemic
dilemma-too many crimes and suspects, not enough time and resources,
and an unspoken decision to forego cases of modest value-all hidden
within a historically accepted case resolution. By comparison, Dutch
prosecutors need not scuttle such cases en masse and have low rates of
simple drops due to the broad availability of time-saving conditional
disposals (which only impose fines) and the relative ease of court processes
in the Netherlands.
201. See TAK, DUTCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 141, at 62 (describing the
trial phase and its heavy reliance on written statements by witnesses that expedite the trial).
202. See Boyne, Varieties of Practice, supra note 120, at 61 (noting that prosecutors in
the German lower court, Amtsgericht, handle over 1,000 cases a year); see also Shawn Marie
Boyne, Is the Journey from the In-Box to the Out-Box a Straight Line?: The Drive for
Efficiency and the Prosecution of Low-Level Criminality in Germany, in THE PROSECUTOR IN
TRAINSNAT1ONAL PERSPECTIVE (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade eds., forthcoming 2011)
(describing the tension between caseload pressures and the legality principle, and its
consequences for German prosecutors).
203. Poland is the exception.
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The rate of public interest drops is also higher in the countries showing
signs of case overload, although this option is not highly regarded in many
European criminal justice systems. As mentioned, even the historic
discretion of Dutch prosecutors to reject cases as unworthy of sanctions has
been effectively curtailed over the past decade in response to political
pressure, with only about five percent of cases now dropped on public
interest grounds .2 04 The more (presumably) guilty individuals that are
allowed to escape any consequence, even in cases of petty offenses, 05 the
less a criminal justice system will be viewed as being both effective and
legitimate. This is particularly true in nations subscribing to the legality
principle, where a high rate of public interest drops indicates a criminal
justice system capitulating to pressures outside of the legal framework.
It should also be noted that the prosecution's screening process and its
use of case drops are necessarily affected by the powers accorded the police
force, which vary from nation to nation. For this reason, the official
statistics may not represent the total number of cases dropped in specific
countries. For instance, the British police have a long tradition of
independently ending cases on both evidentiary and public interest
grounds, 0 while police officers in the Netherlands are delegated certain
case disposal powers by the prosecution service. 0 Both police cultures are
therefore conducive to case drops without the involvement of prosecutors,
and, in fact, officers are expected to serve as a type of filter. Such action is
formally impossible in the French208 and German 29syse , hoever,
where the police are under an absolute requirement to pass cases on to the
prosecution service.
Statistics on conditional disposals demonstrate that the Netherlands
and, to some extent, France entrust prosecutors with dispositive power over
a large number of cases. Other jurisdictions are less inclined to leave such
decisions entirely in the hands of the prosecution; indeed, German
204. TAK, DUTCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 141, at 53.
205. WADE, The Power to Decide, supra note 132, at 67.
206. See Lewis, The Prosecution, supra note 133, at 151, 167 (noting the complete
discretion of police to drop a case).
207. Blom & Smit, Dutch Justice System, supra note 133, at 243.
208. See Aubusson de Cavarlay, French Criminal Justice System, supra note 134, at
198 ("According to French law, judicial police officers at all levels are never allowed to
decide independently of the track to be followed by a criminal offence once it is reported.").
209. See Eisner & Peters, German Criminal Justice System, supra note 140, at 224
("German criminal procedure does not include an option for the police to end cases
independently.").
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prosecutors are required to seek court approval in all but the most minor
cases. 20 Nonetheless, authorization is routinely given, meaning that
prosecutors effectively determine the appropriate reaction in a significant
proportion of cases. Likewise, requests for penal orders are almost always
accepted by the courts, with any real scrutiny left to the prosecutor. These
case-endings thus provide the prosecution de facto adjudicative powers to
211convict a suspect and impose a fine or even a short term of incarceration.
In contrast, the Swedish straffidreldggande2 12  and the Dutch
strabeschikkin2 13 remove the court from the process, providing the
prosecution with de jure authority to convict and sentence. Arguably, the
British prosecution service also has actual adjudicative powers, in
cooperation with the police, by issuing cautions to criminal suspects .2
Although the judiciary is not involved in the cautioning process, an official
record is kept and a punishment associated with an admission of guilt can
be imposed, thereby carrying the official stigma of the British adversarial
system.
In several ways, conditional disposals and penal orders are the most
important case-endings in Europe. They reflect the extent to which
European criminal justice systems now allow the prosecution to determine
the appropriate state reaction for those suspects believed to be guilty,
whether its power is de facto or de jure. When these case-endings are
viewed as forms of prosecutorial adjudication, it becomes clear that even
the iconic continental criminal justice systems-those of Germany and
France-rely heavily upon the discretion of the prosecution services and
their effective or actual adjudication of cases. German prosecutors
determine or strongly influence the vast majority of resolutions, with truly
independent court adjudication occurring in less than one-fifth of all cases.
In France, prosecutors make nearly half of all case-ending decisions
211resulting in a conviction.
2 10. STPO, supra note 72, § 153.
211. See WADE, The Power to Decide, supra note 132, at 75 (stating that because courts
rarely reject penal order applications, the prosecutors are "effectively pre-forming court
decisions").
212. Supra note 172 and accompanying text.
213. Supra note 180 and accompanying text.
214. See Lewis, The Prosecution, supra note 133, at 166 (stating that the Crown
Prosecution Service advises the police on whether a caution should be offered).
215. For an account of the shift of power from the judge d'instruction to the prosecutor,
providing another context of the rise of prosecutorial power, see Jacqueline Hodgson, Guilty
Pleas and the Changing Role of the Prosecutor in French Criminal Justice, in THE
PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE Part III (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade eds.,
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The most intriguing development may be the new penal order process
in the Netherlands. Like its Swedish analogue, the Dutch sirrajbeschikking
amounts to true prosecutorial adjudication, where the prosecutor is not
merely the judge before the judge, so to speak, but instead the sole judge of
a case. But while the straff~reldggande is a relatively obscure mechanism
employed in less than ten percent of all cases in Sweden, the
strajbeschikking is intended to eventually replace the transactie, which is
used in roughly one-third of all cases in the Netherlands. Moreover, while
the Swedish criminal justice system has had little impact outside of
Scandinavia, Dutch reforms have historically had great influence in
European policy debates. Given that the powers provided to prosecutors
via the strajbeschikking have traditionally been reserved for judges in
continental systems, it will be interesting to see whether other countries will
follow the Netherlands' lead.
Today, however, the most discussed form of case-ending is the
negotiated settlement. As mentioned, guilty plea proceedings brokered by
prosecutors constitute a high proportion of criminal actions in England and
Wales. In 2004, two-thirds of all cases before Crown Courts and three-
quarters of all cases before Magistrates' Courts were resolved by guilty
pleas.21 A burgeoning British interest in negotiated settlements thus might
be based upon the sheer number of crimes involved, as well as lingering
questions about the relatively young Crown Prosecution Service. In turn,
some Swedish prosecutors have expressed dissatisfaction with their lack of
negotiating authority,217 although it remains to be seen whether this will
lead to an increase in their already considerable powers. Negotiated
settlements in Germany have received considerable attention in certain
classes of crime-such as highly complex cases of economic wrongdoing-
and the number of French cases using such proceedings has grown in recent
years. Nonetheless, the debate in these countries seems to be more
academic and theoretical than practical.
Presently, little is known about the actual use of negotiated settlements
in France, besides the fact that they have been met with judicial resistance
and are employed in only a small proportion of cases.21 The role of
forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Hodgson, Guilty Pleas].
216. HOME OFFICE, CRIMINAL STATISTICS 2004: ENGLAND AND WALES tbls.2.2, 2.10,
available at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfsO5lhosb1905 .pdf.
217. See generally G~iran Berling, The Criminal Justice System in Sweden, in 4
STRUCTURES OF EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Ulrich Sieber & Marianne Wade eds.,
Dtincker & Humblodt forthcoming).
218. Bruno Aubusson de Cavarlay, Questionnaires of the Second Project Wave,
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German prosecutors in negotiated settlements also remains unclear, given
that the practice only recently received judicial and legislative
219
authorization. Moreover, negotiated settlements in Germany require the
prosecution to take the cases to court for trial, 2 meaning that this approach
will constitute some fraction of an already small proportion of all case-
endings. 2 What makes negotiated settlements controversial in France and
Germany is not that they represent a disproportionate number of cases,
however, or that they might be used in some dastardly manner, but instead
the fundamental challenge they pose to these nations' criminal justice
systems. The notion that a conviction and resulting punishment are the
product of negotiation strikes many as antithetical to the core principles of
continental jurisprudence.
From a distance, negotiated settlements may seem familiar to U.S.
practitioners and scholars, but the actual practice in Europe demonstrates
significant differences from American-style plea bargaining. The process is
not "a glorious Turkish rug market, 22 2 to use Professor Langbein's phrase,
where the parties furiously haggle over an agreeable crime and punishment,
nor does it appear to have the coercive character of plea bargaining in the
United States. There is no evidence that prosecutors threaten harsher
consequences if the parties are unable to reach a settlement; instead,
prosecutors simply lodge the basic charges irrespective of the failed
negotiations. Indeed, settlement discussions may occur between the court
and defense, in contrast to the prosecution-centric American approach.
Moreover, unlike the courtroom process for guilty pleas in the United
States-which typically involves a short colloquy without any evidentiary
presentation-in Europe the parties actually introduce (selected) evidence
in court as a means of bolstering the proposed settlement and obtaining
approval by the judge. In fact, the German court decision that upheld
negotiated settlements also specified that this type of case-ending must take
place within the main trial stage.22 Despite these differences, however, the
http://www.kriminologie.uni-goettingen.de/pps (last visited Sept. 15, 2010) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Hodgson, Guilty Pleas, supra note 215, at pt. I.C.
219. Supra note 185 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (discussing Germany's use of
negotiated case settlements).
221. See infra Appendices 1, 2 (providing statistics on case disposals in Germany).
222. John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearance of
Criminal Jury Trial, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 125 (1992).
223. Supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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European negotiated settlement remains a center of attention on both sides
of the Atlantic.
This brings us to the intriguing state of affairs in Poland. In 2002,
lawmakers attempted to curtail the power of the ill-reputed prosecution
service, seeking to ensure that courts had exclusive control over criminal
justice. This major criminal procedure reform, which was the third in less
than a decade, had the potential to make Poland an outlier in an otherwise
clear trend toward greater prosecutorial power across Europe. The effort to
revert to the court-controlled continental model of the past appears to have
failed, however, as suggested by the vast increase in the use of case-ending
procedures featuring prosecutorial power. Poland has a high rate of simple
drops, for instance, which may mask prosecutorial decisions to ignore cases
on policy rather than evidentiary grounds. Moreover, negotiated
settlements-in the form of a defendant's voluntary submission to
punishment or a prosecutor's application for a conviction without a full
trial-have become increasingly popular in Poland, rising from less than
eight percent of all adjudicated cases in 2002 and 2003, to a quarter of cases
in 2004 and more than forty percent of cases in 2005.22 A substantial
proportion of court cases are thereby premised upon party negotiations,
which are presented by the prosecution or defense for judicial approval and
consented to by the nonmoving party.
The driving force behind this shift is not complicated. A criminal
justice system might be analogized to a balloon-if you squeeze it in one
area, another will expand. By constricting the options available to
prosecutors, Polish policymnakers may have inadvertently encouraged more
case drops and made negotiated settlements the only remaining method to
effectively punish criminal suspects absent a full trial, with both paths
relied upon to save time and resources in a highly overloaded system.
225
Ironically, then, the attempt to transfer power from prosecutors to the courts
seems to have backfired. Judicial review has been eliminated in a
significant number of cases via simple drops. Likewise, negotiated
224. ME'JISTERSTWO SPRAWIEDLIWOSCI, INFORMACJA STATYSTYCZNA o DzIALALNOkCI
POWSZECHNYCH JEDNOSTEK ORGANIZACYJNYCH PROKURATURY w 2005 RoKU (Warszawa
2005) [MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL INFORMATION ON THE ACTIVITY OF CIVIL
PROSECUTORS IN 2005 (Warsaw 2005)1. translated by Professor Antoni Bojah~czyk, Chair of
Criminal Law, Faculty of Law and Admin., Univ. of Stefan Cardinal Wyszyfiski, Warsaw,
Poland.
225. See Bulenda et al., Polish Criminal Justice System, supra note 136, at 264-65
(stating that between 2000 and 2004, the number of requests for a "voluntary submission to
penalty" increased over four times, and the number of a "prosecutor's request for passing a
judgment without conducting a trial" increased twelve times).
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settlements have been transformed into a key feature of the Polish criminal
justice system, with the prosecution effectively determining the outcome in
serious cases that would not be amenable to conditional disposals or penal
orders. Prosecutorial adjudication is now the norm in Poland, and the trend
toward case-ending procedures without full trial appears to be spreading to
other former communist nations.
Il. Some Context
With the foregoing in mind, the range of case-ending options for
European prosecutors seems to have a rough resemblance to those available
to their American counterparts. Both groups decline or drop a substantial
number of cases, either for evidentiary reasons or for lack of public
interest.22 The various forms of conditional disposal seem somewhat
comparable to American diversion schemes, which dispose of cases without
criminal convictions so long as the defendant fulfills the stipulated
obligations. 2 As in Europe, if the defendant fails to meet the
requirements, a prosecution may be instituted. A good analogy for the
European penal order is a little more difficult to find, although the process
in low-level American courts often becomes so standardized, with a widely
understood "going rate" (i.e., punishment) for a given crime, that the
resulting plea agreements may not be altogether different from penal
orders.22 As noted, there are important differences between European
negotiated case settlements and American plea bargains, but they do have
enough in common as to be treated by scholars as members of the same
species.
Moreover, the various forms of prosecutorial adjudication on both
sides of the Atlantic may have at least one similar motivation--caseload
pressure. Neither American prosecutors nor their European counterparts
226. See Michael Edmund O'Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations
An Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 Am. CRIm. L. REv. 1439, 1439-41 (2004)
(analyzing the factors that go into American federal prosecutorial decision-making on
whether to pursue or disregard a case); Michael Edmund O'Neill, When Prosecutors Don 't:
Trends in Federal Prosecutorial Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 221, 221-26 (2003)
(detailing American federal prosecutorial discretion and the reasons prosecutors decide not
to proceed with a case).
227. NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS 152 (1977); 4
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13. 1(d) (3d ed. 2007).
228. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHM4ENT: HANDLING CASES IN
A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 187-89 (1992) (noting that the plea bargaining system in
American lower courts involves established sentences and minor negotiation).
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can try all of the cases on their respective dockets, requiring the use of
discretion and alternative case-ending mechanisms. Sometimes the
adjudication is de jure, when an American district attorney dismisses a case,
for instance, or a Dutch prosecutor uses the strajbeschikking procedure.
Other times, prosecutors engage in de facto adjudication, with judges
"rubber stamping" the prosecutorial application, 2 giving it the formal
license of the court. As such, the prosecutor is the court, for all intents and
purposes, leading the judge's hand in signing the judgment. 3
One basic conclusion is that prosecutorial adjudication exists in
America and Europe, and the phenomenon goes beyond plea bargaining.
But like Professor Langer's insightful multi-country study, 3 our review
only supports a "weak" hypothesis, premised on surface similarities and
trends. A stronger statement-for example, that prosecutorial adjudication
in Europe is virtually identical to that in the United States-cannot be
sustained once the larger context is taken into consideration. Although it is
difficult to succinctly and accurately describe the American prosecutor,
given the sheer number and diversity of prosecution offices,232 some
admittedly broad points might be made.
For instance, aspirational language may describe the prosecutorial
function as an impartial "minister of justice, 23 3 but there should be little
229. See generally Report by Jhrg-Martin Jehie, Discretionary Powers of Public
Prosecution: Opportunity or Legal Principle-Advantages and Disadvantages, Conference
of Prosecutors General, Conference of Prosecutors General of Europe, 5th Session (May
2004) at 8 [hereinafter Report by J6rg-Martin Jehle], available at http://www.coe.int
/t/dght/cooperation/ccpe/conferences/cpge/2004/RapportJehleen.pdf, Erik Luna, Gridland:
An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing, 96 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 25 (2005)
[hereinafter Luna, Gridland].
230. WADE, The Power to Decide, supra note 132, at 80. The Italian system features a
conscious attempt to avoid this de facto shift in power by leaving dismissing decisions in the
hands of the judiciary. Caianiello, The Italian Public Prosecutor, supra note 53, at pt.
IV.B. 1. But see id at pt. IV.B3.2 (noting the presence of bargaining and accelerated
proceedings within the Italian system).
231. See supra notes 5 2-54 and accompanying text (discussing study).
232. See, e.g., STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 1 (2006), available at http://bjs.
ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf (providing statistics on U.S. state prosecutors'
offices).
233. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2007); see also A.B.A.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
Standard 3-1.2 (1993) (describing the prosecutor as "an administrator of justice, an advocate,
and an officer of the court; [who] must exercise sound discretion in the performance of his or
her functions"). Though frequently employed in English language discussions, the term
"minister ofjustice" is highly problematic. It is intended as shorthand for the more impartial
role played by continental prosecutors and their position as representatives of the public
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doubt that American prosecutors see themselves as advocates in a
234
sometimes brutally adversarial process. Their role is not necessarily to
find the truth 23 -that is the job of the trial court-but instead to marshal
the evidence and arguments that support a conviction and sentence. The
American legal system and its so-called "battle model" assume that the truth
will be uncovered and justice achieved through a contest between
adversaries, the prosecution and defense, as the judge and jury sift through
opposing stories.
The adversarial role conception can be exacerbated by prosecutorial
incentive structures. Typically, state attorneys general, district attorneys,
county and city attorneys, and other chief prosecutors are elected officials.
In the rough-and-tumble of American politics, a key factor in reelection is
the number and rate of convictions and the aggregate amount of
punishment. 3 Line attorneys have similar incentives within their offices,
where prosecutors with the highest conviction and sentencing statistics are
in the best position for career advancement. 3 Although receiving an
interest. In Europe, however, the actual Minister of Justice is a politician and member of the
executive branch, and thus not necessarily associated with impartiality at all.
234. See, e.g., KAGAN, supra note 21, at 61-96 (analyzing adversarialism in the
American criminal justice system).
235. Johnson, supra note 21, at 263-64.
236. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN
AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 207 (2004) (noting that "many American prosecuting attorneys
are continuously campaigning and formulate. ... their tactics in individual cases on the basis
of' public opinion); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004
Wis. L. REv. 837, 902-03 ("[I]n evaluating prosecutors' work, the public tends to
overemphasize the measurable or obvious aspects of what prosecutors do (e.g., the number
of convictions they obtain, the length of sentences, and prosecutors' behavior in public
trials) and tend to overlook more momentous decisions that occur behind the scenes."); Eric
Rasmusen et al., Convictions Versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor's Choice, I11 Am. L.
& ECON. REv. 47,75-76 (2009) (using statistical analyses to determine that prosecutors are
motivated by gaining votes and finding that elected prosecutors have higher conviction
rates); cf Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the
Misbehaving Prosecutor: Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. Am. L. 45, 59-62 (2005) (describing political and nonpolitical incentives of state
prosecutors).
237. See, e.g., Richard T. Boylan, What do Prosecutors Maximize?: Evidence From the
Careers of U.S. Attorneys, 7 Am. L. & ECON. REv. 379, 379 (2005) (finding that the length of
prison sentences is positively related to subsequent favorable career outcomes for U.S.
Attorneys); Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize?: An Analysis of the
Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 Am. L. & ECON. REv. 259, 263-65 (2000) (describing
various motivating factors for prosecutors to gain convictions and finding that "federal
attomneys are likely to accept cases with higher career returns and with higher social
returns"); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REv. 125, 134-35 (2004) ("Prosecutors with the highest
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education in legal adversarialism, perhaps complemented by some clinical
experience in law school, new prosecutors may obtain only "rudimentary"
job training when compared to the approaches taken in other nations. 3
Moreover, many young attorneys stay in a prosecution office only for a few
years, seeking to build their resumes and credentials as a means to achieve a
highi-paying job in the private sector.23
Despite all of this, American prosecutors tend to have enormous
autonomy in their decision-making, including powers that amount to
prosecutorial adjudication, with relatively weak hierarchical supervision of
the discretion exercised in individual cases.24 As noe nte introduction,
not every office promulgates written guidelines on the exercise of
discretion, and those that do often keep the guidelines unofficial and even
confidential .24 ' The language tends to be general and flexible, sounding
more like policy statements than directives and providing little in terms of
actual, case-specific guidance. But even relatively specific terms are not
binding on prosecutors in any meaningful way. Internal discipline for
failing to abide by office guidelines is virtually unknown, and courts refuse
to enforce these guidelines in criminal cases. Moreover, the prosecution is
rarely involved in investigations and never responsible for police activities,
despite its reliance on law enforcement agents for trial evidence.
conviction rates (and, thus, reputations as the best performers) stand the greatest chance for
advancement internally."). But see Boylan, supra, at 379 (finding that "conviction rates do
not appear to affect the careers of U.S. attorneys").
238. Frase, supra note 98, at 562-63; see also supra Part IV.B. I (discussing the law
school trend toward enhanced skills training and clinical experiences).
239. See, e.g., TONRY, supra note 236, at 208 ("Many elected state prosecutors and
appointed U.S. attorneys serve only a few years and aspire .. . to enter a lucrative private
law practice."); Dunahoe, supra note 236, at 59-61 (same); cf. Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl
X. Long, Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of Federal Prosecutors, 48 J.L. &
ECON. 627 (2005) (discussing why prosecutors want to work for the government instead of
going into the private sector); Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda
Setting in United States Attorneys' Offices: The Role of U.S. Attorneys and Their Assistants,
23 JUST. Sys. J. 271, 278-81 (2002) (analyzing post-U.S. Attorney job positions to
determine prosecutors' motivations finding that many are motivated by the desire to impress
future employers or to gain media attention for political purposes). But cf Lochner, supra,
at 282-88 (analyzing and discussing trends in career federal prosecutors).
240. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 21, at 255-56 ("What stands out is not that such
review occasionally occurs, but rather how infrequently and superficially superiors monitor
their subordinates' decisions. Oversight in American offices is especially conspicuous by its
absence in the great bulk of relatively 'nonserious' cases. . . ."). See generally KAGAN,
supra note 2 1, at 72.
241. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing problems with internal
guidelines in American prosecutors' offices).
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Prosecutors often argue for the introduction of such evidence against
defense claims of police illegality, but they do so as advocates for their
cases rather than as participants or supervisors of the investigations.
Although this description is necessarily broad and incomplete, it does
highlight some of the reasons why prosecutorial power in the United States
should be disconcerting to scholars, policymakers, and the general public.
If adjudication is about truth-finding and the impartial review of all aspects
of a case, there is good reason to doubt that the American prosecutor is the
appropriate actor to fulfill this function. A key question here is whether
adjudication by European prosecutors raises the same problems. As
mentioned earlier, U.S. scholarship has highlighted various factors that
allegedly constrain prosecutors in Europe, although some have proven to be
more theoretical than practical. For instance, private prosecutions by
victims are relatively uncommon occurrences that can be precluded by
case-ending choices, which tends to make the potential for victim-led
actions somewhat irrelevant to the decision-making process. 242  Other
factors, however, strongly influence European prosecutors in the exercise of
their discretion and therefore merit greater attention in comparative
analysis.
A. The Context of Prosecution in Europe
1. Prosecutorial Role
To begin with, the inquisitorial tradition displays a vision of the
prosecutorial role as nonpartisan public service. European criminal justice
systems typically charge prosecutors with a duty to be completely objective
in their pursuit of the truth, based on a belief in the existence of a
"substantive" or "material" truth that can be determined by a dispassionate
fact-finder. 4 Continental prosecutors assume a high degree of
242. See WADE, The Power to Decide, supra note 132, at 63-65 (showing statistical
infrequency of private prosecution in England and Wales and Sweden).
243. See, e.g., Recommendation 19, supra note 76, at 8 (instructing prosecutors to
"carry out their fuinctions fairly, impartially and objectively"); Francisca Van Dunem, The
Role of the Public Prosecution Office in the Penal Field, in THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC
PROSECUTION OFFICE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 109-10 (1997) [hereinafter Van Dunem,
The Role] (describing prosecutorial adherence in Europe to "principles that seek the closest
possible correspondence between procedural veracity and the underlying facts in order to
secure substantive justice"); Marianne L6schnig-Gspandl, Austria, in THE ROLE OF TiE
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR IN' THE EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 12 (Tom Vander Beken
& Michael Kilchling eds., 2000) [hereinafter L6schnig-Gspandl, Austria] (describing
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independence in their activities and are frequently associated with the
judicial function, 2"4 thereby reinforcing the expectation to act with a degree
of detachment, assisting the courts in achieving the criminal justice
system's goal of discovering the truth and reacting appropriately to it. The
extent to which prosecutors live up to such expectations is uncertain and
perhaps inherently opaque, and the notion of complete objectivity will
sound preposterous to many scholars. Nonetheless, the basic ideal deeply
affects the way in which European prosecutors view their role and work .245
As an independent body with an affiliation with the judiciary,
prosecutors of continental Europe are likely to have quite different aims and
motivations than their counterparts working in truly adversarial settings.
Success is not measured by convictions, and acquittals are not seen as
failures.24 Instead, continental prosecutors are supposed to find the truth
and achieve evenhanded outcomes. This expectation and the concomitant
job culture affect discretionary decision-making and encourage case-ending
solutions that comport with the interests of justice, whatever those interests
may be. While it would be naYve to assume that prosecutors will "get it
right" every time, given enormous time pressures and typically limited
information, there is no evidence that prosecutors in the study countries are
led by anything other than a judicially informed vision of truth and fairness.
Despite their quasi-judicial role and independence, prosecutors are
held accountable through a hierarchical system and series of guidelines
(discussed below). 4 It is widely believed that the lack of such measures
would leave prosecutors free to interpret the needs of justice as they alone
see fit, regardless of the democratically supported goals of government. No
less than undue political meddling in individual cases, a free-wheeling
prosecution would be perceived as undermining the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system. Still, these competing concerns are consistent with
Austrian public prosecutors as "obligated by law to be objective and to explore substantive
truth").
244. See, e.g., LISBON NETWORK, SIXTH MEETING OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN
NETWORK FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN PERSONS AND ENTITIES
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TRAINING OF JUDGES AND PUBLIC PROSECUTORS 4-5 (Nov. 2003)
(discussing the similar roles and training requirements of judges and prosecutors in
European nations).
245. See, e.g., Boyne, Varieties of Practice, supra note 120, at 27 1-72 (reflecting on
German prosecutors' "deep commitment to the German Rechtsstaat or law-based state" and
to "Objectivitiztsprinzip" or principles of objectivity).
246. Id. at 32 (noting that "the majority of German prosecutors do not regard
convictions as victories and acquittals as losses.").
247. See infra Part III.A (discussing various constraints on European prosecutors).
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and arguably balanced by a controversial but core feature of continental
law: the prosecution's connection with both the judiciary and the
executive. This arrangement seeks to provide prosecutorial independence
in performing an objective truth-finding function, while also ensuring that
prosecutors remain politically accountable and guided by official policy in
more general terms, all with the goal of impartial decision-making.
Discussions about prosecutorial positioning within the branches of
government have taken on new dimensions in recent decades in response to
democratic reforms in former communist bloc states and some maj or
changes within the criminal justice systems of Western Europe. To this
day, the placement of prosecutors remains a hotly debated constitutional
* 248
issue. In France and the Netherlands, for instance, prosecutors are
officially members of the judiciary, although hierarchically subordinate to a
member of the executive, the Minister of Justice. 4 In other systems, the
prosecution service is regarded as an adjunct of the executive, but one that
requires a great deal of independence and acts as a sort of "second judge" in
the criminal process .2 10 This is epitomized by the German doctrine that the
prosecution service is a judicial organ of the executive .2 11  European
248. See, e.g., Giulio Illuminati, Italy, in THE PROSECUTOR OF A PERMANENT
INTERNATIONAL CRIINAL COURT 3 70, 414-17 (Louise Arbour et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter
Illuminati, in Arbour et al.] (describing the "wide political debate" in Italy over "whether the
unity of prosecutors and judges should be maintained"); Giulio Illuminati, Italy, in THE ROLE
OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR IN THE EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 111-13 (Tom
Vander Beken & Michael Kilchling eds., 2000) [hereinafter Illuminati, in Vander Beken &
Kilchling] (giving a brief history of the "public debate" over the public prosecutor's role in
Italy).
249. WET OP DE RECHTERLIJKE ORGANISATIE [WET RO] [LAW OF JUDICIAL
ORGANIZATION] art. 1 (Neth.) (listing prosecutors as members of the judiciary); Wade et al.,
supra note 110, at 184 (asserting that "[tjhe French prosecution service is considered part of
the judiciary"); see also Blom & Smit, supra note 133, at 241 (same); Hodgson, supra note
215, at pt. L.A (discussing judicial status of French prosecutors); Jacqueline Hodgson, The
French Prosecutor in Question, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1361 (2010) (same); Peggy
Pfiitzner, Strafrechtspflege in Frankreich, in 2 STRUCTURES OF EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
pt. II.11 (Ulrich Sieber & Marianne Wade eds., Diincker & Humblodt forthcoming) (same);
Peter J.P. Tak, The Dutch Prosecutor. A Prosecuting and Sentencing Officer, in THE
PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Eric Luna & Marianne Wade eds.,
forthcoming 2011) thereinafter Tak, The Dutch Prosecutor] (discussing judicial status of
Dutch prosecutors); Tak, Criminal Justice System in the Netherlands, supra note 166, at pt.
I1.B (same).
250. See Boyne, Varieties of Practice, supra note 120, at 1, 28, 31, 94, 192, 204, 219
("[11n Germany's inquisitorial system, prosecutors function as second judges dedicated to
finding the objective truth.").
251. See, e.g., Kilchling, Germany, supra note 125, at 76 (describing the hybrid
judicial-executive role played by German public prosecutors); see also Marc Engeihart,
Strafrechtspflege in Deutschland, 6 STRUCTURES OF EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE pt. 1I.13
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prosecutors may thus combine "political foundations with judicial
functions," serving as "a kind of suspension bridge between politics and the
judiciary which brings to mind the Bridge on the River Kwai. 5
Continental prosecution services are keenly aware of the balance, with their
prosecutors expected to play a role that combines the truth-seeking
objectivity of the judiciary with fidelity to criminal policy set by the
executive.
2. Education, Training, and Culture
The institutionalization of prosecutors as objective truth-seekers
reflects the inquisitorial tradition central to continental European legal
cultures. Under this view, law is a science, the product of rational decision-
making that can establish the truth and achieve justice through logical,
balanced analysis. The clearest expression of this philosophy is seen in
German substantive criminal law, which has been described as "one of the
great achievements of the human sciences. 2 53 As Markus Dubber notes,
the German penal code is surprisingly brief and its statutory norms may
seem quite vague.25
[But] they are, in fact, incomplete by design. The ambiguities and gaps
in the code are filled by the professor-scientists, who through continuous
scientific research and discourse refine the science that is the criminal
law, and whose discoveries aid--or at least should aid-judges in
resolving particular cases and, more ambitiously still, the legislature in
reforming the criminal code. 255
(Ulrich Sieber & Marianne Wade eds., Dtincker & Humblodt forthcoming) (discussing
judicial status of German prosecutors).
252. Roger Perrot, Role of the Public Prosecution Office in Criminal, Civil and
Commercial Fields, in THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTION OFFICE IN A DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY 166 (Council of Europe et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter Perrot, Criminal, Civil, and
Commercial Fields].
253. Markus Dirk Dubber, The Promise of German Criminal Law. A Science of Crime
and Punishment, 6 GERmAN L.J. 1049, 1051 (2005) (quoting Enrique Gimbemat Ordeig,
Sind die bisherigen dogmatischen Grunderfordernisse eines All1gemeinen Teils geeignet, dem
heutigen Stand der Kriminalitzt, der Strafzumessung und des Sanktionensystems zu genilgen,
in Kis DES STRAFRECH-TS UND DER KRJmiNALWISSENSCHAFTEN? 152, 165 (Hans-Joachim
Hirsch ed. 2001)).
254. Id. at 1054.
2 55. Id.
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In contrast to the American system, the scientific approach of the German
criminal process assumes that every case has a correct solution that can be
achieved through the court's discovery of the truth.
25 6
The viability of law as a science is certainly debatable, Professor
Dubber acknowledges, having been devastated in the United States by the
advent of legal realism and its challenge to formalistic analysis.257 It is
emphasized here, however, only to understand the European prosecutorial
mindset. All continental legal systems have been influenced by this
tradition, duly instilled in French, German, Dutch, Polish, and, to some
extent, Swedish prosecutors through education and training. They have
been indoctrinated with a conception of the legal system as a rational
instrument applied scientifically in order to discover the truth and achieve
258 intr
just outcomes, which itunaffects their own views of the prosecutorial
function and practice within their respective criminal justice systems.
Across Europe, the scientific conception is core to the education and
professional training of prosecutors, who in the end become career civil
servants largely insulated from political pressure. 5
Moreover, European prosecutors are in the profession for the sake of
being prosecutors-in other words, it is an occupational goal rather than a
means to another end (e.g., a law firm job). Although the fledgling
prosecution service in England and Wales is only beginning to achieve
higher status, competition to become a prosecutor in continental Europe can
be fierce. Those who become prosecutors will usually remain in this
position for the rest of their working lives, unless they are in a system that
allows (or even encourages) prosecutors to switch into the judiciary and
vice versa, such as in France and some German states.26 A trainee
prosecutor joins a professional civil service surrounded by experienced
256. Id. at 1053, 1059.
257. See id. at 1053 (comparing the divergent views of criminal law as science in
Germany and the United States).
258. See, e.g., id. at 1054-55 (characterizing German criminal law as "the province of
scientists" and describing the structured and lengthy education in criminal law received by
German law students); Boyne, Varieties of Practice, supra note 120, at 26-27 (describing the
"socialization and professionalization process of. .. German lawyers").
259. See, e.g., TONRY, supra note 236, at 206 (noting that European prosecutors are
"substantially removed from partisan political influence and the temptation to do things
solely because they are politically popular").
260. See, e.g., Peter Morrd, Germany, in THE PROSECUTOR OF A PERMANENT
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 341 (Louise Arbour et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Morr6,
Germany] (finding that "[ijn Germany chief prosecutors" often "have been prosecutors or
judges before" becoming chief prosecutors).
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attorneys, immersed in a strong working culture that ideally expects and
nurtures exchange among prosecutors, encouraging them to draw upon the
experience of colleagues and superiors. Typically, young prosecutors are
employed for a training and test period of a few years before receiving a
more permanent status, which includes strong employment safeguards that
protect against untoward pressure.26 AsagnrlueE opn
prosecutors are only accountable to their superiors, providing a buffer from
direct political influence and public opinion.
The legal culture, the education and training, and the expectations
placed upon prosecutors all shape their self-perception and practice. In
continental Europe, these factors contribute to a particular profile:
prosecutors as judicial professionals. Indeed, prosecutors and judges often
receive the same training and continuing legal education, which contributes
to a prosecutorial culture with a distinct tie to the judiciary. 6 The German
system offers a paradigmatic model derived from its conception of the rule
of law (Rechtsstaats) and a European affinity for bureaucracy. 6 ' German
prosecutors are members of a professional caste, a well-trained group of
lawyers specializing in their area of work, honed through regular exchange
with their colleagues and involvement in country-wide and international
professional organizations, but shielded from direct influence by the
populace.
For the European prosecutor, career advancement will be within the
institution, with the likelihood of promotion limited by the number of
superior positions available. Still, it is a highly regarded form of public
service, providing good pay, reasonable hours, a collegial environment, and
employment security, which in turn leads to a dedication to the
prosecutorial role. This does not mean that prosecutors are unaffected by
the pressures related to high caseloads, for instance, or the desire for
promotion. They also face the demands of interested parties in individual
261. See, e.g., Peter Mlorr6, Position of the Public Prosecution Office, in THE ROLE OF
THE PUBLIC PROSECTuION OFFICE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 44 (1997) [hereinafter Morrd,
Position] (outlining protection of prosecutorial independence in Germany, including lifetime
appointment with removal only for cause).
262. See, e.g., Morrd, Germany, supra note 260, at 341 (noting that, in Germany, both
prosecutors and judges "need the same legal education and professional requirements" in
order to serve in their respective offices). See generally supra note 255.
263. See Morr6, Germany, supra note 260, at 342-46 (describing in detail the structure
of the German prosecutorial bureaucracy, wherein "directions and instructions" pass
"hierarchically" from a central "executive organ" down to "subordinate prosecutors," with
the result being that "[pirosecutors are bound by the directives and instructions of their
superiors").
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disputes and may even experience the anxiety of a media blitz in certain
high-profile cases. All the same, prosecutors will still see themselves as
long-term inhabitants of a working culture that places a profound emphasis
on professional ethics and expectations, to which they will have to answer
for any compromise made to political or popular demand.2M4 These norms,
rather than a drive for courtroom victories, exert the greatest influence on
prosecutorial decision-making. 6
3. Hierarchy and Guidelines
As alluded to above, accountability is ensured through formal
structures that guide and constrain discretion, including those that directly
relate to case-endings. 6 First and foremost is a clear, established hierarchy
for European prosecution services. 6 Line prosecutors work within an
264. For instance, public controversy was sparked by the conditional disposals of
powerfiul defendants in the Ackermann and Mannesmann cases. See, e.g., Melanie Amann,
Wie Ackermann unter die Kirschdiebe kam, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE SONNTAGSZEITUNG,
Nov. 26, 2006 (providing an example of such controversy); Georg B36nisch & Frank Dohmen,
Freikauf erster Klasse, DER SPIEGEL, Nov. 27, 2006 (same); Anke Brnmner, 1st Justitia bei
einigen blinder als bei anderen?, DER TAGESSPIEGEL, Dec. 3, 2006 (same); Rainer Frenkel,
Eiertanz in Saal 111, DIEi ZEIT, Nov. 30, 2006, http://www.zeit.de/2006/149/Mannesmann (last
visited Nov. 17, 2010) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
265. See, e.g., Boyne, Varieties of Practice, supra note 120, at 271 ("[I1n contrast to
prosecutors in the U.S. system who may be driven by a desire to vanquish the opposition at
trial, German prosecutorial decision-making is sharply constrained by collegial norms of
decision-making.").
266. See, e.g., Recommendation 19, supra note 76, at 9 (demanding that public
prosecutors "define general principles and criteria to be used by way of references against
which decisions in individual cases should be taken, in order to guard against arbitrary
decision-making"); id. at 22-23 (elaborating, in the explanatory memorandum, upon the need
for "a certain level of co-ordination and an effort at consistency" in public prosecutorial
decisions in order to "safeguard" the public).
267. See, e.g., Boyne, Varieties of Practice, supra note 120, at 23 (describing the
"hierarchically" structured prosecutorial service in Germany); Morr6, Germany, supra note
260, at 342 (describing the "hierarchically" structured prosecutorial service in Germany);
Perrot, Criminal, Civil, and Commercial Fields, supra note 252, at 168 ("As a general rule,
Public Prosecution Offices have a pyramidal structure and instructions from the top filter down
to local prosecutors and their deputies and then to the most junior staff."); Antoine Reinhard,
France, in TASKS AN POWERS OF THE PROSECUTION SERVICES IN THE EU MEMBER STATES 11
851 (Peter J.P. Tak ed., 2005) [hereinafter Reinhard, France] (describing the "hierarchically"
structured prosecutorial service in France); Peter J.P. Tak, The Netherlands, in THE ROLE
OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR IN THE EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 126 (Tom
Vander Beken & Michael Kilchling eds., 2000) [hereinafter Tak, The Netherlands]
(describing the "hierarchically" structured prosecutorial service in the Netherlands). Italy
appears to be the exception. See, e.g., Illuminati, in Arbour et al., supra note 248, at 370
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organizational structure in which their immediate superior, if not all superior
prosecutors, have the authority to direct and even substitute a prosecutor in a
given case. Senior prosecutors are expected to make sure that those under their
supervision apply the law even-handedly and in line with policy, especially as
expressed in guidelines .26 8 Powers going down the hierarchy may be used to
direct a prosecutor to act in a certain way or to pull him off a case, where his
actions are deemed contrary to the law or the relevant guidelines as interpreted
by his hierarchical superiors.26 In these situations, the immediately superior
prosecutor can take over the case or appoint another prosecutor under his
supervision. Such substitution may also occur where, for one reason or
another, a junior prosecutor is unable to work on a case or lacks the experience
to handle its intricacies.
Prosecutorial decision-making thus takes place within a hierarchical
system that provides prosecutors with both formal and informal opportunities
to review and discuss cases with their colleagues. Unlike their American
counterparts, however, European prosecutors have no immediate structural
accountability to the general public. The idea of elected prosecutors would be
outlandish to most Europeans, and it certainly would not be seen as a necessary
component of democratic legitimacy. A degree of populism may be integrated
to some extent through juries and lay judges-typically used in more serious
cases-but the actors within the criminal justice system are professionals
whose connection to political decision-making is derivative, provided through
guidelines set by democratically legitimized institutions.
Any political accountability is therefore indirect. Frontline prosecutors
are expected to apply the criminal law as set by the country's legislature, and
(labeling Italian prosecutorial power as "diffuse and not centralised"); Illuminati, in Vander
Beken & Kilchling, supra note 248, at I II ("Nowadays, no hierarchical organization of the
prosecution offices exists at a national level [in Italy]."); Perrot, Criminal, Civil, and
Commercial Fields, supra note 252, at 168 ("it is in the nature of the Public Prosecution
Office to be structurally subject to other superior bodies, with the exception of the Italian
Public Prosecution Office, to which this observation seems not to apply.").
268. See, e.g., Morrd, Position, supra note 261, at 42, 46-48 (describing the German
prosecutorial "chain of superiors," which bears collective responsibility for providing
subordinates with "guidelines" on "how to fiulfil [sic] duties").
269. See, e.g., id. at 48 (citing the German Court Organization Act, which gives a
"superior prosecutor" the power to substitute one prosecutor on a case for another if a
"disagreement arises" between the subordinate prosecutor and his superior);
Recommendation 19, supra note 76, at 21-22 (noting, in the explanatory memorandum, the
need for hierarchical review of public prosecutorial decisions not to prosecute); Kilchling,
Germany, supra note 125, at 76 (discussing the German prosecutorial hierarchy, under
which prosecutors "can he instructed to deal with a certain case in a particular way or can
even be replaced").
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they are remotely tied to elective government through a chain of command that
eventually leads to an executive official.27 In England and Wales, a member
of government, the Attorney General, supervises the Director of Public
Prosecutions, who runs the prosecution service .2 17 1 Likewise, the Swedish
Minister of Justice is politically accountable for the prosecution service
throughout his country.27 In France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland,
the Minister of Justice is formally the head of service with varying degrees of
power to issue orders down the chain of command. 7 In the Netherlands, the
Ministry of Justice merely appoints the influential College of Prosecutors-
General, a body that enjoys great autonomy and authority in running the
criminal justice system as a whole, including formulating guidelines for the
prosecution service .274  In Germany, state Prosecutors-General enforce the
criminal law and report to the respective state (Liinder) Minister of Justice.27
270. See, e.g., Kai Ambos, Comparative Summary of the National Reports, in THE
PROSECUTOR OF A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 499-501, 503-05, 5 10-11,
524-25 (Louise Arbour et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Ambos, Comparative Summary]
(comparing different mechanisms of electoral accountability for prosecutors).
271. See, e.g., Andrew Sanders, England and Wales (United Kingdom), in THE
PROSECUTOR OF A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 297 (Louise Arbour et al.
eds., 2000) [hereinafter Sanders, England and Wales] (noting that, in England and Wales,
the Deputy of Public Prosecutions "is appointed by. and accountable to. the Attorney-
General").
272. See, e.g., Josef Zila, Sweden, in TASKS AND POWERS OF THE PROSECUTION
SERVICES IN THE EU MEMBER STATES 11 1160-61 (Peter J.P. Tak ed., 2005) (identify'ing the
"Ministry of Justice" as the sole executive body capable of giving "instructions as to
prosecution policy" in Sweden).
273. See, e.g., Arkadiusz Lach, The Prosecution Service of Poland, in TASKS AND
POWERS OF THE PROSECUTION SERVICES IN THE EU MEMBER STATES 11 606 (Peter J.P. Tak
ed., 2005) (noting that the Polish Minister of Justice is "accountable before the Parliament
and he can be held liable for prosecution policy or even decisions in particular cases");
Reinhard, France, supra note 267, at 851 (characterizing the French Minister of Justice as
"politically accountable for the policy of the prosecution service" and able to "direct the
Prosecutor General to initiate a . .. prosecution by written instructions"); Tak, The
Netherlands, supra note 267, at 128 (describing the Dutch Minister of Justice's power to
"give general or specific instructions on the exercise of tasks and powers of the prosecution
service" and to "give instructions on ... prosecution in individual cases as Well"); Boyne,
Varieties of Practice, supra note 120, at 25-26 (describing the German Minister of Justice's
power to issue "general rules and regulations which seek to guide prosecutorial decision-
making").
274. See, e.g, Peter J.P. Tak, The Dutch Prosecution Service, TASKS AND) POWERS OF
THE PROSECUTION SERVICES IN THE EU MEMBER STATES 365-66 (Peter J.P. Tak ed., 2004)
("The Board of Prosecutors-General may give instructions to the members of the prosecution
service concerning their tasks and powers in relation to the administration of criminal justice
and other statutory powers, e.g. supervision of the police.").
275. See, e.g, Kilchling, Germany, supra note 125, at 75 (explaining that every German
"State has its own prosecution service, which is subordinated to the Ministry of Justice" and
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As mentioned, some nations have placed explicit restraints on case-
specific orders. In France, for instance, controversy concerning partisanship
and self-interested decision-making in individual cases has resulted in limits on
the Minister of Justice, who now cannot demand that a case be dropped.
Instead, this political official only has the power to order prosecution, with the
duly instructed prosecutor remaining free to voice his own contrary opinion in
court when filing such charges.27 Likewise, frequent orders to file or drop
charges under Poland's previous Minister of Justice have led the current
administration to plan reforms curtailing such powers. For the most part, the
hierarchical structure of European prosecution services allows political officials
only to issue guidelines that provide general direction to prosecutors in their
daily work ensuring that they enforce criminal policy as foreseen by the
legislature and executive. 7 Only on rare occasions do political officials
interfere in individual cases.27
"[hjeaded by a General Prosecutor'); Boyne, Varieties of Practice, supra note 120, at 22
("Germany's prosecution offices ... are organized on the state or Ldinder level and are
subsumed within the state-level Ministries of Justice.").
276. See, eg, Aubusson de Cavarlay, French Criminal Justice System, supra note
134, at 198, (noting that the French Minister of Justice, and French superior prosecutors
generally, have "the power both to impose prosecution and to determine what the public
prosecutor is to request of the court, but. ... not to order that a case be dropped"); WADE,
The Power to Decide, supra note 132, at 101 (discussing the ability of French prosecutors
to tell "the court that they believe the charges are unfounded"); see also Perrot, Criminal,
Civil, and Commercial Fields, supra note 252, at 171 (noting several examples of the
exercise of prosecutorial autonomy in European countries, including France); Eug~ne
Frencken, Position and Status of the Public Prosecution Office, in THE ROLE OF THE
PUBLIC PROSECUTION OFFICE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 38 (1997) [hereinafter Frencken,
Position and Status] (discussing generally the importance of prosecutorial autonomy from
political pressure in European countries and the growing prevalence of restrictions on
"~ministerial interventions" into public prosecutors' affairs); cf Otto Triffierer, Austria, in
THE PROSECUTOR OF A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 212-13 (Louise
Arbour et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Triffterer, Austria] (discussing mechanisms by
which Austrian prosecutors can voice their disagreement with a superior's decision to
prosecute or not prosecute a certain case).
277. See, e.g., Recommendation 18, supra note 120, at 22, 24-25 (p~roviding guidance
in this area); Recommendation 19, supra note 76, at 6, 9 (emphasizing, in the explanatory
memorandum, that government officials in Europe are only permitted to provide general
direction to prosecutors in their daily work); Frencken, Position and Status, supra note
276, at 33-34 (stating that the Belgian Minister of Justice may address instructions or
recommendations to the Public Prosecution Office, but he may not intervene in the
direction of the criminal proceedings); Morr6, Position, supra note 261, at 42-43
(explaining that only the Minster of Justice in Germany, not the government, may instruct
the prosecutor directly).
278. See, e.g., Dan Fr~inde, Finland, in THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF A PERMANENT
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 319-20 (Louise Arbour et al. eds., 2000) (stating that
the last time there was political interference in a routine criminal case was in 1983); Peter
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Still, prosecutors must follow the guidelines issued by the managing
heads of their service when using their discretion to end cases or choosing
particular procedural paths .279  Although the detail provided by such
guidelines varies, the Dutch system provides an example of meticulous
control .280 This point-based approach not only guides prosecutorial charging
decisions but also predetermines which case-ending solutions are possible.28
For instance, if a suspect amasses a certain number of points, the case must
be brought to court, or if the amount falls within certain boundaries the
prosecutor must use a conditional disposal. 8 Any deviation from the
prescribed solution requires a Dutch prosecutor to give detailed, written
reasoning for his decision, which will be reviewed by his superiors. 8
In general, European prosecutors who regularly disregard service
guidelines are likely to be reprimanded, disciplined, and in exceptional cases,
Garde, Denmark, in THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR IN THE EUROPEAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEMS 41 (Tom Vander Beken & Michael Kilchling eds., 2000) (explaining how
the Minister avoided a potential hostile majority in Parliament by declining to interfere in a
celebrated case in Denmark); Illuminati, in Arbour et al., supra note 248, at 376-77
(explaining that there is a risk that prosecutorial decisions will be affected by political
influences even though political pressures should have no effect in routine criminal cases);
Morr6, Germany, supra note 260, at 346 (explaining that prosecutors are not supposed to
interfere in routine criminal cases); Triffterer, Austria, supra note 276, at 22 1-22 (stating
that prosecuting offices do not interfere in routine criminal cases in Austria).
279. See, e.g., Andrew Sanders, England and Wales, in THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR IN THE EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 64 (Tom Vander Beken &
Michael Kilchling eds., 2000) thereinafter Sanders, England] (stating that prosecutors must
follow internal policies and controls when using discretion); Tak, The Netherlands, supra
note 267, at 132 (stating that the Board of Prosecutors-General directed public prosecutors to
follow national prosecution guidelines to harmonize the utilization of discretion).
280. See, e.g., Intervention by Egbert Mjer, Discretionary Powers of Public
Prosecution: Opportunity or Legal Principle-Advantages and Disadvantages, Conference
of Prosecutors General, Conference of Prosecutors General of Europe, 5th Session (May
2004) at 3-4 [hereinafter Intervention by Egbert Myjer], available at http://www.coe.int/
t/dghl/cooperation/ccpe/conferences/cpge/2004/lnterventionMYJER -en.pdf (describing the
computerized system of the Netherlands Board of Prosecutors-General); Tak, The
Netherlands, supra note 267, at 138 (discussing national guidelines for sentencing in the
Netherlands); Tak, Criminal Justice System in the Netherlands, supra note 166, at II.C.2.c
(same).
281. See, e.g., infra Figure 2 (providing examples of the Dutch point-based approach);
see also Intervention by Egbert Myjer, supra note 280, at 3-4 (describing the computerized
system of the Netherlands Board of Prosecutors-General).
282. See, e.g., infra Table 2 (explaining that offenders who amass a certain number of
points will be taken to court).
283. See, e.g., Intervention by Egbert Myjer, supra note 280, at 3-4 (stating that the
prosecutor must provide his superior with reasons why he has decided to seek a higher
penalty or why he has decided not to prosecute).
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dismissed from their post. Moreover, those jurisdictions that publish the
guidelines necessarily create an enforceable right to receive the prescribed
case-ending. For instance, a Dutch suspect can insist upon a conditional
disposal when his point score "entitles" him to this resolution. 84 In England
and Wales, judicial review of a prosecutorial decision may be deemed
unreasonable if it deviates significantly from the resolution provided by the
guidelines; in extreme cases, a decision of this kind may even provide
grounds for legal action against the prosecutor for malicious prosecution. 8
Ultimately, these structures seek to protect prosecutorial independence
while limiting the danger of self-interested decision-making. 8 In 2000, the
European Council of Ministers concluded that coordination of prosecutorial
services and a concerted effort at consistency were required to guarantee
equal treatment of all citizens and efficient functioning of criminal justice
systems.28 In particular, the Council emphasized the aforementioned means
to limit prosecutorial discretion:
* a well designed hierarchy, with no place for insidious bureaucracy, in
which all members of the Public Prosecution service should feel
responsible for their own decisions and capable of taking the initiatives
needed to do their particular job;
" general guidelines on the implementation of crime policy, setting out
priorities and the means of pursuing them, having account of the
discretionary powers recognized to the public prosecutor; and
" a set of criteria to guide decision-making in individual cases, with the aim,
for example, of preventing inconsistencies such as that of certain offenses
systematically attracting prosecution in certain public prosecutors' offices
and not in others or being dealt with under different procedures or
categorized differently.
288
The extent to which hierarchy, guidelines, and the like actually regulate
prosecutorial behavior across Europe remains to be tested. But the patterns
of decision-making seem to indicate that these formal structures, along with
education, training, culture, and role perception, place significant restraints on
a prosecutor's use of discretionary authority.
284. TAK, DUTCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 141, at 134-37.
285. Sanders, England, supra note 279, at 65.
286. See, e.g., Recommendation 19, supra note 76, at 15 (arguing that prosecutorial
independence "must be fixed by law so as to rule out ... any risk of drift towards self-
interest by public prosecutors themselves").
287. Id at 22.
288. Id at 23.
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Table 2: Case Examples Evaluated in Accordance
with the Dutch Polaris Guidelines*
Basic Offenses Score Penalty Points
A steals a bicycle (10 points) 10
B breaks into a house (60 points) to steal a computer 60
C commits assault against V (47 points) 47
Oualification
A stole 3 bicycles (add 15 points) 25
A is a persistent offender (add 100%)** 50
C used a knife (add 17 points) 64
C randomly selected V (add 25%) 80
Results
0-20 pts: prosecutor will end the case with a fine at most (drop/conditional disposal)
21-30 pts: prosecutor will end the case with a fine or task (conditional disposal)
31-60 pts: prosecutor will end the case provided a task is performed (conditional disposal)
61-120 pts: prosecutor will demand sentencing to a task or, if a crime of severe violence,
imprisonment (conviction)
> 120 pts: prosecutor will demand sentencing to imprisonment (conviction)
Penalty Points Values"*
1 point = E 29 of fine, 2 hours of task punishment (e.g., community service), or I day of
imprisonment
Case Application
If A committed the basic offense, he will face a prosecutorial drop or fine of E 290. If A stole
three bikes and is a persistent offender, he will face a fine of E 1450 or 100 hours of community
service, for example.
If B committed the basic offense, he will face a conditional disposal of 120 hours of, e.g.,
community service.
If C committed the basic offense, he will face a conditional disposal of 94 hours of, e.g.,
community service. If C used a knife and chose his victim randomly, he will be taken to court
with the prosecutor requesting 80 days of imprisonment.
* The authors would like to thank Marcel Bijen and Floris Varenkamp of the Dutch Prosecution
Service 's Head Office for their assistance in compiling these examples.
* *As ofJanuary 1, 2011.
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4. The Full Ambit of the Prosecutorial Function
Consistent with the European vision of law enforcement, prosecution
services also have duties stretching beyond the narrow mandate of making
case-ending decisions. 8 Continental prosecutors are considered
representatives of the public interest,290 a conception that is starting to apply
to British prosecutors in their practice and priority setting.29'1 As such, they
are expected not only to act objectively and fairly in relation to the suspect,
but also to consider, inform, and sometimes even compensate others
affected by case decisions, particularly crime victims. 292  Prosecutors are
directly involved in the formulation of crime prevention and policing
strategies, and in some countries (e.g., France) they can be required to
participate in civil trials that affect the public interest.293  The latter
responsibility allows the "operation of the judicial branch of power"
294
where individual citizens and private actions alone would be unable to
secure the rule of law. While these duties may not have a deep impact on
289. See, e.g., Conference of Prosecutors General, supra note 118, at 20-24 (discussing
the duties of prosecutors in different countries); Report by Silvij inkovec, Prosecutors'
Duties Outside the Criminal Justice Sector, Conference of Prosecutors General of Europe,
5th Session (May 2004) at 6-9, [hereinafter Report by Silvij Sinkovec], available at http://
www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/ccpe/conferences/cpge/2004/RapportSfNKiOVEC-en.pdf (stating
examples of the different extra-judicial powers and relations of public prosecutors in various
European countries); Recommendation 19, supra note 76, at 4 (describing additional duties of
public prosecutors in certain jurisdictions); Recommendation 1604, supra note 117, at 26-
27, App. 5 (explaining, in the explanatory memorandum, the nonpenal law responsibilities
of public prosecutors); Mario Busacca, The Role of the Public Prosecution Office in Civil
and Commercial Fields, in THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTION OFFICE IN A DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY 157-64 (1997) [hereinafter Busacca, Civil and Commercial Fields] (discussing the
different duties and powers of the Public Prosecutor in Italy); Perrot, Criminal, Civil, and
Commercial Fields, supra note 252, at 174-75 (explaining the ways the Public Prosecution
Office can intervene in civil cases).
290. See, e.g., Recommendation 19, supra note 76, at 4 (stating that public prosecutors
act on behalf of society and in the public interest).
29 1. See, e.g., Wade et al., supra note 1 10, at 182-84 (explaining that the prosecution
services in Britain are converging with the continental systems and taking on more roles).
292. See, e.g., Recommendation 19, supra note 76, at 9 (stating that public prosecutors
should take proper account of the views and concerns of crime victims); Morr6, Germany,
supra note 260, at 344 (explaining the existence of prosecutorial accountability towards
victims); Marianne Wade et al., Well Informed? Well Represented? Well-Nigh Powerless?,
14 EURt. J. GRIM. POL'Y & RES. 249, 250-51 (2008) (discussing a prosecutor's role in relation
to victim's rights).
293. See, e.g., Wade et al., supra note 110, at 184 (explaining that French prosecutors
have the ight to intervene in procedures beyond the criminal justice arena when necessary).
294. Report by Silvij inkovec, supra note 289, at 10-12.
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the daily work of most European prosecutors, they provide insight into the
broader expectations of the prosecutorial service.
Most importantly, the prosecutorial function includes oversight of
police investigations to guarantee accuracy and compliance with individual
rights. 9 European prosecutors are expected to play an active role in
making sure a case is fully investigated and any evidence brought to court
295. See, e.g., Recommendation 19, supra note 76, at 7-8 (describing the public
prosecution's involvement in police investigations); Recommendation 1604, supra note 117,
at App. I 1(a) (explaining, in the explanatory memorandum, what role the personnel of
public prosecution services play in the investigation of a crime); Ambos, Comparative
Summary, supra note 270, at 513-15 (explaining that the criminal police in France are
controlled by the prosecutor); Giacomo Barletta, Opening Speech, in THE ROLE OF THE
PUBLIC PROSECUTION OFFICE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY It (1997) (stating that the Public
Prosecution Office supervises the police); Carlo Bellitto, The Role of the Public Prosecution
Office in the Criminal Field, in THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTION OFFICE IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 78 (1997) (stating that the prosecution office has the police at its
disposal); Jacques Buisson, The Role of the Public Prosecution Office in the Criminal Field,
in THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTION OFFICE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 54-65 (1997)
[hereinafter Buisson, Criminal Field] (explaining the prosecuting authorities' command over
police activities); Carlos Castresana Fernandez, The Role of the Public Prosecution in the
Criminal Field, in THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTION OFFICE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
100-01, 103 (1997) (discussing the investigative procedure in force in numerous European
countries, specifically with regard to police); Kdlmdn Gy~5rgyi, Hungary, in THE
PROSECUTOR OF A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3 54-56 (Louise Arbour et
al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Gydrgyi, Hungary] (stating that the prosecution supervises the
investigation); Illuminati, in Arbour et al., supra note 248, at 374-75 (explaining that the
prosecution has the power to direct investigations); Illuminati, in Vander Beken & Kilcbling,
supra note 248, at 113-14 (explaining that the prosecutor directs the investigations and gives
guidelines to the police); Loschnig-Gspandl, Austria, supra note 243, at 15 (explaining the
role of the public prosecutor with regard to police); L. Miskolci, Hungary, in THE ROLE OF
THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR IN THE EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 97 (Tom Vander
Beken & Michael Kilchling eds., 2000) [hereinafter Miskolci, Hungary] (stating that the
prosecutor serves as a mediator between the court and the investigation office, and as a
result, he may supervise the legality of the police actions more efficiently); Morr&, Position,
supra note 261, at 43 (stating that the police are subject to the directives given by the
prosecutor); Morr6, Germany, supra note 260, at 344-45 (explaining that the prosecutor is
the "master of investigations"); Miroslav Ruzicka, Czech Republic, in THE PROSECUTOR OF A
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 286-87 (Louise Arbour et al. eds., 2000)
(stating that prosecutors supervise the activities of investigators); Alexandre Shushanashwili
& Georgi Glonti, Georgia, in THE PROSECUTOR OF A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 336-37 (Louise Arbour et al. eds., 2000) (discussing the role of the prosecutor in
investigations); Triffierer, Austria, supra note 276, at 218-19 (explaining the prosecutorial
responsibilities for the investigation and prosecution of a case); Van Dunem, The Role, supra
note 243, at I111 (explaining the common characteristics of the relations between legal and
police departments across different countries); cf Wade, European Prosecution, supra note
120, at 391 (explaining that the line between prosecutorial functions and police duties is
blurring across Europe because of a tendency towards inter-agency cooperation).
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represents the truth.29 Despite national variations, Europe has reached a
virtual consensus that prosecutors should be personally involved in the
investigation of serious crimes, and their office should provide direction in
other cases through general guidelines. 9 Swedish prosecutors take the
lead on all complex crime investigations, for example, and even British
police are expected to consult and work with prosecutors regarding the
collection of evidence in serious and complicated cases .298  In other
countries, the prosecution service is formally in charge of all investigations
and required to provide the police with guidance in every case .2 99 Although
time and resource constraints tend to limit direct oversight to situations
where prosecutorial leadership is indispensable,3 continental prosecutors
296. Prosecutors are explicitly placed in charge of investigative proceedings by Article
81 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 160 of the German Code of Criminal
Procedure, Section 148 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure (as well as Section 13 of
the Police Act), and Article 298, paragraph 1, of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure.
Chapter 23, Section 3, of the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure requires the prosecution
service to take charge of complex investigations as soon as someone is reasonably suspected
of -the offense; the prosecution service will also assume immediate responsibility of
investigations if special reasons so require. Zila, Swedish Criminal Justice System, supra
note 138, at 298-99 (quoting RB 23:3). No matter who leads the investigation, the Swedish
prosecution service retains responsibility for it. Id. at 299. Despite Italy's new
adversarialism in criminal procedure, once an Italian prosecutor is informed of an
investigation (which is supposed to occur without delay), the police become subservient to
the prosecutor's orders. Caianiello, The Italian Public Prosecutor, supra note 53, at Part
III.A.l1.
297. Ambos, Comparative Summary, supra note 270, at 514-15; Buisson, Criminal
Field, supra note 295, at 58-59; Nico Keijzer, The Netherlands, in THE PROSECUTOR OF A
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 419 (Louise Arbour et al. eds., 2000);
Miskolci, Hungary, supra note 295, at 96-97; TAK, DUTCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, Supra
note 14 1, at 126-28; WADE, The Power to Decide, supra note 132, at 58-59.
298. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing role of Swedish
prosecutors in complex investigations); Sanders, England and Wales, supra note 27 1, at 297,
301-02 (stating that British police choose to seek the advice of the CPS in particularly
serious or complex cases); Ambos, Comparative Summary, supra note 270, at 512-13. For
the newly reformed contours of this somewhat different position, see Chris Lewis, The
Evolving Role of the English Crown Prosecution Service, in THE PROSECUTOR IN
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE pt. IL.A (Eric Luna & Marianne Wade eds., forthcoming
2011) [hereinafter Lewis, The Evolving Role].
299. See supra note 304 (providing countries in which the prosecution is in charge of
investigations).
300. See Gyt~rgyi, Hungary, supra note 295, at 355 (explaining that the police may start
proceedings, except in cases which are the exclusive responsibility of the prosecution); TAK,
DUTCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 141, at 128 (asserting that prosecutors must
prioritize when instituting investigations because of financial constraints); WADE, The Power
to Decide, supra note 132, at 58-59 (explaining that the PPS only becomes involved where
it is really necessary).
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are held responsible for the legality of investigations .30 ' Their formal status
as "ruler," "director," or "master" of the investigative stage in France,
Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland, as well as in all complex cases in
Sweden, carries with it an obligation to ensure fairness of criminal
302investigations and adherence to procedural rules at all times.
The criminal trial of continental Europe is discussed at length
elsewhere, but a few aspects deserve mention here. The civil law tradition
is marked by a less aggressive defense bar and the prominence of written
documents, especially the prosecution's files.30 With regard to the former,
the continental judge and prosecutor are expected and trusted to protect the
rights of the accused-in fact, the prosecutor has a duty to present
exculpatory and mitigating evidence 3 -which ostensibly limits the need
for a vigorously independent defense. As for the latter, the abiding
conception of prosecutors as quasi-judicial officers in pursuit of the truth
provides their case files a presumption of veracity and considerable weight
in court, particularly given that the files are open and available to the
defense. 0 For these and other reasons, trials in continental Europe are
vastly different from those in adversarial-based systems. In the
Netherlands, for instance, judges rely almost entirely upon case files in
making their decisions and thereby manage to complete most trials in a few
hours and the most complicated cases in a matter of days.30 Even in
continental systems where case files themselves are not considered
evidence and trials require live witnesses (e.g., in Germany through its
301. See, e.g., Kilchling, Germany, supra note 125, at 75 ("[T]he prosecutor holds the
position of a watchdog of legality even with respect to judicial decision-making.").
302. See, e.g., Ambos, Comparative Summary, supra note 270, at 512-16 (explaining
the role of prosecutors in the investigation); see also Hodgson, Guilty Pleas, supra note 215,
at pt. L.C (discussing role of French prosecutors in the investigation); Caianiello, The Italian
Public Prosecutor, supra note 53, at pt. III.A. I (discussing the role of Italian prosecutors in
the investigation); Tak, The Dutch Prosecutor, supra note 249 (discussing the role of Dutch
prosecutors in the investigation); Zila, Prosecutorial Powers, supra note 179, at pt. 111.13
(discussing the investigatory role of prosecutors in Nordic countries).
303. Infra notes 338-39.
304. See, e.g., Recommendation 19, supra note 76, at 8 (explaining the duties of the
public prosecutor towards defendants).
305. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights
art. 6(l), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953; Recommendation
19, supra note 76, at 8.
306. Piet-Hein A.J. Cremers, Fight Against Criminality Relations Between Public
Prosecutor and Police, in TiE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTION OFFICE IN A DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY 67, 75 (1997); Tak, Criminal Justice System in the Netherlands, supra note 166, at
pt. 111.
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principle of immediacy, or Unmittelbarkeitsprinzip), courts utilize and rely
upon the files in a manner that would be unacceptable in the United
States.30 A prosecutor's influence upon a trial in continental Europe is thus
twofold, through oral presentation and the evidence provided in the file.
Another important distinction, which is also well-covered in the
literature, involves the rules of evidence in civil law systems. European
prosecutors have an affirmative duty to disregard evidence against the
accused that they have reason to believe was the product of unlawful
conduct, and when uncertain, they should seek a court ruling on the
evidence. 38Prosecutors are thereby expected to act on their own accord
and to not use incriminating evidence obtained by illegal methods. 0
Continental judges have the power to declare such evidence inadmissible,
although they are not bound by the theoretical rigor of the American
exclusionary rule. Suppression is not mandatory and technicalities or minor
irregularities will be ignored, with the court instead focusing on evidentiary
reliability and the integrity of the legal sytm310
Moreover, continental judges will consider all relevant information
when evaluating the case before them, pursuant to the principle of "free
evaluation of evidence" (e.g., Grundsatz der freien Beweiswiirdigung in
Germany) .3 11' A defendant's prior convictions and other arguably probative
but prejudicial information can be taken into account by the court, which is
supposed to evaluate the reliability of this evidence while also paying due
respect to issues of fairness. 1 Although a confession will have a
significant impact at trial, it will not have the near-conclusive effect seen in
common law proceedings. Consistent with their charge to seek the truth,
continental judges require further evidence of guilt independent of any
307. Among other things, the continental approach would be inconsistent with the U.S.
Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
129 S.Ct. 2527, 2542 (2009) (refining the requirements of the U.S. Constitution's
Confrontation Clause); Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 2693 (2008) (same); Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004) (same).
308. Recommendation 19, supra note 76, at 28.
309. See, e.g., id. at 19 (stating, in the explanatory memorandum, that the prosecutor
"must take account of the manner in which incriminating evidence is obtained").
310. Erik Luna, A Place for Comparative Criminal Procedure, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 277,
319-21 (2003) [hereinafter Luna, Comparative Criminal Procedure].
311. See STPO, supra note 72, § 261 ("The court shall decide on the result of the
evidence taken according to its free conviction gained from the hearing as a whole."). This
norm provides that information relating to a broad range of findings of guilt (e.g.,
administrative fines for misdemeanors alongside criminal convictions) will be considered
during sentencing. Id.
312. Id. § 243(4).
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inculpatory statements, which has repercussions for the role played by the
prosecution and its case-ending powers. 1
5. Prosecutorial Adjudication
This brings us back to the issue of prosecutorial adjudication. As
discussed in the previous part, all European countries feature prosecutorial
case-ending discretion that amounts to adjudication. 1 Sometimes this
discretion results in de facto prosecutorial adjudication, where, for instance,
a negotiated case settlement requires agreement by the defendant and
approval by the judge .31" The latter is rarely withheld, however, meaning
that the prosecutor's discretionary decision effectively adjudicates the case.
A minority of European criminal justice systems also provide for
prosecutorial adjudication in its fullest sense, with prosecutors replacing
316judges by finding guilt and imposing punishment directly upon suspects.
While de jure adjudication in Sweden via the straffdrelaggande is
restricted to a relatively narrow category of offenses for which a fine or
317
conditional sentence would be appropriate, the analogous Dutch
strajbeschikking marks a landmark in prosecutorial power .318  As
mentioned, prosecutors in the Netherlands are expected to gradually phase
out conditional disposals (i.e., transacties) in favor of their new means of
de jure prosecutorial adjudication. The strajbeschikking is applicable to the
313. The British system is similar to the American system in certain respects, including
the possibility of a jury fact-finding, a ban on introducing previous convictions as evidence
of guilt, an adversarial trial with a less active judge, and a conclusive effect of a defendant's
guilty plea. As for evidentiary admission, a British judge will suppress evidence he deems
to be unfair to the defendant. See, e.g., R. v. Gerald Gall, [1990] 90 Crim. App. 64, 68-69
(Eng.) (discussing and applying evidentiary suppression rule).
314. See, e.g., Recommendation 18, supra note 120, at 2 (explaining the principle of
discretionary prosecution); Compilation of Replies to the Questionnaire, Conference of
Prosecutors General, Conference of Prosecutors General of Europe, 5th Session (May 2004)
at 6-19 [hereinafter Compilation of Replies], available at http://www.coe.intl
tldghllcooperationlccpe/conferences/cpge/2004/CPGE_-2004_O3Replies-bil.pdf (providing
questionnaire answers regarding discretionary powers of public prosecutors).
315. Illuminati, in Vander Beken & Kilchling, supra note 248; Lt~schnig-Gspandl,
Austria, supra note 243.
316. Zila, Swedish Criminal Justice System, supra note 138; Tak, The Dutch
Prosecutor, supra note 249.
317. See, e.g., Zila, Swedish Criminal Justice System, supra note 138, at 292-93
(providing conditions in which this case disposition is allowed).
318. See, e.g., Tak, The Dutch Prosecutor, supra note 249 (discussing
strajbeschikking).
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vast majority of offenses in the Netherlands, and if the percentage of drops
and trials remains the same, prosecutors will be legally adjudicating a third
of all cases in the near future .31'9  This change could reverberate across
Europe, given the high profile of Dutch criminal justice reforms and the
inspiration they provide for neighboring countries.
All told, prosecutorial discretion is extensive and robust throughout
Europe, where cases can be effectively, if not legally, adjudicated by
prosecutors. In contrast to the continental assumption that case-ending
discretion only applies to minor cases,32 prosecutorial adjudication is
occurring in virtually every category of crime .32 1 The use of this discretion
in Germany, for instance, demonstrates not only that it is a land with plea
bargaining but also one of prosecutorial adjudication through several case-
ending options. 2 Some European academics and practitioners will
continue to deny this,32  producing heated debate.32  Prosecutorial
adjudication presents a theoretical indictment of any process claiming to
adhere to a principle of legality that demands prosecution whenever a crime
is discovered with sufficient evidence against a given suspect. 325  The
319. That is, the number of cases disposed of using the transactie.
320. See, e.g., Recommendation 18, supra note 120, at 2, 22-23 (explaining the
principle of discretionary prosecution): Conference's Summary, Conference of Prosecutors
General, Conference of Prosecutors General of Europe, 5th Session (May 2004) at 6,
available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/ccpe/conferences/cpge/2004/Resume
Conference -en.pdf (stating that the discretionary prosecution is less applicable to
moderately serious offenses).
321. See generally KARSTEN ALTENHAIN ET AL, DIE PRAXIS DER ABSPRACHEN IN
WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFVERFAHREN (Nomos 2007).
322. Kilchling, Germany, supra note 125, at 91-93.
323. Compilation of Replies, supra note 314, at 6-19; Contribution by Mr. Jerzy
Szymanski, Discretionary Powers of Public Prosecution: Opportunity or Legality
Principle-Advantages and Disadvantages, Conference of Prosecutors General of Europe,
5th Session (May 2004) at 2-4, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/
ccpe/conferences/cpge/2004/ContributionSZYMIANSKI-en.pdf;, see also Opening Address
by Mr. Harold Range, Conference of Prosecutors General of Europe, 5th Session (May
2004) at 2, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/ccpe/conferences/cpge/2004/
AllocutionRANGE-en.pdf ("[T]he German prosecution service has been governed by the
principle of mandatory prosecution since the outset and still is today.'); Perrot, Criminal,
Civil, and Commercial Fields, supra note 252, at 172 (comparing mandatory and
discretionary prosecutions and stating which European countries follow each framework).
324. See, e.g., Conference's Summary, supra note 320, at 7 (discussing how different
countries view discretionary prosecution); Kilchling, Germany, supra note 125, at 76-77
(explaining that the application of law always involves some discretionary decision-making
even though German statutes do not provide any discretion for the prosecutorial decision).
325. Tom Vander Beken & Michael Kilchling, General Conclusions: The Challenge of
Balancing the Input and the Output Within Criminal Justice Systems, in THE ROLE OF THE
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practice on the ground is far different, 2 however, as the principle of
legality appears to have become a somewhat mild presumption rather than
an outcome-determinative rule. 2
A related but more significant concern, we believe, is the sidelining
and even elimination of courts from the criminal process. Scholars are only
starting to recognize "the new judge-like role of the public prosecution,"
which is "so extensive that [the prosecutor] in fact becomes a judge besides
the judge.0 28  Whatever its consequences for the mandatory prosecution
doctrine, prosecutorial adjudication threatens important legal concepts
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR IN THE EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 9-138 (Tom Vander
Beken & Michael Kilchlmng eds., 2000) [hereinafter Vander Beken & Kilchling, General
Conclusions] (explaining that the prosecution in a country with a strong legality-tradition
can exercise discretion when there is insufficient evidence).
326. See, e.g., Contribution by Italy, Discretionary Powers of Public Prosecution:
Opportunity or Legality Principle-Advantages and Disadvantages, Conference of
Prosecutors General of Europe, 5th Session, (May 2004) at 3, available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/ccpe/conferences/cpge/2004/Contributionltalie en.pdf
(explaining that it is impossible to always take action against all crimes and stating that the
objective of mandatory prosecution only exists in theory); Report by J6rg-Martin Jehie,
supra note 229, at 14 (explaining that there is almost no European country that follows the
principle of legality without exception); Ambos, Comparative Summary, supra note 270, at
505-09, 525-26 (discussing the presence of prosecutorial discretion); Gy6rgyi, Hungary,
supra note 295, at 3 52-53 (stating that the prosecutor has discretion to decide the outcome
of a case during the course of the investigation); Illuminati, in Vander Beken & Kilchling,
supra note 248, at 122 (stating that a factual discretion exists in practice because the legality
principle is not cost-effective); Kilchling, Germany, supra note 125, at 74-77 (explaining
that the application of law always involves some discretion); Id. at 92-93 (emphasizing that
a new form of legality must be established); L~schnig-Gspandl, Austria, supra note 243, at
17 (explaining that a degree of discretion remains with even the strictest forms of the legality
principle); Miskolci, Hungary, supra note 295, at 107 (emphasizing that even a state
traditionally based on the principle of legality must broaden the scope of discretionary power
in order to maintain expediency); Morr6, Germany, supra note 260, at 342-43 (explaining
that there are exceptions to the strict rule of mandatory prosecution); Triffierer, Austria,
supra note 276, at 214-15 (stating that the principle of mandatory prosecution is substituted
by discretionary prosecutions); Vander Beken & Kilchling, General Conclusions, supra note
325, at 149-50 (stating that the differences between legality and expediency based systems
are fading in practice).
327. See, e.g., Kilchling, Germany, supra note 125, at 93 (stating that there are new
interpretations of legality); L6schnig-Gspandl, Austria, supra note 243, at 17 (asserting that
the principle of legality has some flexibility); see also Report by J6rg-Martin Jehle, supra
note 229, at 13-15 (stating that there are exceptions to the principle of legality); Perrot,
Criminal, Civil, and Commercial Fields, supra note 252, at 172-73 (explaining that there is
a margin of uncertainty in assessing the legal elements of an offense, which leaves room for
arbitrariness and discretion).
328. L~schnig-Gspandl, Austria, supra note 243, at 22, 27; Busacca, Civil and
Commercial Fields, supra note 289, at 158; Perrot, Criminal, Civil, and Commercial Fields,
supra note 252, at 166.
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found in both the civil law and common law traditions, including the
separation of powers doctrine-namely, between judicial and executive
branches-and the principle that a party (e.g., a prosecutor) cannot be a
judge in his own case.3129  Moreover, there are practical concerns about
political influence on prosecutorial decision-making, 30 as well as the
possibility of "net widening," where cases that should be declined and
removed from the criminal justice system altogether instead become
standard fare for adjudication by prosecutors .33 1 An honest debate about the
use and extent of prosecutorial adjudication and the ramifications it has for
the role of prosecutors and judges-not to mention the position of victims
and suspects within criminal proceedings-appears long overdue. 3
What is more, prosecutorial adjudication in Europe may pose the most
troubling risk of all: the conviction and punishment of innocents. 3 This
phenomenon may be an inevitable occurrence in any system of criminal
justice. To date, however, there is a marked difference in the discussion of
wrongful convictions in England and Wales as compared to continental
Europe.33 While the British literature is replete with such miscarriages of
329. See, e.g., Recommendation 19, supra note 76, at 7 (stating that the role of
prosecutors cannot interfere with the independence and impartiality of court judges);
Recommendation 1604, supra note 117, at 2 (explaining that there must be a separation of
powers between the prosecutor and the judiciary). See generally Frencken, Position and
Status, supra note 276, at 39; Jiri Toman, The Role of the Public Prosecution Office in the
Criminal Field, in THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTION OFFICE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
137 (1997); Tom Vander Beken, Belgium, in THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR IN THE
EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 37 (Tom Vander Beken & Michael Kilchling eds.,
2000) [hereinafter Vander Beken, Belgium].
330. See, e.g., Vander Beken & Kilchling, General Conclusions, supra note 325, at 150
(emphasizing that criminal law will become more "executivistic" and open to political
influence).
331. See, e.g., Sanders, England and Wales, supra note 279, at 63 ("[Olifenders
comnmitting minor offences can be diverted from no action at all, as much as from
prosecution."); Vander Beken, Belgium, supra note 329, at 37 ("[T]he danger of net-
widening should be taken into account when evaluating the growing diversion possibilities
of the public prosecutor.").
332. See, e.g., Vander Beken & Kilchling, General Conclusions, supra note 325, at 150
("From a substantive perspective, prosecutors ... take over and exercise a judicial or quasi-
judicial decision-making position whereas, from a functional perspective, they act as a
(nonindependent) part of the executive. It is the disjunction between ... these two
perspectives that is deserving a permanent and critical examination.").
3 33. Id.
334. See Kent Roach, Wrongful Convictions. Adversarial and Inquisitorial Themes, 35
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 387, 437 (2010) (describing "the Criminal Case Review
Commission for England, Wales, and Northern Ireland" created to investigate potential
wrongful convictions, and noting that such bodies are not present in many other European
countries).
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justice, there is a conspicuous absence of reported incidents in other
European nations."' 5 Continental jurists often see this as an affirmation of
their respective systems, with any discussion of miscarriages in Britain and
the United States focusing on the inherent weaknesses of the adversarial
336 cotprocess. The cotnental systems feature few, if any, professional groups
with an inherent interest in uncovering wrongful convictions, however, and
as mentioned, the defense bar is relatively weak when compared to its
common law counterpart. 3
All parties, including defense attorneys, are expected to work
constructively with the courts to discover the truth, based upon the belief
that balanced prosecutors and judges will ensure that only the guilty are
convicted. 3 This perspective might well be an advantage in shaping and
controlling how prosecutors work, but it may also engender a more docile
approach in which mistakes are less likely to be discovered, even where all
parties act in good faith.33 Prosecutorial adjudication, particularly in its
new de jure forms, would seem to heighten the danger, given the absence of
340
much, or any, court review. Whether the professional ethos and role
conception of the continental prosecutor minimize the chances of wrongful
convictions is unknown.34 It seems clear, however, that continental Europe
lags behind the common law systems in its understanding of the
phenomenon.
Then again, the professional culture and judicial mindset of continental
prosecutors may preclude, or at least temper, the psychological biases that
tend to produce wrongful convictions and various other errors often
335. See Andrew Ashworth, Developments in the Public Prosecutor's Office in
England and Wales, 8 EuR. J. CIME CRim. L. & CRIM. JUST. 149, 260 (2000) (noting that in
England and Wales, there has been "the exposure of major miscarriages of justice which
resulted in people's spending 15 years or longer in prison, having been convicted after all
kinds of errors and irregularities by the police, prosecutors, scientific experts and judges").
336. See Roach, supra note 334, at 391 ("There is nothing particularly new to the idea
that inquisitorial systems might be better suited than adversarial systems in preventing
wrongfuil convictions, and such conclusions have been reached by some of the best minds
that have examined the phenomena of wrongful convictions.").
337. Id. at 390.
338. See, e.g., Thomas Weigend, The Prosecution Service in the German Administration
of Criminal Justice, in TASKS AND POWERS OF THE PROSECUTION SERVICES IN THE EU MEMBER
STATES 205 (Peter J.P. Tak ed., 2004) [hereinafter Weigend, The Prosecution Service]
(describing the ways in which prosecutors are expected to ensure accurate verdicts).
339. Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506,579-80 (1973).
340. Sanders, England and Wales, supra note 271, at 300.
341. Roach, supra note 334, at 395.
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associated with extreme adversarialism.342  More generally, the broader
context suggests that prosecutorial adjudication need not undermine the
legitimacy of European criminal justice. 4 The trends described in this
Article are not indicative of ad hoc or even ad hominem decision-making,
and increasing prosecutorial discretion does not necessarily lead to
uncontrolled case-ending or arbitrary use of procedural paths.3 In fact, the
available information evinces a degree of uniformity in the use of case-
ending options across Europe. 4
What constrains the discretion of the European prosecutor, particularly
those of the civil law tradition, are various "soft" factors that nonetheless
reduce the potential for abusive decision-making. 4 Continental
prosecutors regard themselves as judicial officers who apply the law as a
science and find the truth through rational analysis .34 ' They accept the job
as an end itself, serving as representatives of the public -interest who are
imbued by a collegial environment of professional ethics and are never
beholden to the whims Of politics. 48  Accountability comes through
hierarchy, guidelines, the review of superior prosecutors, and the desire to
conform to role conceptions. 4
Pressures do exist, for sure, especially due to the sometimes enormous
number of cases that must be resolved .3 50 But unlike in the United States,
the number and rate of convictions and the amount of punishment are not
the basic measures of success .35'1 The judicial-minded goals of finding the
truth and achieving just outcomes are primary and affect oversight of police
investigations, the preparation of case files, the exercise of case-ending
discretion, the presentation of evidence, and all other aspects of the
prosecutorial function. 5 It might even be argued that European
342. Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1587, 1626 (2006); Erik Luna, System Failure,
42 Am. GRIM. L. REV. 1201, 1211 (2005); Medwed, supra note 237, at 133.
343. WADE, The Power to Decide, supra note 132, at 112.
344. See id at 64 ("Where the PPS has discretionary powers to drop or dispose of
cases ... this is regulated by law, and in more detail, by guidelines.").
345. Id. at 109.
346. Ambos, Comparative Summary, supra note 270, at 526.
347. Francois Falletti, The French Prosecution Service, in TASKS AND POWERS OF THE
PROSECUTION SERVICES IN THE EU MEMBER STATES 177 (Peter J.P. Tak ed., 2004).
348. Tak, PART 1, supra note 107, at 7.
349. Ambos, Comparative Summary, supra note 270, at 498.
350. Id. at 28.
351. Tak, PART I, supra note 107, at 12-13.
352. Ambos, Comparative Summary, supra note 270, at 500.
491
149 7 WA SH & LEE L. REV 1413 (2 010)
prosecutors, rather than the courts, are in the best position to achieve fairness
and consistency in the criminal justice system."' 3 Subjecting prosecutors to
strict guidance in using their discretion is far less controversial as a matter of
law and culture than taking such action in relation to judicial decision-
making.35 The idea that prosecutors across Europe are expected to ensure
the even-handed application of law is reflected in, among other things, their
powers to appeal against court sentences that are too high as compared to
similar cases.35 So although it poses a fundamental challenge to traditional
continental theory and doctrine, prosecutorial adjudication does not
necessarily produce an affront to individual or aggregate justice. 5
Most importantly, European nations limit the potentially alarming
consequences of prosecutorial adjudication (including the harms of wrongful
convictions) by maintaining far narrower criminal codes and milder schemes
of punishment than those found in the United States. 3 11 In Europe, criminal
provisions have remained relatively stable, concepts like vicarious liability
and guilt without a culpable mental state are generally rejected, and
imprisonment is used only as the ultima ratio, the last resort.35 In contrast,
the past few decades have witnessed a massive growth in American criminal
justice: more crimes on the books (e.g., 4,000-plus federal offenses), more
liability expanding doctrines (e.g., strict liability), and more potential
punishment (e.g., mandatory minimum sentences) .3 '9 As a result, the United
States has become the most punitive nation in the Western world by virtually
every measure. 360 Today, America leads the world in prison population, with
353. Tak, PART 1, supra note 107, at 8-9.
3 54. Id. at 5.
355. See, e.g., STPO, supra note 72, § 296 ("Both the public prosecution office and the
accused shall be entitled to file the appellate remedies admissible against court decisions.");
Weigend, The Prosecution Service, supra note 338, at 205 (noting that "[tihe prosecutor can
move for acquittal at the end of the trial, and he can even file an appeal in favour of the
accused").
356. Tak, PART1, supra note 107, at 12.
357. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 70-71 (2003) (elucidating how the
European punishment schemes are significantly milder than their American counterparts).
358. See, e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, Theories of Crime and Punishment in German
Criminal Law, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 679, 692 (2005) ("The criminal law, in other words, is said
to be the state's ultima ratio in its effort to protect legal goods; it must employ less intrusive,
civil, means if they can provide sufficient protection for the legal good in question.").
359. See, e.g., Luna, Overcriminalization, supra note 19, at 704-12 (describing growth
of American criminal justice); Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32
CARDozo L. REy. 1, 21 (20 10) (same).
360. See, e.g., Michael Tonry & David P. Farrington, Punishment and Crime Across
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2.3 million people behind bars. More than one in every ninety-nine
Americans is incarcerated, a rate more than eight times greater than that of
Germany. 361
A number of reasons have been offered for the punitive gap
between the United States and Europe. For instance, James Q. Whitman
has argued that continental Europe's historic aversion to degrading
penalties for the upper classes and its maintenance of relatively mild
punishments for high-status offenders offered a standard for sentencing
reform in a new egalitarian age .362 In other words, modern class-neutral
sanctioning regimes arose from a "leveling up" of lenient treatment
previously reserved for the upper classes. 6 In contrast, Professor
Whitman points to a "leveling-down" trend in America, with harsh
punishments meted out to all people regardless of status.3M4 This
argument is bolstered by the influence of politics on criminal justice. In
the United States, law-and-order campaigns have been especially
successful, drawing upon high-profile crimes or various moral panics,
Space and Time, 33 CRIME & JUST. 1, 6 (2005) (finding that American policies were the
most punitive in terms of probability of commitment given a conviction, expected days
imprisonment per recorded crime, expected days imprisonment per conviction, and average
times served by imprisoned); Alfred Blumnstein, Michael Tonry & Asheley Van Ness, Cross-
National Measures of Punitiveness, 33 CRIME & JUST. 347, 348 (2006) (finding that the
United States had the harshest sentences for homicide, rape, robbery, residential burglary,
assault, and motor vehicle theft); see also Crime and Punishment in America: Rough Justice,
THE ECONOMIST (2010), available at http://www.economist.comnode/16640389?storyid=
16640389 (last visited October 19, 2010) (discussing the exceptional punitiveness of
American criminal justice) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
361. See, e.g., International Centre for Prison Studies, King's College London, World
Prison Brief, available at http://www.kcl.ac.ukldepsta/law/researchlicps/worldbrief (last
visited October 19, 2010) (noting that America's per capita prison rate is 748 per 100,000-
with the world's highest prison population at roughly 2.3 million inmates-while Germany's
per capita prison rate is 87 per 100,000) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Adam Liptak, US. Imprisons One in 100 Adults, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008,
at A 14 (same).
362. See WHITMAN, supra note 357, at 9-10 ("[Hfligh-status continental convicts ...
could expect certain kinds of privileged treatment. They were permitted a relatively normal
and relatively comfortable existence, serving their time in 'fortresses' rather than in prisons.
Their 'cells' were something like furnished apartments, where they received visitors and
were supplied with books and writing materials.").
363. See id. at 10 ("[W]ithin the limits of the possible, everyone in a continental prison
is now treated in the way only aristocrats and the like were once treated .. .. These
countries are the scene of a leveling-up egalitarianism. ... whose aim is to raise every
member of society up in social status.").
364. See id. at 11 ("From a very early date, America[] showed instead, at least
sporadically, a typical tendency to generalize norms of low-status treatment-to level
down.").
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inevitably resulting in the enactment of more crimes and harsher
punishments. 36 1 On the other side of the Atlantic, criminal justice issues are
less influenced by raw politics. 6 6 Instead, legal experts and practitioners
help shape continental European policy, opting for progressive approaches,
such as decriminalization and diversion, 6 rather than following populist
calls for punitiveness. 6
Where do prosecutors fit within the criminalization debate? European
prosecutors are among the criminal justice professionals who have helped
maintain the status quo.36 In the continental tradition, they are first and
foremost quasi-judicial officers whose role conception is based on truth-
finding and just outcomes, not on convictions and tough sentences .370 Their
interests and allegiances lie with the profession, and they are invested in
maintaining the criminal justice system's current structure. Moreover, they
do not face election and need not respond to public pressures .37'1 Even
though important changes are occurring across Europe, there is a great deal
of reluctance to adopt practices that seem to undermine the legitimacy of
criminal justice. 7 Despite an increase in negotiated case settlements, for
instance, most European professionals are aghast at plea bargaining
practices reported in the United States. As happened with German
practitioners, British lawyers were careful to deny the existence of
negotiated settlements-even in the face of very high rates of guilty pleas
before the courts-and only recently did Parliament acknowledge and
endorse the practice of plea and sentence bargaining. 73  Continental
365. See Luna, Overcriminalization, supra note 19, at 719-20 (describing politics of
overcriminalization); Luna & Cassell, supra note 359, at 22-24 (same).
366. See WHITMAN, supra note 357, at 199 (noting that "democratic politics has much
less impact on criminal justice in Europe than it does in the United States").
367. See generally JEHLE & WADE, supra note 120, at 5-6, 19, 24-25; Conclusions,
Conference of Prosecutors General, supra note 118, at 3-4.
368. For a partial critique of Whitman's theory, see generally Richard S. Frase,
Historical and Comparative Perspectives on the Exceptional Severity of Sentencing in the
United States, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 227 (2004). For an alternative theory of
American punitiveness, see generally Michael Cavadino & James Dignan, Penal Policy and
Political Economy, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 435 (2006) (arguing that a nation's
political economy is strongly related to its punitiveness). But see David Nelken,
Comparative Criminal Justice: Beyond Ethnocentricism and Relativism, 6 Eult. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 291, 295-306 (2009) (critiquing Cavandino and Dignan's thesis).
369. WADE, The Power to Decide, supra note 132, at 27-28.
370. Id. at 28.
371. Ambos, Comparative Summary, supra note 270, at 501.
372. Sanders, England and Wales, supra note 279. at 1 11.
373. Weigend, The Prosecution Service, supra note 3 38, at 216.
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Europe, particularly Germany, continues to debate the propriety of such
practices in light of the principle of legality and the doctrine of compulsory
prosecution.~ Nonetheless, there appears to be a general consensus in
Europe that the use of coercive plea bargaining through expanded criminal
liability and threats of harsh punishment would be beyond the pale. 
375
By comparison, prosecutors in the U.S. have every incentive to extend
criminal liability and increase potential sentences. Both chief and line
prosecutors are players in America's competitive enterprise of law
enforcement, not neutral and detached actors without a personal stake in
individual case-outcomes or net results over time. As mentioned above,
success is typically measured by the number of convictions and amount of
punishment, leading to reelection for district attorneys and promotion for
their deputies. 7 With more crimes and punishments on the books,
prosecutors exercise greater authority in the criminal justice system.3 The
expansion of criminal liability makes it easier to prosecute a course of
conduct, 378 while the increase in punishment gives defendants every reason
to cooperate by providing information, entering into plea agreements, and
waiving constitutional rights .379  All of this enhances the power of
prosecutors, who can obtain more and cheaper convictions via plea
bargaining or, if that fails, deploy potent legal weaponry against their
opponents at trial.
In sum, it is the difference in role perception, incentive structures, and
punitive potential that separates the danger of prosecutorial adjudication in
Europe versus the United States. For European prosecutors, case-ending
options are only a means to deal with overwhelming dockets while
achieving just outcomes. It would be an imperm-issible use of prosecutorial
374. Sanders, Prosecutions in England and Wales, in TASKS AND POWERS OF THE
PROSECUTION SERVICES IN THE EU MEMBER STATES 12, 116 (Peter J.P. Tak ed., 2004).
375. Supra note 357 and accompanying text.
376. Supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
377. See Luna, Overcriminalization, supra note 19, at 723-24 (noting incentive
structures).
378. See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 36, at 519 (describing how
eliminating a difficult-to-prove element in a given offense or criminalizing alleged
precursors to the target behavior allows prosecutors to "continue to enforce the original
crime, but more cheaply, by enforcing the substitutes").
379. See Luna, Overcriminalization, supra note 19, at 724 (noting that punishment can
be raised by, among other things, increasing the attached penalties, enacting an anti-
recidivist statute, or charging a single course of conduct as multiple crimes). Even where
European systems have adopted more punitive American ideas, they take on a much milder
form, as seen with the introduction of a "three strikes" policy for certain offenses in England
and Wales.
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discretion to threaten defendants with drastic increases in punishment for
exercising their right to trial. Prosecutors in the United States face similar
docket pressures, but for them, punishment is not merely a matter of justice
but an adversarial tool to be used to increase conviction rates via plea
bargaining. Threats of harsh sentences are not only allowed, they are to be
expected. For those defendants who reject a plea bargain, the end result
may be punishment grossly disproportionate to their offenses.
B. A Comparative Example
To help make this more concrete and highlight the relative dangers of
prosecutorial adjudication in Europe and America, consider a case
discussed at the outset of this Article: United States v. Weldon Angelos. 8
Certainly, Angelos was no angel, but he was hardly public enemy number
one. To reiterate, the twenty-three-year-old Utah native was arrested for
dealing marijuana and possessing firearms, none of which seemed
particularly newsworthy at the time. If he had been prosecuted and
convicted in local court, Angelos might have served a few years in prison,
at most, and today he would be a free man. Instead of bringing state
charges, however, officials decided to prosecute the case in federal court,
where lengthy sentences under statutes like 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) provide the
government enormous leverage over defendants. Such was the case for
Angelos, as described by the trial court:
[T]he government told Mr. Angelos, through counsel, that if he pled
guilty to the drug distribution count and a § 924(c) count, the
government would agree to drop all other charges, not supersede the
indictment with additional counts, and recommend a prison sentence of
15 years. The government made clear to Mr. Angelos that if he rejected
the offer, the government would obtain a new superseding indictment
adding several § 924(c) counts that could lead to Mr. Angelos facing
more than 100 years of mandatory prison time. . ... Ultimately, Mr.
Angelos rejected the offer and decided to go to trial. The government
then obtained two superseding indictments, eventually charging twenty
total counts, including five § 924(c) counts which alone carried a
potential minimum mandatory sentence of 105 years.38
In this way, the prosecution sought to adjudicate the case by posing an
extreme sentencing differential unless the defendant pled guilty-a fifteen-
380. United States v. Angelos. 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227. 1263 (D. Utah 2003).
381. Idatl1231-32.
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year sentence under the plea bargain versus a potential trial punishment of
more than a century in prison. This was an attempt at de facto adjudication,
given that the defendant could and did reject the deal and proceed to trial.
The harshness -of the threatened sentence makes the entire enterprise
coercive, however, with many, if not most, individuals likely to plead out to
avoid a draconian penalty. Of course, evaluating the "unfairness" of a trial
sentence can be difficult, as reasonable minds can differ on the appropriate
sentence for a given offense.38 But this case appears straightforward.
Virtually every commentator and case participant-including the judge, the
jury, and, at least initially, the prosecution-recognized that Angelos's
crimes did not merit an effective life sentence. 8
This conclusion can be buttressed by relatively objective points of
reference, such as the punishment imposed on other offenders. For
instance, Angelos's sentence is longer than the maximum federal term of
imprisonment for an aircraft hijacker, a second-degree murderer, a
kidnapper, and a child rap ist.384 Consider also the fate of the confidential
informant who arranged the marijuana deals and testified against Angelos at
trial. This key witness had nearly identical charges pending against him-
for drug dealing and firearms possession-but unlike Angelos, he had a
serious criminal record, making him a better candidate for hard time.
Through the power of prosecutorial discretion, however, the informant's
case "magically" disappeared entirely from the criminal justice system.
In turn, Angelos's sentence after trial, fifty-five years, was a form of
de jure prosecutorial adjudication. Indeed, the government was quite
literally the master of this sentence through its controlled buys of relatively
small amounts of marijuana, with the criminal acts "in some sense procured
by the government. 3 8 ' Law enforcement could have arrested Angelos after
the first incident but decided to wait for additional conduct that would
multiply potential charges and punishment. Once Angelos was found guilty
of three § 924(c) counts at trial, the punishment sought by the prosecution
was mandatory. The sentence followed from the prosecutor's charging
decisions and not the judge's independent evaluation of a fair sentence
given the facts of the case.38
382. Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining, supra note 38, at 245.
383. See, e.g., Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1230-32, 1242 (noting prosecutor's plea
offer, jury's opinion on sentencing, and court's belief "that to sentence Mr. Angelos to
prison for the rest of his life is unjust, cruel, and even irrational").
384. Id. at 1244-46 &tbl.1.
385. Id. at 1253.
386. See id. at 1261 (concluding that the sentence was "unjust, disproportionate to his
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All of this provides the makings for animated conversation among
almost any group, including criminal justice scholars and practitioners in
other nations. In fact, the plight of Weldon Angelos provides a striking
point of comparison to prosecutorial adjudication abroad. When informed
about this case, our European colleagues were critical of the prosecutorial
decision-making and shocked by the level at the punishment. None of the
systems surveyed would have empowered a prosecutor to seek and achieve
an effective life sentence in such a case. The following summarizes the
likely results in six European nations. 8
1. England and Wales (Two to Four Year Sentence)
In England and Wales, an adult with no previous convictions
convicted at trial of selling marijuana on several occasions and possessing
firearms could be sent to prison for around five years, largely the result of
mandatory punishment for weapons possession. If he had pled guilty in a
timely fashion, his sentence might be reduced by one-third for cooperation
with the court. Recent research on similar controlled purchases by law
enforcement resulted in low-level drug dealers like Angelos receiving two
to four year sentences, with the more serious leaders of drug gangs getting
up to thirteen years, but only if serious violence were involved in their drug
dealing. It should be noted, however, that the lack of judicial discretion in
the mandatory sentencing cases for firearms possession has resulted in
courts finding ways around obligatory punishment, and in due course, it
will probably lead to a revision of the law. In the past, Britain had
mandatory sentences for drug possession, but the law was revised once it
was shown to be unjust.
2. France (One Year Sentence or Probation)
In France, the average length of imprisonment for domestic drug
trafficking (transporting and selling) is sixteen months, with the actual
length depending on factors like the participation of the offender in a drug
trafficking network, the kind and amount of drug involved, and his personal
offense, demeaning to victims of actual criminal violence-but nonetheless constitutional").
387. For providing us information, our thanks are due to Chris Lewis of the University
of Portsmouth (England and Wales); Bruno Aubusson de Cavarlay of CESDIP (France);
Paul Smit of the Dutch Ministry of Justice Research Centre (the Netherlands); Piotr Sobota
of the Polish Ombudsman's Office (Poland); and Josef Zila of Orebro University (Sweden).
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situation. Selling marijuana rather than heroin, for instance, would lead to a
less severe sentence, for instance, and an individual's regular participation
in drug trafficking would probably be taken into account as an aggravating
circumstance. Carrying a firearm is a separate offense, but since the
maximum penalty for this crime is lower than for drug trafficking, the judge
would only be limited by the ten-year maximum sentence for drug
trafficking. A sentence of one year might be requested by the prosecutor,
although an individual without a prior conviction and who maintains lawful
employment would probably receive a noncustodial or suspended sentence
with supervision.
3. Germany (Five Year Sentence or Less)
Under the German Narcotics Act (Betdubungsmittelgesetz)3 8 ' a person
dealing anything other than a small quantity of the relevant substances
while carrying a firearm will be sentenced to no less than five years
imprisonment. The fact that an individual like Angelos sold such quantities
more than once is likely to be treated as evidence of drug dealing rather
than several smaller separate offenses. However, because he was dealing
marijuana instead of a harder drug like heroin, he did not use the weapon,
and he was a first-time offender, there would be no reason for a court to
impose a sentence above the statutory minimum. In fact, discussions with
prosecutors suggest that they would tend to adopt a different charging
strategy for these facts, aiming to achieve a sentence of between one and
two years imprisonment, which would automatically be suspended.
4. The Netherlands (Fine of 300-350 Euros)
To begin with, this prosecution would probably never have occurred,
as the Dutch criminal justice system does not allow law enforcement to
"incite" a crime (e.g., conduct controlled drug purchases). Even if the case
somehow made it into the system, however, there would be no minimum
punishment, only a statutory maximum sentence. Here, an offender like
Angelos would be charged with two offenses, drug trafficking and illegal
possession of a firearm. Given that he is a first-time offender who did not
actually use the firearm, a custodial sentence would be an unlikely result.
388. Betdubungsmittelgesetz [BtMG] [Narcotics Act], Mar. 1, 1994, BORGERLICHES
GESFT7RUCH [BGB] 1, at 358.
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In all probability, this case would be resolved out of court by allowing the
offender to pay a fine (transactie) of around C300-350. If the offender did
not agree to the fine, the case would go to court and would likely produce a
similar outcome without a prison sentence. In practice, though, most
offenders accept the fine rather than demanding trial.
5. Poland (3.5 Year Sentence or Less)
Under Polish law, selling marijuana (or any other illegal drug) is
punishable by one to ten years imprisonment, with an average sentence of
around sixteen months. If, as in Angelos's case, every act of drug sales was
executed over a relatively short period of time, it would likely be classified
as a single offense. If the court were to find separate acts of drug sales,
however, the offender could be sentenced for multiple offenses with a
maximum penalty of fifteen years imprisonment. Nonetheless, it is
doubtful that the sentence would exceed three years. The offense of
possessing a firearm without permission carries a sentence of six months to
eight years imprisonment, with an average punishment of about ten months.
In all likelihood, the sentence for someone like Angelos would be the sum
of the average punishments for drug sales and firearms possession, with a
probable outcome of no more than 3.5 years imprisonment.
6. Sweden (One Year Sentence or Less)
An offender like Angelos would be sentenced by the court for two
offenses, a drug crime and a weapons crime. Under the guidelines adopted
by the Swedish appellate court (Hovrdtten for Skeine och Blekinge), the
starting point for sentencing is to establish the "penal value" (straffvdrde)
for the drug offense. Selling 0.2 kilograms of marijuana (roughly eight
ounces) on one occasion carries a penal value of four months imprisonment,
with multiple sales resulting in slightly higher values. The penal value for
the marijuana in Angelos's case would probably correspond to, more or
less, six to eight months imprisonment. The penal value for carrying a
firearm, one not considered an especially dangerous or advanced weapon, is
approximately one month imprisonment. After establishing the penal
value, various other steps are taken in the process of sentencing, although
these tend to involve issues of mitigation and normally lead to a more
lenient penalty than the base penal value of the case. In total, the sentence
in this case might be between eight and ten months imprisonment; a lower
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sentence of three to six months might be possible, however, and the total
punishment certainly would not exceed one year imprisonment.
The story of Weldon Angelos thus offers a poignant case for
comparing prosecutorial adjudication. On both sides of the Atlantic,
prosecutors exercise discretion in dealing with offenders lie Angelos.
Through their charging decisions and choice among case-ending options,
American and European prosecutors may become adjudicators of guilt and
punishment, with courts simply confirming the underlying decisions. Part
of this is a response to increasing criminal dockets in virtually every
Western nation. In contrast to the United States, however, prosecutorial
discretion in Europe is not a tool for adversarial gamesmanship. Rather, it
is a means to ensure that charges and sentences fit the offenders and their
offenses despite the reality of caseload pressures and resource limitations.
This goal is consistent with the quasi-judicial role ascribed to the
continental prosecutor, whose duty is to determine the truth of the case and
an appropriate outcome for an individual defendant in light of the full
spectrum of crimes and criminals, rather than to maximize conviction rates
and aggregate sentences. The prosecutorial fuinction in Europe is
constrained by hierarchical structures and detailed guidelines, as well as
more subtle but influential factors like professional training and culture.
Moreover, the relatively narrow codes and mild sentencing schemes-and,
should all else fail, the ability of the court to reject the prosecutor's
opinion-guarantee that the problems seen in America, exemplified by the
case of Weldon Angelos, would not come to fruition. As suggested by the
responses above, such outcomes would be unthinkable in Europe. 8
IV A Thematic Problem and the Prospectsfor Reform
This Article has sought to demonstrate that de facto and de jure
prosecutorial adjudication is not a uniquely American phenomenon.
European prosecutors have acquired an assortment of tools to dispose of
cases, which are being used in almost every category of crime and at a rate
389. For a comparison based on a hypothetical case, see Jenia Iontcheva Tuamer,
Prosecutors and Bargaining in Weak Cases: A Comparative View, in THE PROSECUTOR IN
TRM4SNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade eds., forthcoming 2011).
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few scholars would have thought possible. The concept of compulsory
prosecution pursuant to the principle of legality is a "myth,"090 to use
Professor Goldstein's words from three decades ago. Prosecutors are
effectively adjudicating cases across Europe, determining the outcome with
at most cursory oversight by the courts and thereby acting as a judge before
the judge. The authority to actually adjudicate cases extends beyond the
essential capacity to drop charges, with some systems empowering
prosecutors to determine guilt and impose punishment on their own. Like
the situation in America, prosecutorial adjudication in Europe raises serious
concerns, such as the separation of powers, the accumulation of too much
force in too few hands, and the specter of innocent individuals wrongfully
convicted.
With that said, however, the phenomenon in Europe proves far less
treacherous than that in the United States. Professors Langbein and
Weinreb were absolutely correct that European prosecutors are not
American district attorneys who simply speak another language (or in the
case of the British, with a different accent) .39 1 As discussed in Part 111, the
role perception of the continental prosecutor is distinctly judicial, one of
independence and objectivity, aimed at truth-finding and fair results. 9
This image is instilled through education, training, and a professional
culture of civil service. Unlike their American counterparts, European
prosecutors are not elected or directly influenced by politics; conviction
rates and sentence lengths are neither indicators of success nor grounds for
retention or promotion; and those who become prosecutors see their
position as an end itself, a lifetime calling, not a segue to another career.
Moreover, European legal systems limit the power of prosecutors and the
results of their decision-making by employing narrower conceptions of
criminal responsibility and imposing far milder punishments. In the
remaining pages, we would like to explore in greater depth a principal
source of the troubles associated with prosecutorial adjudication in
America, which, in turn, allows us to contemplate possible correctives for
its most disquieting aspects.
390. Goldstein & Marcus, The Miyth, supra note 88.
391. Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 92, at 1550.
392. Supra Part Ill.
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A. American Adversarialism
Although various factors may contribute to the problems of
prosecutorial adjudication, one potential cause seems to have considerable
explanatory value: the extreme adversarialism, or hyper-adversarialism, of
the American legal process. In his 2002 book, Adversarial Legalism,
Robert Kagan offers an account and critique of America's reliance upon
lawyer-controlled litigation as a means not only to resolve individual
disputes, but also to make and implement public policy.393  Practicing
lawyers thoroughly dominate the process-they allege claims for relief,
raise potential defenses, gather legal precedents, marshal supporting
evidence, and so on-while judges occupy the largely passive position of
reacting to the parties' arguments. 9
The sources of American-style adversarialism are diverse, including
some well-known historical and cultural roots .39 ' The nation's collective
ideology has been shaped by several overarching themes, including: rugged
individualism, with private citizens ordering their own affairs and
demanding control over their interests; and generalized anti-statism, where
mistrust of government runs deep and bureaucracy is a near four-letter
word.3196  When state intervention is deemed unavoidable, however, the
conventional wisdom argues for decentralized decision-making by elected
officials accountable to the local citizenry. 9 None of this means that
Americans have an inherent desire to sue, but instead that legal conventions
encourage dispute resolution by adversarial processes. 9 And none of this
means that U.S. citizens have a preference for haphazard enforcement of
overly broad crimes and extreme punishment. Rather, American ideology
in practice lends itself to punitive responses. 9
Criticism of hyper-adversarialism in the United States is hardly new.
More than a century ago, Roscoe Pound detailed a series of reasons to be
393. See generally KAGAN, supra note 21.
394. Id. at 9 ("[T]he assertion of claims, the search for controlling legal arguments, and
the gathering and submission of evidence are dominated not by judges or government
officials but by disputing parties or interests, acting primarily through lawyers.").
395. Id. atl15.
396. Id.
397. See id. at 40 ("Americans have attempted to articulate and implement the socially
transformative politics of an activist, regulatory welfare state through the political and legal
institutions of a decentralized, nonhierarchical governmental system.").
398. See id. at 34 (arguing that "political traditions and legal arragements ... provide
incentives to resort to adversarial legal weapons").
399. Idat6l.
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dissatisfied with the legal system, including the "sporting theory of justice"
that many assume is a fundamental principle of American law.40
[W]e take it as a matter of course that a judge should be a mere umpire,
to pass upon objections and hold counsel to the rules of the game, and
that the parties should fight out their own game in their own way
without judicial interference .... It leads the most conscientious judge
to feel that he is merely to decide the contest, as counsel present it,
according to the rules of the game, not to search independently for truth
and justice. It leads counsel to forget that they are officers of the court
and to deal with the rules of law and procedure exactly as the
professional football coach with the rules of the sport.40
Since Pound's time, scholars have repeatedly critiqued the adversarial
approach, describing it as a "battle model" of the legal process, for instance,
402
and a "fight theory" of litigation. Ths etaphors are not just
descriptive but also normative, with the authors seeking to draw an
alarming comparison between the supposedly prudent, blind justice of the
American legal system and the emotionally charged, precarious nature of
warfare or sporting events. 0 To this day, the entire adversarial process is
filled with such images, although not always intended or understood to be
pejorative. For example, case decisions and legal tetS0 use militaristic
metaphors to describe the participants and process. Lawyers are "heroes,"
"hired guns," "gladiators," "warriors," "champions," "1generals," "lone
gunfighters," or "the man on the firing line"; those who help the lawyer are
"allies," his opponents are "barbarians" and "enemies," and those hurt in the
process are "casualties"; and the process may involve "Rambo tactics,"
"Pearl Harbor tactics," "scorched earth tactics," "kamikaze tactics," and
"Hiroshima tactics," all culminating in "victors" and "vanquished.
405
400. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 40 Am. L. REv. 729, 736 (1906).
401. Id.at738-39.
402. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRiAL: MYTrH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE
80-90, 368-69 (1949) ("[T~he Battle Model [is] the process conceived as a 'battle' or 'fight'
or 'duel,' . . . [there are other] associated military terms: the defense counsel is a 'champion
of the accused' . .. the defendant is the 'target' of the criminal process, to confess is to
'surrender' ... .."); John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third 'Model' of the
Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 367-68 (1970); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE:
REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 444-50 (2008).
403. Supra notes 400-402 and accompanying text.
404. The present article is no exception.
405. Elizabeth G. Thomburg, Metaphors Matter:- How Images of Battle, Sports, and
Sex Shape the Adversary System, 10 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 225, 233-36 (1995).
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Such terms are more than rhetorical flare. They reflect the way in
which litigants view the means and ends of the legal system and their
function within it. The lawyer is a hero, akin to a celebrated general or
successful athlete, where his role as competitor is considered appealing. 0
In fact, the parallel between the legal system and sport or war may be one
of the reasons for public support of adversarialismi--it is entertaining,
involves strategic choices and maneuvering, makes terrific fodder for news
outlets and shows, and like the Wide World of Sports, it delivers the thrill of
victory and the agony of defeat.40 The mass media generates images that
tend to reinforce the alleged benefits of adversarialism and the virtues of its
practitioners. For instance, Michael Asimow recently suggested that
popular culture "glorifies heroic and dedicated prosecutors," who "protect
us from predatory criminals," "unmask perjury and conspiracy in the
courtroom and trounce slithery defense lawyers. 408  Hollywood's
burnished image of American prosecution affirms the value of
adversarialism, as only the zealous advocacy of individual prosecutors can
ensure that justice is done.40
This picture is consistent with the aforementioned ideological
principles and corollaries, especially individualism and decentralized
decision-making, 1 which remain strong in America's collective
conscience and lend themselves to adversarial litigation. Of course, there
are other rationales for public and professional support of legal
adversarialism, including a general ignorance about alternatives and the
self-interests of repeat players .4 1 ' The current approach is the only one
known to most of the citizenry, and many lawyers may be surprised to learn
that American adversarialism is so extreme that it has no close parallel,
even among common-law nations. 42 Besides, lawyers have a vested
406. Id. at 245.
407. Michael Asimow, Popular Culture and the Adversary System, 40 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 653, 667 (2007) ("Scholars trace the origins of the adversarial system back to primitive
systems of trial by battle anid trial by ordeal. It may be that people like adversarial trials for
some of the same reasons they like sporting events and other contests. . ...
408. Id. at 679.
409. Id.
410. Supra notes 395-97 and accompanying text.
411. See Asimow, supra note 407, at 677 (explaining how the media creates a
"narrative undoubtedly served to legitimate the existing adversary system by constantly
repeating the message that adversarialism is the only true path to justice.").
412. Supra Part III.B.
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interest in maintaining the status quo in the United States, where they control
the process and the courts merely respond. 1
Moreover, American-style adversarialism does have positive traits. 1
Among other things, the adversary system has provided the machinery for
some of America's greatest moments of law and public morality, such as
the landmark desegregation cases and myriad suits protecting the values
enshrined in the First Amendment .4 "5 This was made possible by a
decentralized adversarial system receptive to novel arguments by private
parties who might be shut out of the political process. 416  In this way,
adversarialism and the litigation it fosters provide legitimacy to the
American form of government. 1  Indeed, adversarialism has advantages
in the arena of crime and punishment. Bearing in mind the plurality of
public opinion and the diversity of the populace, some issues of criminal
justice may be best resolved on a more local level, where policy
judgments can be made by politically accountable district attorneys and
put into practice by line prosecutors in contested proceedings. 1
Adversanialism has also produced benefits for criminal defendants. The
Constitution enshrined adversarial rights to check abuses of power, and over
time, adversanialism generated rules of criminal procedure that sought to
curb police misconduct, especially with regard to poor and minority
suspects .49 During the 1960s, adversarial litigation prompted the U.S.
Supreme Court to constitutionalize several critical points in the investigative
413. See Asimow, supra note 407, at 669 ("One reason why we retain pure
adversarialism is that it is good for lawyers. Like all human beings, lawyers prefer a system
that they control (whether through trials or through settlements and plea bargains) rather
than one that subordinates them to figures, such as judges, whom they cannot control.").
414. See KAGAN, supra note 21, at 23 ("[A]dversarial legalism has enabled political
underdogs in the United States to demand better treatment from the government, first and
foremost in the cause of racial equality but also in the quest for more equitable electoral




417. Id. at 3.
418. As Professor Pizzi notes, "it is almost guaranteed that prosecutors who are elected
in highly rural counties will have quite different constituencies and will face very different
criminal problems from those prosecutors elected in heavily urban counties." Pizzi, supra
note 101, at 1344. Given the "differences in resources [and] enforcement philosophies and
priorities," it should be expected that "two prosecutorial offices in the same state will treat
the possession of a small amount of cocaine, a first time property offense, and drunk driving
differently." Id.
419. Andrew E. Taslitz, Temporal Adversarialism, Criminal Justice, and the Rehnquist
Court: The Sluggish Life of Political Facrfinding, 94 GEo. L.J. 1589, 1597 (2006).
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process--search and seizure, arrest, custodial interrogation, identification
procedures, and so on-and then provided an adversarial-based
enforcement mechanism through the exclusionary rule .420 Likewise, the
basic necessities of a decent adversarial criminal process, one that ensures a
rough equality of arms via the right to counsel, prompted the creation of
public defenders' offices across the nation.42 A dicsed previously, a
properly working adversarial process may offer innocent defendants better
opportunities to uncover exonerating evidence, to question dubious
testimony and claims, and to obtain post-conviction relief, all premised on
criminal procedure rights and the ethical duty of defense counsel to
zealously represent their clients, which are products of adversarialism itself.
In some circumstances, however, the harm of adversarialism may far
outweigh any benefits. Professor Kagan highlights a pair of negative
consequences: the costliness of party-directed adversarial decision-making,
which generates prolonged, complicated, and resource-intensive litigation;
and the legal uncertainty produced by pliable, complex norms and
unpredictable rulings, which result from decision-making that is fragmented
and largely nonhierarchical. 2 Both characteristics raise issues of equality,
with adversarial litigation producing sometimes drastically inconsistent
results across cases and among parties. It can also generate significant
agency costs, as the vast discretion associated with adversarialism
practically invites lawyers to serve their own self-interests rather than those
of their clients. Moreover, the battle nature of legal adversarialism inspires
a mentality where the ends always justify the means. Like war, victory is
all that matters in hyper-adversarial litigation. Otherwise unthinkable
tactics-bringing questionable or excessive legal claims, shaping beneficial
testimony and mercilessly attacking opposing witnesses, ignoring or even
hiding unfavorable evidence, appealing to base emotions and prejudices,
and so on-all become conceivable when winning means everything.
Along the way, lawyers can forget or may choose to ignore an
important fact-at issue is the welfare of real individuals, whose lives may
be irreparably and unjustifiably harmed by a take-no-prisoners approach to
law. Nowhere is the danger of extreme adversarialism more pronounced
than in the criminal justice system. As noted, the last few decades have
420. Id
421. See id. at 1598 (describing how "nlew constitutional rules ... gave lawyers more
power to conduct effective investigations, and they improved the resources with which to
conduct the adversarial battle-for example, encouraging the rise of public defenders'
offices').
422. KAGAN, supra note 21, at 9.
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seen drastic increases in the breadth of criminal liability and the amount of
punishment in the United States. Prosecutors on this side of the Atlantic are
partisans in the criminal process, with chief prosecutors and their line
deputies having strong incentives to maximize convictions and aggregate
sentences. Sometimes, this leads otherwise reasonable people to threaten
excessive charges and disproportionate punishment in order to induce guilty
pleas. At other times, prosecutors employ dubious evidence and
disconcerting strategies, all to sway fact-finders toward conviction. The
plight of Weldon Angelos exemplifies some of these issues and the
problems associated with prosecutorial adjudication, but it is hardly the
only case.
Consider, for instance, the most awesome prosecutorial power of all-
to seek and obtain the death penalty. As is true in noncapital cases, self-
interest can play a significant role in decisions about capital punishment,
with some prosecutors explicitly seeking election based on the defendants
they have put on death row.42 Putting aside whether this political reality is
troubling in and of itself, the resulting incentive structure may well
encourage prosecutors to pursue unsavory strategies in capital cases, such
as presenting inconsistent theories in pursuit of multiple death verdicts
(e.g., arguing in one case that a particular person killed the victim, but then
claiming in another case that someone else was the actual killer). 2
Moreover, the infusion of politics and self-interest into a decentralized,
unguided approach to prosecution virtually ensures inconsistent decision-
making in death cases. Some studies have suggested that capital charging
decisions are correlated to irrelevant factors (e.g., race) or, conversely, are
so arbitrary as to have a "lightning-strike" quality. 2 But in many
423. See, e.g., Kenneth Bresler, Seeking Justice, Seeking Election, and Seeking the Death
Penalty: The Ethics of Prosecutorial Candidates' Campaigning on Capital Convictions, 7 GEO.
J. LEGAL Erwucs 941, 943 (1994) (detailing the "particularly gruesome campaign pacice... of
prosecutors and former prosecutors politicking on the defendants they have sent to death row").
424. See, e.g., Stumpf v. Mitchell, 367 F.3d 594, 613 (6th Cir. 2004) ("In this case,
the state clearly used inconsistent, irreconcilable theories at Stumpf's hearing and
Wesley's trial."), rev'd sub nom., Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005); Thompson v.
Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1057 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) ("The
prosecutor manipulated evidence and witnesses, argued inconsistent motives, and at
Leitch's trial essentially ridiculed the theory he had used to obtain a conviction and death
sentence at Thompson's trial.").
425. See SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATII AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL
DISPARITES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 1 (1989) (outlining racial disparities in capital
sentencing); David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical
Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. Rium. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 731 (1983) ("[O]ur
analyses suggest that Georgia's death-sentencing system is tainted by the influence of
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instances, the mere threat of the death penalty allows the prosecutor to
effectively adjudicate the case, with defendants entering into plea bargains
to avoid execution regardless of any factual or legal claims they might
raise.
In all fairness, the disturbing aspects of hyper-adversarialism are not
solely related to the prosecutorial function. Imagine, for instance, the not-
so-hypothetical situation where grieving family members simply want to
know the location of their loved-one's body. If defense counsel is
approached about whether he has any details that might help their search,
the lawyer is not only duty bound but personally incentivized to withhold
information about the murder victim unless he can secure sufficient
concessions for his client. Similar conclusions can be reached in (arguably)
more jarring circumstances, as illustrated by two high-profile cases from
the past decade. In one, a prominent defense attorney knew that his client
had killed a seven-year-old girl, but at trial he adlamantly denied that the
defendant had anything to do with the crime and, more importantly,
attacked the lifestyle of the victim's family, suggesting that one of the
parents' fiends might be the real killer.42 In the other case, defense
attorneys kept quiet about a murder confession by their client while an
innocent man served more than a quarter-century in prison for that crime.42
To be sure, the defense tactics in the first case fell squarely within the
canons of professional conduct,4 28 while the attorneys in the second case
could have been disbarred for revealing their client's admission. The basic
issue remains, however: American adversarialism and its full expression in
arbitrary and capricious factors, notably the victim's race and the place where the
defendant is prosecuted."); Glenn Pierce & Michael Radelet, The Impact of Legally
Inappropriate Factors on Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990-99, 46 SANTA
CLARA L. Ray. 1 (2005) (study finding geographic variations in captial punishment and an
association between the death penalty and victim race and ethnicity); Michael L. Radelet et
al., Race, Gender, Region and Death Sentencing in Colorado, 1989-1999, 77 U. COLO. L.
REV. 549, 549 (2006) ("[Tlhe death penalty is most likely to be sought for homicides with
white female victims, and .. . the probability of death being sought is 4.2 times higher for
those who kill whites than for those who kill blacks."); cf Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (analogizing arbitrary death sentences to "being
struck by lightning").
426. See, e.g., Alex Roth, Experts Make Case for Defense Attorneys, SAN DIEGO
UiJoN-TRIB., Sept. 22, 2002, at A- I (providing an account of David Westerfield's trial).
427. See, e.g., Sixty Minutes: A 26-Year Secret (CBS television broadcast May 25,
2008) (explaining that Alton Logan spent twenty-six years in prison for a crime he did not
commit even though the real murderer had confessed to his own attorneys).
428. Roth, supra note 426 ("Two ethics experts said there is absolutely no evidence
Westerfield's attorneys committed any violations of the California Rules of Professional
Conduct... .)
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the criminal process seem to have an infinite capacity to produce ethical
dilemmas. In these situations, the defense attorney can only avoid pangs of
conscience, in David Luban's words, by "retreat[ing] into a nearby
phonebooth and return[ing] moments later clothed in the Adversary System,
trailing clouds of glory."'4 19  Needless to say, any candid rethinking of
American criminal justice must take into consideration adversarialism's
impact on both the prosecutorial and defense functions.
Moreover, the foregoing is not meant to implicitly lionize the
European prosecutor by casting aspersions on the American district
attorney. The bureaucratic, hierarchical approach may be tedious and at
times ineffective; European civil service and its protections can breed
laziness; and the pressure to close files hardly seems a transcendental
component of justice. Likewise, the near automation of some prosecutorial
offices, such as the Dutch point system, resembles a mechanical
jurisprudence that can easily lose sight of the fact that it is a human being
who is prosecuted and punished, not an inanimate object .430 As mentioned,
there are legitimate, if not at times compelling, arguments in favor of an
adversarial criminal justice system, political accountability, local control,
and ample prosecutorial discretion, all of which are engrained in the
American legal tradition. 3
B. Possible Solutions
What is equally clear is that the context and consequences of
prosecutorial adjudication in the United States are different and far graver
than in Europe. Although the American criminal justice system will not
(and arguably should not) be supplanted by the inquisitorial approach or
any of its European variants, there may be ways to eliminate or at least
temper the worst aspects of prosecutorial adjudication in the United States,
drawing upon the experiences of other nations. In this endeavor,
comparative criminal justice scholarship becomes all the more important,
requiring serious contemplation of the arguments by Professors Frase and
Weigend for selective transplants from France and Germany, 3 for
429. David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER 83, 89 (David
Luban ed., 1983).
430. See, e.g., Luna, Gridland, supra note 229 (critiquing mechanical sentencing).
43 1. See, e.g., Pizzi, supra note 101, at 1336-51 (highlighting advantages the American
adversarial system enjoys over civil law criminal justice systems).
432. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (outlining Richard Frase and Thomas
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instance, with due consideration to Professor Langer's concept of "legal
translation"433 and the groundbreaking discourse by Professors Goldstein,
Langbein, and Weinreb.
Some alternatives may seek to recalibrate the balance of powers
among the branches of government and thereby reduce the negative
consequences of prosecutorial adjudication. This might involve the courts
asserting a greater role at the front-end and back-end of the criminal
process, that is, at charging and sentencing. Several scholars have
examined such possibilities, offering theoretical arguments based on the
harm principle or notions of human dignity and autonomy. 3 As a matter
of constitutional law, judicial review of prosecutorial charging and
sentencing decisions might be premised on the separation of powers
doctrine, the due process clause, and the ban on cruel and unusual
punishment .43 ' Although a few lower courts have suggested as much, they
represent outliers with no impact on legal doctrine. 3
Weigend's reform proposals involving transplants from France's and Germany's criminal
justice systems).
433. See generally Langer, Legal Translations, supra note 51.
434. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment,
55 HASTINGS LIJ 509, 530-70 (2004) (arguing that notions of dignity and personal
autonomy should limit substantive criminal law); Claire Finkelstein, Positivism and the
Notion of an Offense, 88 CAL. L. REv. 335, 358-93 (2000) (arguing that "[tihe definition of
an offense must be constructed in a way that makes the infringement of liberty justified in
light of the harm the prohibited conduct inflicts').
435. See, e.g., Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 36, at 594-95 (suggesting a
constitutional basis for checking abuses).
436. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 289 (D. Mass. 2004)
(questioning constitutionality of prosecutorial decision-making); United States v. Dyck, 287
F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1021 (D.N.D. 2003) (same); United States v. Sidhom, 144 F. Supp. 2d 41.
41 (D. Mass. 2001) (same).
[Tihe power to impose a sentence has been virtually transferred from the court
to the government, which, as the prosecuting authority, is an interested party to
the case. This transfer continues an erosion of judicial power and a breach in
the wall of the doctrine of the separation of powers.
Thus, the government, not only has the authority to prosecute crime and to
decide the nature of the criminal charge to be preferred, but now has the power
to determine the severity of the punishment. As a result, courts are required to
react passively as automatons and to impose a sentence which the judge may
personally deem unjust.
Sidhom, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 41. Arguably, a due process violation occurs when the court is
prevented from sentencing the defendant as an individual based on its assessment of the
offense and offender, and instead is required by prosecutorial charging decisions and
determinate sentencing laws to impose an excessive punishment. "The concept of
individualized sentencing is deeply rooted in our legal tradition and is a fundamental liberty
interest," one district court judge opined, and a "due process right arises at sentencing
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Of course, the courts and constitutional judicial review are not the only
means to adjust the balance of authority in criminal justice. Through
appropriate legislation, lawmakers themselves could ameliorate some of the
worst consequences of prosecutorial adjudication. They could affirmatively
empower judges to review charging decisions and strike those that are
excessive or duplicative, subject to oversight by higher courts. Legislators
could mandate that prosecution offices promulgate a comprehensive set of
charging guidelines enforceable by the judiciary. Likewise, they could
enact a type of general "safety valve" provision that allows sentencing
judges to go below otherwise obligatory sentences when certain criteria are
met. 3 Or lawmakers could try to depoliticize the entire process of creating
crimes and punishment, authorizing a blue-ribbon commission to draft a
thinner, milder, more rational and comprehendible scheme, with, for
instance, the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code and its current
sentencing project serving as a template. To some extent, these ideas
mnirror the limitations on prosecutorial adjudication in Europe.
A different tack would focus not on the weaponry wielded by the
prosecution but on the composition of its office, employing a somewhat
"1soft" solution to the excesses of prosecutorial adjudication. In recent
years, prominent scholars have endorsed this approach, drawing upon
concepts from other legal traditions as a remedy for hyper-adversarialism in
American criminal justice. For example, Michael Tonry has argued for the
professionalization of prosecutors as career civil servants, specially trained
and appointed based on merit, along the lines of the European model:
Career officials are more likely than politically selected officials to
decide individual cases on the merits of their distinctive circumstances
and to consider policy proposals from long-term perspectives of whether
they will improve the quality of justice or the effectiveness of
administration. Commitment to abstract principles of justice is part of
the professionalism and professional self-esteem of career officials, and
buffers individual decisions and policy choices from raw emotions and
officials' self interest. 438
Consider also George Thomas's ingenious idea of creating "criminal
law specialists" who both prosecute and defend criminal defendants,
because sentencing involves the most extreme deprivation of personal liberty and therefore
calls for a highly individualized process where a person must be assessed and sentenced as
an individual." Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 1021.
437. See, e.g., Luna & Cassell, supra note 359 (advocating adoption of such a
measure).
438. TONRY, supra note 236, at 207-08.
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roughly akin to the British system prior to the introduction of the Crown
Prosecution Service. Unlike the ethos of prosecutorial domination and
defense dismay that currently exists in the United States, the pool of
specialists would face the exact same pressures, possibilities, and pitfalls,
thereby providing a basis for mutual understanding and respect:
The district attorney and her assistants would draw from the pool to
prosecute, and the chief public defender and his assistants would draw
from the pooi to defend. We have instantly equalized case loads for
criminal law specialists. We have also reduced the built-in stresses and
strains of seeing the world from only one perspective. Specialists will
no longer view defense requests for exculpatory evidence as a mere
annoyance and, instead, will be much more willing to cooperate with
defense discovery. [They will also be] more attuned to the possibility
that a defendant might be innocent.43
A still "softer" solution would require no action by government at all.
Rather than changing the law to limit prosecutorial power or restructuring
the relevant status and experiences of the profession, reform efforts could
be focused on the cradle of prosecutors and, for that matter, all lawyers and
judges-the American law school. In a sense, legal education has always
been a work-in-progress, evolving in response to developments in law and
society or, conversely, seeking to transform the legal system and affected
social structures from the bottom up. The rise (and fall) of various
theoretical frameworks in legal scholarship-formalism, realism, legal
process theory, critical legal studies, empiricism, interdisciplinarity, and so
on-have corresponded to new pedagogical styles and course texts."40 Yet
aspects of legal education have been remarkably resistant to change,
especially from the bar and bench. Nonetheless, two areas of pedagogical
439. George C. Thomas 111, When Lawyers Fail Innocent Defendants: Exorcising the
Ghosts That Haunt the Criminal Justice Systems. 2008 UTAH L. REv. 25, 45-46. One
appealing alternative involves prosecutorial self-regulation, such as rewarding prosecutors
based on performance indicators other than convictions and sentences. See generally
Stephanos Bibas, Re-warding Prosecutors for Performance, 60OHIo ST. J. Cium. L. 441
(2009); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FoRDHAML. REV. 851 (1995).
Another involves implementing office policies that encourage thorough, upfront case-
screening over plea bargaining later in the process. See generally Wright & Miller,
Screening/Bargaining, supra note 13.
440. Ernest J. Weinrib, Can Law Survive Legal Education?, 60 VAND. L. REv. 401
(2007). Further, "[w]hen these understandings originate in the universities and are thus
invested with the authority of prestigious institutions of learning, the practice of law itself
can become either. ... more aware of law's distinct voice in the conversation of civilized
humanity or ... more prone to succumb to prevailing academic orthodoxies." Id
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reform have achieved a degree of support from the academy and could be
relevant to adversarial excesses manifested in the prosecutorial function.
1. The Practical Turn
In 1992, a taskforce of the American Bar Association issued the so-
called "MacCrate Report," aimed at narrowing the gap between doctrinal
education and practical training that left many new attorneys unprepared for
legal practice upon graduation from law school."4' After providing a
historical overview of the legal profession, the report developed a list of
skills necessary for competent lawyering (e.g., problem solving and
efficient practice management) and a set of core values for the profession
and its members (e.g., continuous self-development)." Fifteen years later,
the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching published
another appeal for the academy to reexamine itself, questioning the
dominance of the case-based teaching methodology, for instance, and the
failure of educators to connect legal analysis with the complexity of actual
practice and the skills it requires."3'
The MacCrate and Carnegie Reports, complemented by various
articles and books,'4" sound a clarion call to law schools that "a great
profession [is] suffering from varying degrees of confusion and
demoralization," and that any "reawakening of professional dlan must
include revitalizing legal preparation.""45 In particular, the Carnegie Report
places great emphasis on the integration of practical and experiential
learning through exposure to authentic lawyering issues, presumably
through realistic simulations and live-client experiences." But because
441. A.B.A, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL
CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION:
NARROWING THE GAP (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]; see also Russell Engler, The
MacCrate Report Turns 10: Assessing Its Impact and Identifying Gaps We Should Seek to
Narrow, 8 CLINICAL L. REv. 109 (2001) (discussing the MacCrate Report and its
antecedents).
442. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 441, at 121-221.
443. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT].
444. See generally Roy STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A
VISION AND A ROAD MAP (2007).
445. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 443, at 19.
446. See, e.g., David M. Siegel, The Ambivalent Role of Experiential Learning in
American Legal Education and the Problem of Legal Culture. 10 GERMAN L.J. 815. 8 15-19
(2009) (exploring these alternative methods of learning).
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much of this burden will be borne by practitioners in the form of clinical
and adjunct faculty, it might seem that the practical turn in legal education
might only exacerbate the problems of hyper-adversarialism among lawyers
in general and prosecutors in particular. After all, the most successful
practitioners are often those who are most adroit at the battle model of the
American legal process.
The Carnegie Report and its predecessors were not simply interested in
skills training in the art of litigation, however. To the contrary, a primary
concern was the extent to which the traditional approach of legal education
teaches students to focus on "only those details that contribute to someone's
staking a legal claim on the basis of precedent" and to redefine complex
disputes "as opportunities for advancing a client's cause through legal
argument.""47 What is often left out is the moral dimension of legal conflicts
and the ethical questions they raise.
Law schools fail to complement the focus on skill in legal analyses with
effective support for developing ethical and social skills. Students need
opportunities to learn about, reflect on and practice the responsibilities
of legal professionals. Despite progress in making legal ethics a part of
the curriculum, law schools rarely pay consistent attention to the social
and cultural contexts of legal institutions and the varied forms of legal
practice.48
With appropriate implementation, many of the recommendations for
legal education might help alter the traditional mindset and concomitant
practices. Dynamic skills training and clinical education might go a long
way toward limiting the excesses of American adversarialism. Well-
constructed skills courses and in-house clinics (or externship programs with
substantial faculty involvement and supervision) not only connect
substantive law with the legal profession but also provide opportunities to
teach students the "best practices" of a principled lawyer. Instead of
learning what can be done or what is begrudgingly allowed-which new
attorneys might only discover through trial-and-error or gather from war
stories and tips of the trade provided by the most successful (or cagey)
litigators in the office-legal educators can emphasize what a principled
lawyer should do or what professional ethics aspire to in the practice of law.
Having ethics permeate the entire curriculum could have a similar impact,
forcing students to go beyond doctrinal issues of torts, contracts, and
447. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 443, at 187.
448. Id.
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property, and to examine whether the law and its application in real cases
further the highest values of the profession and society-at-large."49
Along these lines, prosecutor clinics and externship programs with
concurrent coursework could be part of an educational process that, among
other things, speaks to the most troubling instances of prosecutorial
adjudication .450  The enormous power wielded by government attorneys
makes the education of future prosecutors crucial, former Attorney General
Janet Reno argued a few years ago, and clinical programs "hold a special
opportunity of bettering our criminal justice system.",
45 1
Clinical programs provide a wonderful opportunity to expose potential
prosecutors to the many different disciplines that come into play in the
criminal justice system. The ideal program should mine-and
maintain-the idealism and desire to change and improve that is present
in all young people, and instill in them the notion that crime does not
happen in a vacuum. Let them, for example, consider and discuss
whether society is better off incarcerating a drug offender without
providing drug treatment. Give them the means with which to explore
innovative and alternative ways of preventing, rather than merely
prosecuting, crime. Expose them to the real and traditional workings of
prosecutor offices, and to interdisciplinary approaches to crime
fighting. 45
2
Most of all, Reno suggested that clinical programs can help law students
become fair and ethical prosecutors, not just forceful and efficient ones, by
stressing the imperative of doing justice rather than securing courtroom
victories. 5
449. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE
PERVASIVE METHOD 4 (1994) ("Ethics deserves discussion in all substantive areas because it
arises in all substantive areas."); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 31, 51 (1992) (arguing for the pervasive method of legal ethics instruction
because "enhance[ing] capacities for moral judgment ... requires continuing opportunities
for reflection"). See generally Symposium: Teaching Legal Ethics, 58 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 et seq. (1995) (including various proposals for implementing the pervasive method
of legal ethics education).
450. For discussions of prosecutor ethics and externship programs, see Symposium:
Prosecutorial Externship and Clinical Programs, 74 Miss. L.J. i. et seq. (2005); Lisa K.
Halushka, The Prosecution Externship from the Classroom to the Courtroom, I11 T.M.
COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 323 (2005); and Norman Fell, Development of a Criminal
Law Clinic. A Blended Approach, 44 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 275 (1996).
451. Hon. Janet Reno, The Importance of Prosecution Training in Law School, 74
Miss. L.J. xii, xiii (2005).
452. Id. at xiii-xiv.
453. Id. at xiv.
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The classroom component of a clinical/extern program offers
educators the occasion for in-depth exploration of the ethical rules and
special obligations of prosecutors. 5 This may begin with relatively
abstract or systemic considerations, like the role of prosecutors in the
criminal justice system, as well as the ways in which their responsibilities
are different, and higher, than those of other attorneys and the reasons for
the differences. Students may be asked to evaluate real-world cases or
realistic hypotheticals using prevailing rules and their own sense of justice.
Conflicts between professional standards and actual case resolutions can be
especially edifying, forcing students to consider the tension between
zealous advocacy and the rules of ethics, between personal self-interest and
the ideal of a public interest representative, and between legally permissible
outcomes and their own conception of right and wrong. For instance, the
Angelos case might provide a helpful exercise on the use and abuse of
prosecutorial power in charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing.455
Future prosecutors can also benefit from classroom interaction with
future defense attorneys, possibly through a combined criminal clinic
course. 456 Students are allowed to discuss their views and experiences with
the "other side"-they might even be asked to switch sides for classroom
exercises or as a form of role play-all with the goal of establishing a basis
for mutual understanding and respect. Moreover, students should be
encouraged to act as "savvy participant-observers" in their prosecution
placements, using the opportunity to study the criminal justice system and
the prosecutor's role within it, and comparing how different prosecutors
exercise their discretion. 5 These experiences may crystallize through
454. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2002). See generally Am. BAR AWSN,
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AM) DEFENSE FUNCTION
(3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FuNCTION]; Stacy Caplow, "Tacking too Close to the Wind": The Challenge to Prosecution
Clinics to Set Our Students on a Straight Course, 74 Miss. L.J. 919 (2005); Peter A. Joy,
Prosecution Clinics: Dealing with Professional Role, 74 Miss. L.J. 955 (2005).
455. ABA STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FuNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra
note 454, Standards 3-3.9, 3-6.1; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROPOSED
REviSIONS TO STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 53-54, 62-67, 77-80, 101-02
(draft June 2010).
456. See, e.g., Jean Montoya, The University of San Diego Criminal Clinic: It's All in
the Mix, 74 Miss. L.J. 1021, 1037 (2005) (saying that a combined criminal clinic promotes
the goal of getting students "to appreciate the opponent's perspective, not only to promote
civility respect and professionalism more generally, but also to enhance their competency").
See generally Linda F. Smith, Benefits of an Integrated (Prosecution & Defense) Criminal
Law Clinic, 74 Miss. L.J. 1239 (2005) [hereinafter Smith, Benefits].
457. Linda F. Smith, Designing an Extern Clinical Program: Or As You Sow, So Shall
You Reap, 5 CLINICAL L. REv. 527, 550 (1999).
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reflection, possibly by contemporaneous journal writing, 5 transforming
disparate incidents into larger themes that can help shape or change
perspectives.
Based on the foregoing, it might seem that real cases and stories are
only helpful as examples of how prosecutors should not behave. But there
are countless American lawyers, both past and present, who can serve as
positive models for aspiring attorneys and a contrast conception to the win-
at-all-cost approach of hyper-adversarialism. 5 9 Consider, for instance,
then-Attorney General Robert Jackson's famous address to the conference
of U.S. Attorneys, where he argued that federal prosecutors can "afford to
be just" in light of the awesome power they are entrusted with .460  "Any
prosecutor who risks his day-to-day professional name for fair dealing to
build up statistics of success has a perverted sense of practical values, as
well as defects of character.",46'1 Even when it loses a case, Jackson
maintained, the government has actually won if justice was achieved. 6
As discussed above, current law does little to stop prosecutors from
overcharging defendants and threatening disproportionate punishment,
producing de facto or de jure prosecutorial adjudication and thus an
enhanced record of success for the state's attorney. While the law does
nothing to prevent this, an imperative ethical issue lingers. Should a
458. See, e.g., William P. Quigley, Reflections from the Journals of Prosecution Clinic
Students, 74 Miss. L.J. 1147, 1152-74 (2005) (discussing the themes raised by students'
reflective writings about their clinic experiences); Smith, Benefits, supra note 456, at 1259-
79 (same).
459. For instance, then-practitioner Abraham Lincoln offered the following advice to a
prospective client:
Yes, we can doubtless gain your case for you; we can set a whole neighborhood
at loggerheads; we can distress a widowed mother and her six fatherless children
and thereby get you six hundred dollars to which you seem to have a legal claim,
but which rightfilly belongs, it appears to me, as much to the woman and her
children as it does to you. You must remember that some things legally right are
not morally right. We shall not take your case, but will give you a little advice
for which we will charge you nothing. You seem to be a sprightly, energetic
man; we would advise you to try your hand at making six hundred dollars in
some other way.
2 WILLi~um HERNDON & JESSE WEK HERNDON's LINCOLN 345 (1889) (quoted in DAVID
LUBAN, LAwYERS AND JUSTICE 174 (1988)).
460. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 18, 19 (1940).
46 1. Id.
462. Id.; see also Geoffr~ey M. Klineberg & Janet Reno, What Would Jackson Do?:
Some Old Advice for the New Attorney General, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 197 (2008)
(discussing this speech and suggesting Jackson as a model for the new U.S. Attorney
General).
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principled prosecutor engage in such behavior, pursuing victories rather
than appropriate outcomes? Unfortunately, such questions are rarely raised
in law school classes today.
2. The Transnational Turn
The preceding suggests that a new emphasis in American legal
education on ethics and experiential learning could, over time, help
moderate hyper-adversarialism and its impact on the prosecutorial function.
Interestingly, legal education in Europe is going through a transformation
of its own."3 Pursuant to the so-called Bologna process, all EU nations and
many non-EU countries are seeking to create a single "European Higher
Education Area" that would provide, among other things, uniform grading,
quality assurance programs, comparable and mutually recognized degrees,
and career mobility for university graduates .464 There have been some
questions about the extent to which particular nations will adapt to the
Bologna process and whether, for instance, clinical education can be
incorporated into European law schools. 6 What is clear, however, is that
legal education in Europe has moved toward a comparative, transnational,
and/or global curriCUIum,4 1 with the aim of expanding students' minds and
preparing them for an interconnected legal world. 6
463. See generally Special Issue: Transnationalizing Legal Education, 10 GERMAN. L.J.
629 et seq. (2009). For discussions of traditional legal education and its reform in Europe
(especially Germany), see Annette Keilmann, The Einheitsjurist-A German Phenomenon, 7
GERMAN L.J. 293 (2006); see also Jutta Brunnde, The Reform of Legal Education in
Germany: The Never-Ending Story and European Integration, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 399
(1992); MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., CompARATWvE LEGAL TRADITIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS
AND CASES 130-52, 539-53 (2d ed. 1994).
464. Laurel S. Terry, The Bologna Process and Its Impact in Europe: It's So Much
More Than Degree Changes, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 107, 135 (2008).
465. See, e.g., Richard J. Wilson, Western Europe: Last Holdout in the Worldwide
Acceptance of Clinical Legal Education, 10 GERMvAN L.J. 823, 826-31 (2009) (explaining
the author's studies on the growth of clinical legal education throughout the world and
Western Europe's resistance to this growth); Laurel S. Terry, Living With the Bologna
Process: Recommendations to the German Legal Education Community from a US.
Perspective, 7 GERMAN L.J. 11 (2006) (discussing the effect of the Bologna Process on
Germany).
466. Cf Catherine Valcke, Global Law Teaching, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 160, 161-67
(2004) (critiquing the use of the terms global law, comparative law, and transnational law);
Sadiq Reza, Transnational Criminal Law and Procedure: An Introduction, 56 J. LEGAL
EDUc. 430, 430 (2006) (noting potential definitions of "transnational criminal law").
467. See, e.g., Simon Chesterman, The Evolution of Legal Education:
Internationalization, Transnationalization, Globalization, 10 GERMAN L.J. 877, 877 (2009)
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In the U.S., "globalization" has become a sort of buzzword in legal
education, with schools marketing themselves as "global law schools,"
hiring faculty with expertise in international and comparative law,
establishing exchange and dual degree programs with foreign law schools,
and encouraging a global focus in scholarship and activities."6 Along these
lines, this Article's comparative analysis is consistent with the inclusion of
transnational law within the law school curriculum. Despite being a
recurrent topic of reform,"9 curricular integration of transnational
perspectives was not discussed in the MacCrate and Carnegie Reports and
related works-and, to be honest, it is unlikely to have the relatively
straightforward pedagogical impact of pervasive ethics, skills training, and
clinical experience.
Nonetheless, there is precedent for the utilization of foreign
experiences in American education and law. After the Civil War, leading
university administrators borrowed from the continental approach to higher
education in the sciences and professional schools, with, for instance,
German legal education providing an especially influential model for
American law schools. 7 In more recent times, the U.S. Supreme Court has
(examining "the evolution of legal education as it has moved through international,
transnational, and now global paradigms"); Jaakko Husa, Turning the Curriculum Upside
Down: Comparative Law as an Educational Tool for Constructing the Pluralistic Legal
Mind, 10 GERMAN' L.J. 913, 913 (2009); Alexander H.E. Morawa & Xiaolu Zhang,
Transnationalization of Legal Education: A Swiss (and Comparative) Perspective, 26 PENN
ST. INT'L L. REv. 811, 811-12 (2008); Rosalie Jukier, Transnationalizing the Legal
Curriculum: How to Teach What We Live, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 172, 173-74 (2006)
(analyzing "[blow the Faculty of Law at McGill University" has "integrate[d] transnational
legal perspectives into its curriculum); Soogeun Oh, Globalization in Legal Education of
Korea, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 525 (2005) (explaining how Korea has "set globalization as part
of the national agenda" and how "in this flow of globalization legal education has absorbed
the concept and applied it to the actual reform process"); Brunnde, supra note 463, at 424.
468. See Chesterman, supra note 467, at 883-85 ("[Tlhe first mark of globalization as
distinct from transnationalization was the move from exchange programs to double-degree
programs across national jurisdictions."); see also John Edward Sexton, The Global Law
School Program at New York University, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 329 (1996) (explaining New
York Universitys Law School's efforts to increase students global experience and
education); Harry W. Arthurs, Law and Learning in an Era of Globalization, 10 GERMAN
L.J. 629, 630-31 (2009) (explaining the current growth of globalization in the law school
curriculum).
469. Sadiq Reza, Transnational Criminal Law and Procedure: An Introduction, 56 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 430,430-595 (2006); Workshop Papers: Transnational Legal Education, 55 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 475-599 (2005); Mathias Reimann, The End of Comparative Law as an
Autonomous Subject, 11 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 49, 50-51 (1996) (noting the long history of
calls for incorporating comparative law into American legal education).
470. See Gail J. Hupper, The Rise of An Academic Doctorate in Law: Origins Through
World War 11, 49 Am. J. LEGAL Hisi. 1, 7-13 (2007) (explaining the adoption of some
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drawn upon foreign law as persuasive authority in some prominent
decisions."7' Although the latter practice is highly controversial, 7 the
softer, less divisive option of incorporating transnational law into legal
education might have long-term benefits for the profession and American
society as a whole.
As advocates have noted, a transnational perspective comports with
the globalization of legal issues and the expectations of lawyers. 7 ' The
global marketplace, realized through international systems of
communication and transportation, requires practitioners fluent in
multijurisdictional issues of law and competent at cross-border problem
solving. 7  The modem channels of interaction and exchange that have
fostered the global marketplace, however, have also facilitated criminal
activity that transcends borders, from drug smuggling and human
trafficking, to computer crimes and multinational corporate misconduct, to
high-sea piracy and international terrorism. The investigation and
prosecution of such crimes requires cooperation among affected nations-
to secure the arrest and extradition of suspects, for instance, and to obtain
evidence abroad-based on the knowledge of international agreements and
an understanding of the relevant foreign actors and legal processes. 7
attributes of the German legal education into the American legal education).
471. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576-77 (2005) (citing foreign materials);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573, 576-77 (2003) (same); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 316 n.21 (2002) (same). But see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (2003)
("Justice Breyer's dissent would have us consider the benefits that other countries, and the
European Union, believe they have derived from federal systems that are different from
ours. We think such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a
constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing one.").
472. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 604-05 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (acknowledging use of
foreign materials); see also id. at 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting use of foreign
materials); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same); Atkins, 536 U.S. at
347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 324-25 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (same);
Printz. 521 U.S. at 921 n. 11 (2003) (refusing to look at other countries to assess the U.S.
Constitution).
473. John B. Attanasio, The Globalization of the American Law School, 46 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 311, 311 (1996); W. Michael Reisman, Designing Law Curricula for a Transnational
Industrial and Science-Based Civilization, 46 J. LEGAL EDuc. 322, 324 (1996); GLENDON ET
AL., supra note 463, at 9.
474. Still other issues for the legal profession may be presented by the creation of
supranational institutions and tribunals (e.g., the European Union and the International Court
of Justice) and attempts to unify' or harmonize law across nations. See, e.g., HIRAM E.
CHODOSH, GLOBAL JUSTICE REFORM: A COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY 3, 29-30, 32-34
(2005) (describing the issues created by forming supranational institutions); Arthurs, supra
note 468, at 634-35 (same).
475. Richard S. Frase, Main-Streaming Comparative Criminal Justice: How to
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More importantly for present purposes, the pedagogical integration of
tranisnational law helps challenge "ethnocentricism," the assumption that
other countries necessarily view and respond to problems in the same way
or that the approach taken in one's own nation is superior to all others. This
type of parochialism is a long-recognized and nearly universal
phenomenon, leading many to believe that the domestic status quo is
natural and inevitable rather than the result of historical and cultural
contingencies. 46 The problem seems particularly acute in the United
States, 47where it may diminish the ability to question existing
arrangements or even to recognize the need for critical review.
In the legal profession, this intellectual boundary can be traced back to
law school and the formation of a less-than-worldly legal worldview. Law
students who are tutored in domestic law alone, oblivious to differences
across cultures and over time, may come to view the existing legal system
as preordained and inexorable, making it difficult to question the status quo.
For instance, as Craig Bradley notes, "I and, I'm sure, most of my
contemporaries managed to pass through three years of law school without
ever finding out that jury trials do not generally occur in criminal cases on
the European continent. 4 18 With the understanding that "perfectly civilized
countries dispense with juries altogether," an American practitioner might
Incorporate Comparative and International Concepts and Materials into Basic Criminal
Law and Procedure Courses, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 773, 781-83 (1998) [hereinafter Frase,
Main-Streaming]; Erik Luna, Comparative Criminal Procedure, supra note 3 10, at 277-81,
327; Ellen S. Podgor, Incorporating Transnational Law in First Year Criminal Law and
Procedure Classes, 56 J. LEGAL EDuc. 444, 444 (2006); PHILIP L. REiCHEL, COMPARATIVE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: A TOPICAL APPROACH 3-10 (3d ed. 2002).
476. As one legal comparativist opined in 1922, "When one is immersed in his own
law, in his own country, unable to see things from without, he has a psychologically
unavoidable tendency to consider as natural, as necessary, as given by God, things which are
simply due to historical accident or temporary social situation.' Pierre Lepaulle, The
Function of Comparative Law with a Critique of Sociological Jurisprudence, 35 HARV. L.
REV. 838, 858 (1922); see also CHODOSH, supra note 474, at 13, 15 (quoting prominent
comparative law books); W.J. Kamba, Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework, 23
INT'L &Comp. L. Q. 485, 491 (1974).
477. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the
United States, 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 545, 547 (1995) ("American legal dialogue starts from the
premise that no relevant insights are to be found beyond water's edge."). See generally
Craig M. Bradley, Overview, in CRIINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY xvii, xxii
(Craig M. Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter Bradley, Overview]. Of course, there are
many positive aspects of national pride and confidence, such as instilling a sense of shared
identity among the citizenry and a willingness to act for the common good in spite of one's
own self-interests. See, e.g., Luna, Comparative Criminal Procedure, supra note 3 10, at 282
(noting some positive attributes); REICHEL, supra note 475, at 2-3 (same).
478. Bradley, Overview, supra note 477, at xxii.
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have a different perspective on the alleged necessity and jurisprudence of
jury trials."' 9
The more optimistic scholars see comparative law as a vehicle for
reform, where foreign legislation, judicial decisions, and practices provide
alternative models that might be adopted (or adapted, transplanted,
translated, etc.) in the United States .480  Given the aforementioned
convergence in criminal processes, with traditional components of an
adversarial system being adopted in civil law nations, the remaining
differences may be particularly enlightening on the fundamental values,
policy choices, and the street-level and courtroom practices that animate the
American legal system .48'1 The similarities may assuage knee-jerk reactions
against legal approaches in other nations. They also make it more likely
that some approaches could be transplanted in the United States, as
evidenced by a history of roughly comparable systems adopting each
other's practices. 8
Even if adoption proves infeasible, comparativism presents an
opportunity to reflect upon the American legal system. By contrasting
domestic and foreign practices-looking at a nation's legal system in "the
tell-tale mirror" of another system, which may appear indifferent or even
hostile to principles heralded in one's homeland 48 3 -professionals, scholars,
and students may come to a fuller appreciation of their own laws and
practices. 8 Someone who studies the criminal justice systems of other
nations and their experiences with similar phenomenon may thereby gain a
clearer perspective of his home criminal justice system and the reasons to
modify or sustain some current approach. 8 ' After all, it seems hard to
479. Id. See generally REICHEL, supra note 475, at 4.
480. Supra note 475 and accompanying text; see also generally Frase, Main-Streaming,
supra note 475, at 777-80; GLENDON ET AL., supra note 463, at 9-10; REICH-EL, supra note
475, at 5.
481. Supra note 475 and accompanying text.
482. Frase, Main-Streaming, supra note 475, at 780.
[I]ncreasing similarity means that potential "donor" and "recipient' systems have
become more compatible, thus lessening the risk of 'rejection" of legal
transplants. The fact that foreign systems have already borrowed many practices
from the United States, and from each other, shows that such international legal
transplants are indeed feasible, even across systems that remain fundamentally
different in important respects.
Id
483. CHARLES J. HAmSON & THEODORE F. PLUcKNETr, THEi ENGLISH TRIAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW 8 (1955).
484. GLENDON ET AL.. supra note 463, at 9.
485. See, e.g., Stephen C. Thaman, A Comparative Approach to Teaching Criminal
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know the merits and demerits of one's own system without considering the
alternatives. 4 86
Of course, comparison is a basic approach to human decision-making,
and it remains a principal method of legal education in the United States
(and elsewhere). Every day we are called upon as individuals and
collectives to make choices-from the trifling (e.g., what to have for
breakfast) to the momentous (e.g., whether to enact a national health care
program)-and the ultimate decisions often turn on an evaluation of the
alternatives. 8 Comparative analysis pervades all forms of legal judgment,
from the framing of cases by litigants, to the selection of decision rules by
courts, to the drafting and analysis of proposed legislation by lawmakers. 8
In the classroom, law professors are constantly engaged in comparativism,
whether they recognize it or not. One way to conceive the Langdellian shift
in law school pedagogy is that it changed most legal educators into
domestic or internal comparativists, who invariably draw upon contrasting
legal rules and doctrines in different states as part of the case method and
Socratic dialogue. 8
Indeed, courses in criminal law and procedure often implicate
comparativism, either explicitly or implicitly. First-year criminal law has
become a comparative enterprise, involving a mix of state and federal
decisions (and a smattering of common law chestnuts), all interpreting
different criminal codes and providing contrasting doctrines for classroom
Procedure and its Application to the Post-Investigative Stage, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 459, 463
(2006) [hereinafter Thaman, Comparative Approach]; REicHEL, supra note 475, at 4-5;
Frase, Main-Streaming, supra note 475, at 792.
486. See, e.g., HAmsoN & PLUCKNET-r, supra note 483, at 7-8 ("It is a good deal easier
to have a dispassionate and clear view of our own system of law, of its advantages as much
as of its disadvantages, if we begin to see it in the contrasts which it presents to another
system"); see also Giovanni Sartori, Comparing and Miscomparing, 3 J. THEORETICAL POL.
243, 245 (1991) ("[Clomparing is 'learning' from the experience of others and, conversely,
he who knows only one country knows none."); 2 THE LATER WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY,
1925-1953, at 304 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1984) (noting that "all intelligent political
criticism is comparative"). See generally Mattei Dogan & Dominique Pellassy, The
Compass of the Comparativist, in 1 COMPuARATIVE POLITICS: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE 33 (Howard J. Wiarda ed., 2005); Andrew Huxley, Golden Yoke, Silken
Text, 106 YALE L.J. 1885, 1896-99 (1997).
487. See generally CHODOSH, supra note 474, at 9, 21; GLENDON ET AL., supra note
463, at 8-9.
488. See generally CHODOSH, supra note 474, at 9-10.
489. Peter Strauss, Transsystemia-Are We Approaching a New Langdellian Moment?,
56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 161, 161-62 (2006); see also Markus D. Dubber, Legitimating Penal
Law, 28 CARitozo L. REv. 2597, 2601 (2007) (noting that analysis of American criminal law
is "domestic" or "internal" comparative law).
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discussion. 9 In turn, basic criminal procedure courses invoke comparisons
between abstract models, historical and modern approaches, state and lower
federal court cases, and, on occasion, foreign practices. 9 Once criminal
law and procedure are seen as a form of (largely internal) comparative law,
the incorporation of foreign laws and practices hardly seems risky or
492
excessive.
Overall, the addition of transnational materials into legal education
serves important pedagogical goals, 93 like challenging ethnocentric
thinking and helping students to understand other cultures, bringing this
knowledge and perspective to bear on legal problems here and abroad, and
preparing future practitioners for a world without hard borders and all the
possibilities and pitfalls that globalization entails. In the present context, a
transnational turn in education may offer an indirect method of responding
to and potentially easing the problems associated with hyper-
adversarialism. If future practitioners were familiar with the prosecution
function in other countries, they might agree that a civilized nation can have
an effective and fair criminal justice system without countenancing heavy-
handed prosecutorial adjudication.
This experience might increase the likelihood that when these students
become lawyers, judges, and legislators, they might look favorably on
reforms to prosecutorial power. But even if the transnational turn does not
generate hard legal changes, law students might be affected by an
490. Markus D. Dubber, Criminal Law in Comparative Context, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC.
433, 436 (2006) [hereinafter Dubber, Comparative Context].
491. See, e.g., MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMI1NAL PROCEDURES: CASES,
STATUTES & EXECUTIVE MATERIALS (3d ed. 2007) (incorporating federal, state, and local
materials); Christopher Slobogin, Transnational Law and Regulation of the Police, 56 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 451, 451 (2006) (explaining the importance of studying Transnational Law
and how it is applicable to all courses in law school); Albert W. Alschuler, Introduction:
Adding a Comparative Perspective to American Criminal Procedure Classes, 100 W. VA. L.
REV. 765, 765 (1998) (emphasizing the need to have up to date studies and resources on
comparative countries' laws); Frase, Main-Streaming, supra note 475, at 792 (explaining the
importance of looking at transnational law); Thamnan, Comparative Approach, supra note
485, at 463 (explaining the need to look at other countries' criminal justice processes to
reform the issues with the United States'); Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal
Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1964) (describing the "crime control" and "due process"
models of the criminal process).
492. See Dubber, Comparative Context, supra note 490, at 436 (explaining how first-
year criminal law looks at comparative law internally, involving a mix of state and federal
decisions).
493. See, e.g., Shirley M. Hufstedler, World in Transition, CHANGE, May/June 1980, at
8-9 (warning of the dangers of parochial education and calling for pedagogical change in
American universities).
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introduction to foreign prosecution services, covering not only the powers
that European prosecutors have (and those they do not), but also their
education, training, and culture. Today, a law student is exposed, at most,
to the differences between state and federal prosecutors, with the latter
often portrayed as being far more ethical and judicious in their decision-
making. Recent events, however, have provided reason to question any
alleged difference in kind across jurisdictions. 9 In this light, an
exploration of European prosecutors-their quasi-judicial role perception
and obligation to impartially pursue the truth, seeking just outcomes rather
than certain convictions and tough sentences-might be instructive for
American prosecutors-to-be. 9
V Caveats and Conclusion
Admittedly, this Article has raised more questions than it could ever
answer. To begin with, it does not delve into ongoing methodological
debates in comparative law, where methodology provides the ostensible
justification for taking the field seriously. Comparative law is not law per
se but instead a mode of legal anal ysis,4 96 the success of which may depend
on its capacity for "metacomparison," that is, a theoretical and practical
framework for comparing comparisons.~ Despite the important goals and
exciting prospects of such research, some scholars have expressed
disappointment at the condition of the discipline, which lacks any
494. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, The Tainted Federal Prosecutor in an Overeriminalized
Justice System, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1569 (2010) (discussing politicization of federal
prosecution and potential for abuse); see also supra note 1 and accompanying text (noting
problems in federal prosecution).
495. For articles advocating the incorporation of transnational materials and referencing
prosecutorial issues, see Dubber, Comparative Context, supra note 490, at 43 8-39
(discussing the legality principle and sentencing); Podgor, Incorporating Transnational Law,
supra note 475, at 447-48; Slobogin, supra note 491, at 453 (noting prosecutorial oversight
of police); Thaman, Comparative Approach, supra note 485 at 462-63, 468-72 (discussing
rise in power of American prosecutors, as well as plea-bargaining, procedural diversity, and
the legality principle); Alschuler, supra note 491, at 768 (discussing plea bargaining in
Germany); Frase, Main-Streaming, supra note 475, at 778, 785-86 (discussing plea
bargaining in Germany and France).
496. "As we all know, there is only foreign law and comparison between laws,"
Mathias Reimann notes. Reimann, supra note 469, at 70. "Foreign law is substance but
comparison is simply a method." 1d; see also ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN
APPROACH TO COMPARAM~E LAW 1-2 (1993) (analyzing the study of comparative law); cf
Sartori, supra note 486, at 243 (making a similar argument regarding comparative politics).
497. CHODOSH, supra note 474, at 1, 4.
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agreement on methodology, either as a descriptive or prescriptive matter,
and little basis for assessing the relative worth of comparative works. 9
Change may be afoot, however, as the literature has begun both to
emphasize methodological questions and to provide responses .49 But
again, the Article does not seek to engage this critical topic. Rather, we
simply note that the approach taken here is cognizant of the methodological
debate and the difficulties of any comparative endeavor. We believe the
Article's foci-prosecutors in the United States and Europe-are
comparable in a worthwhile sense, if not as the clichrd apples-to-apples, at
least as types of "fruit" whose similarities and differences are intellectually
interesting and perhaps quite telling.500 In other words, prosecutors on
different sides of the Atlantic are not "stones and monkeys," to use
Giovanni Sartori's phrase, a comparison of no interest that "ends where it
begins. 01For comparative analysis, the prosecutor presents a meaningful
category of criminal justice actor, whose case-ending powers and resulting
social impacts provide significant features worthy of examination. We also
attempt to provide a thicker account of the prosecutorial function by
examining the milieu of prosecutors in Europe and America, as well as
offering (hopefully) enlightening examples to the reader.
So although the Article is intended to be provocative, its ambition is
fairly modest-more or less, a hypothesis-generating inquiry into
prosecutorial power, its sources, and its limitations. As the authors of a
leading casebook note, "What [comparativists] are usually looking for is,
initially, a deepened understanding of the problem, a source of
inspiration.0 02 Along these lines, ours is just an opening venture that seeks
498. Id. at4.
499. See, e.g., id. at chs. 2-5 (developing a conceptual fr-amework for comparative
studies and applying it to justice reform in India and Indonesia); Vernon Valentine Palmer,
From Lerotholi to Lando Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology, 53 Am. J.
Comp. L. 261, 261 (2005) (challenging methodological critiques as establishing unattainable
research standards and calling for a more pragmatic, inclusive view of comparative law
methodology).
500. See CHODOSH, supra note 474, at 22-23.
501. See generally Sartori, supra note 486, at 245.
502. GLENDON ET AL., supra note 463, at 10; see CHODOSH, supra note 474, at 19-20,
57-60. Dean Chodosh notes that,
The questions of which variables to choose, how to measure them consistently,
and according to which purpose are nearly impossible to answer in advance of
conducting a comparison. Once the comparison accounts for these questions,
evaluating and improving the comparison then becomes possible.
Incommensurability and indeterminancy, when supported by a comparative
evaluation, are useful justifications for humility, but not if they cause one to
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to inspire other works in this area, regardless of whether they are supportive
or critical. In particular, the primary goal of this Article is to enrich the
American understanding of European prosecutors, which might in turn
provoke a broader dialogue on the comparative study of prosecution and the
possibility of reform in both places. What is more, the ideas forwarded in
the previous section, especially the "soft" options, are not death-defying.
Still, there may be substantial barriers to any reform efforts. As
discussed, the adversarial approach to law and criminal justice is deeply
engrained in the American psyche, derived from principles like
individualism, anti-statism, and federalism. Likewise, the populace has a
certain fetish with competition, whether it is in the economy, in sports
arenas, or in the courtroom. None of this is inherently bad. In fact, the
American approach to law carries many benefits, such as its capacity to
vindicate rights in individual cases and instigate better policies through
public interest litigation, for instance, and its responsiveness to local values
and criminal justice needs via elected district attorneys and line prosecutors.
Even assuming that a consensus can be reached about the problems of
adversarialism, at least when it leads to oppressive prosecutorial
adjudication, some reforms may prove impracticable or ineffective. As
noted, the courts have shown little inclination to curb prosecutorial power
directly, whether out of fear of being labeled "activist" judges or due to the
natural human bias toward the status quo. Lawmakers may face the same
pressures and incentives-to add crimes, expand culpability principles, and
increase sentences-and the results of criminal justice commissions have
been mixed. 0 As for the less direct options, professionalizing prosecution
along the civil-service model may raise the hackles of those opposed to
government bureaucracies in any form, for instance, while the notion of a
criminal law specialist who both prosecutes and defends will be subject to
difficult questions of constitutional rights and conflicts of interests.
Both suggestions would also face a degree of professional
intransigence and simple inertia, as will the proposed reform to American
make perfect the enemy of good.
Id. at 59.
503. For instance, sentencing commissions in several states and in the federal system
"abandoned their insulating functions and competed with elected officials to show who was
tougher." TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME, supra note 236, at 211. Indeed, the work-
product of the federal government's sentencing commission, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,
is needlessly complex and virtually incomprehensible. See generally Luna, Gridland, supra
note 229 (critiquing federal sentencing guidelines); KATE STrrn & Jost A. CABRANEs, FEAR
OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTrS (1998) (same).
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legal education. To be sure, legitimate concerns have been raised about the
extent to which the practical turn in legal education ignores the fundamental
role of conventional classroom teaching and its emphasis on basic
analytical reasoning. Others worry that heavy skills training will so
consume the curriculum that core doctrinal courses will be marginalized
and upper-division specialty or interdisciplinary classes will become
extinct.5 " The incorporation of transnational materials will confront
hurdles as well. Despite a long history of calls to integrate comparative
studies across the curriculum, 05 comparative law is still largely viewed as a
discrete subject in U.S. law schools. Numerous explanations have been
offered, from the persistence of legal ethnocentricism in America, to the
lack of a coherent educational vision and feasible organizational strategy, to
the self-doubts of some legal educators.1
0 6
None of these obstacles are insurmountable, however, as revealed by
history and confirmed by recent developments. In the past, the courts have
announced constitutional doctrines to rein in police abuses; and although
coercive police tactics may be more provocative, the excesses of
prosecutorial discretion can be just as consequential. Likewise, at least a
few commissions have been able to insulate sentencing policy from raw
politics and sel f-interest, 07 and the Model Penal Code has served as the
archetype for criminal law reforms across the nation.50 Moreover, there
are some small but promising signs that the American public and its elected
504. See, e.g., Joyce McConnell, A 21st Century Curriculum, W. VA. LAW., Sept./Oct.
2008, at 12 (noting such concerns). See generally David M. Siegel, The Ambivalent Role of
Experiential Learning in American Legal Education and the Problem of Legal Culture, 10
GERMAN L.J. 815 (2009) (discussing ambivalent position of legal clinics and adjunct faculty
in American legal education).
505. See Roscoe Pound, The Place of Comparative Law in the American Law School
Curriculum, 8 TUL. L. Rrv. 161, 165 (1934) (recommending comparative law education in
American law schools); see also Reimann, supra note 469, at 50-51 (analyzing the history
of recommending the consideration of comparative laws).
506. Dubber, Comparative Context, supra note 490, at 435; Frase, Main-Streaming,
supra note 475, at 774-75; Husa, supra note 467, at 920; Jukier, supra note 467, at 173,
180-84; Podgor, Incorporating Transnational Law, supra note 475, at 444-45; Reimann,
supra note 469, at 52-53; Valcke, supra note 466, at 160.
507. ToNRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME, supra note 236, at 211.
508. See, e.g., Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L.
R.Ev. 515, 516 (2000) ("Over two-thirds of the states have adopted new statutory schemes
under the heavy influence of the Model Penal Code; a similar proportion of American
jurisdictions trace the MPC's substantive crime definitions; and more than two thousand
criminal cases have cited to the Code and its provisions.").
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representatives are beginning to question the nation's approach to crime and
punishment. 09
In fact, the transformation in American legal education may already be
underway. Leading administrators and educators have voiced agreement in
the need for change expressed in the Carnegie Report and its precursors,
and some schools have announced bold initiatives and major curricular
reforms.510 As for the study of transnational law, some believe we are
approaching a Langdellian-type moment in legal education, requiring law
schools to move from a predominantly domestic focus to a more global
perspective."1' As mentioned, American criminal law professors already
engage in internal comparativism; and although it requires some effort, the
move to external comparative law need not be overwhelming. 
512
All of this should be taken to heart by those who care about American
criminal justice-and by those concerned about the dangers of prosecutorial
discretion. To an extent, the ideas mentioned here draw upon the function
and limits of law enforcement in other nations, whose experiences with
prosecutorial adjudication can enlighten American dialogue on prosecutors,
their powers, and their perils. But the foregoing should not be taken as a
plea for the adoption of any specific aspect of a foreign legal system, an
appeal for any given legal remedy or institutional reform, or advocacy for
any particular detailed agenda for educational change. If it is even possible,
a comprehensive solution to the many problems with American criminal
justice will take time, resources, and concerted efforts by numerous
constituencies.
509. See, e.g., Luna & Cassell, supra note 359, at 1-5 (discussing growing public and
political opposition to mandatory minimum sentencing).
5 10. See generally Symposium: Radical Proposals to Reform Legal Pedagogy, 43
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 595 (2008).
511. From the Editors, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 330, 330 (2006).
512. Anxious educators may be reassured by distinguishing comparative law
scholarship-portrayed in the literature as "a very serious business, which, accordingly,
starts to look very much as something for only those truly initiated," Husa, supra note 467,
at 920-from comparative law teaching. Moreover, the growing pedagogical interest in
comparative criminal law and procedure has produced books and articles aimed at
facilitating the incorporation of transnational perspectives into criminal justice coursework.
See generally CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2d ed.
2007); STEPHEN C. THAMAN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A CAsEBOOK APPROACH
(2002); Symposium: Transnational Criminal Law and Procedure, 56 J. LEGAL EDuC. 430
(2006); Comparative Law Symposium: Is There a European Advantage in Criminal
Procedure?, 100 W. VA. L. REv. 763 (1998); Luna, Comparative Criminal Procedure, supra
note 310; see also supra note 491 (referencing discussions of comparative materials on
prosecutors).
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Instead, this Article has merely tried to prime the discussion by
highlighting an overarching trend that seems to have gone unnoticed in
comparative criminal justice scholarship. This development is larger than
plea bargaining, which is but a part of a bigger phenomenon, extending
beyond Germany and France to the entirety of Europe and, we suspect, to
all reaches of the common law and civil law world. The intercontinental
convergence is toward greater authority of the public prosecutor, especially
a power to adjudicate criminal cases with little or no judicial oversight. The
issue raises serious concerns in Europe, despite the training and culture of
its prosecutors, indoctrinated with a judicial mindset of impartiality and the
centrality of truth-finding and fairness. Given the persistence of adversarial
combat and harsh punishment in the United States, prosecutorial
adjudication deserves at least as much attention on this side of the Atlantic.
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Appendix 1. Number of Cases by Case-Ending Decision
Case-Ending Type England and France Germany The Netherlands Poland Sweden
Wales
Simple Drop 148,000 407,451 1,754,603 13,995 297,493 107,003
Public Interest Drop 13,000 1 325,192 505,125 11,808 na. 22,283
Conditional Disposal 152,000 343,497 252,635 81,819 Nna.
Penal Order na. 133,403 623,021 na. [b 24,626
Negotiated Settlements da. n.d.a. na.
t
' n.a. 169,006 ma.
Full Trial Before Court
t 9
] 1,491,000 532,279 382,286 160,594 246,052 116,204
This statistical comparison excludes cases in which no suspect was found (which are passed on to the prosecution service in France and
Germany). The data for Sweden are from 2002; the data for the other countries are from 2004.
SThis option is available to prosecutors but is not used in a statistically relevant number of cases.
Until 2009, negotiated settlements were not foreseen by statute but are tolerated by the courts under certain circumstances. Although
the category of cases taken to court includes such settlement, research has been piecemeal and no reliable statistical estimate can be
provided.
tat Except for Poland. this figure includes a large proportion of cases involving a guilty plea and thin the potential of plea bargaining.
Appendix 2. Percentage of Cases by Disposal Category
Disposal Category France Germany The Poland"] Sweden
Netherlands
Cases Brought Before a Court 9.7 12.3 61.1 32.2 56.2
Sanctions Imposed by the Prosecutort'l 5.4 11.9 - 12.6
Conditional Disposals by the Prosecutor2.48 290.8-
without a Formal Verdict 2548 2. .
Proceedings Dropped in Combination 4.8 --- - 7.7
with a Cautioning of the Suspect
Proceedings Dropped Unconditionally Due to Lack 6.0 21.8 300.5 23.5
of Public Interest or for Efficiency Reasons3.
Proceedings Dropped for Legal or Factual Reasans 11.0 27.4 5.0 20.4 -




l - 21.8 1.2 -
The European Sourcebook doesnot have meaningful data for England and Wales. Foe the available statistics for England and Wales,
see Lewis, The Evolving Role, supro nose 298, Part I.E. The data from Germany. Poland, and Sweden are from 2007; the data for
France and the Netherlands are from 2006
SThe data on Poland are incomplete.
Specifically, this category is eatitled "sanctions imposed by the prosecutor (or by the court, bin on application of the prosecutor and
without a formal court henring) that lead to a formal verdict and count as a conviction." It would include, for instance, penal orders.
tat This category includes, for instance, recommnendatioms of private criminal prosecution and cases transferred to another competent
domestic.
